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Abstract
This thesis presents an original analysis of the firm in economic development as a firm 
that manages a balance sheet from which cash flow may be generated in the usual income 
and expenditure way that is common to most theories of the firm, but also through 
balance sheet operations designed also to maintain the liquidity of the firm. This analysis 
is based on the work of Michal Kalecki, Hyman Minsky and Josef Steindl and extends 
the post-Keynesian understanding of the firm to take account of balance sheet 
management, and applies it to firms emerging in a developing country in the transition 
from a centrally planned economy.
In the Keynesian tradition the banking and finance sectors play three distinct roles for the 
firm sector: financing, funding (replacing short term with long term liabilities) as well as 
providing the means for firms to manage their liquidity in order to protect themselves 
against the unexpected and meet their financial commitments. Hyman Minsky’s balance 
sheet firm is supplemented with insights from Michal Kalecki, Josef Steindl and others to 
suggest that firms are heterogenous in their financing, funding and liquidity management 
strategies, that also vary according to the financial institutions available to the firm. 
Therefore, the impact of financial development on an economy will depend both on the 
dynamics of institutional change and the composition of the enterprise sector. A study of 
Vietnam demonstrates that the approach can help to explain the economic impact of 
financial development. A flow of funds analysis illustrates developments in financial 
flows between key sectors as a result of institutional reform and external capital flows. A 
closer study of the enterprise sector in which firms are organised according to size and 
ownership demonstrates heterogenous responses to financial development.    
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis will present an original analysis of the firm in economic development as both 
a firm that manages a balance sheet from which cash flow may be generated in the usual 
income and expenditure way that is common to most theories of the firm, but also 
through balance sheet operations designed to maintain the liquidity of the firm. Building 
on the work of Michal Kalecki, Hyman Minsky and Josef Steindl it will further make the 
case that as firms may differ in their ability to access outside finance and also manage 
liquidity then financial deepening and the liberalisation of financial markets and the 
banking system (financial development) will not affect firms equally, and the overall 
impact of financial development will depend in part on the composition of the firm 
sector. Moreover, although the ‘balance sheet firm’ adopted in the thesis is developed 
from observations on firm behaviour in developed economies with mature financial 
institutions, key principles behind the approach can be used to elucidate firm behaviour in 
the absence of mature financial institutions, as well as in periods of development. The 
approach proposed in this thesis also suggests a role for the state in the absence of mature 
financial institutions. However, as will be demonstrated in a study of the experience of 
Vietnam, state intervention may be problematic for reasons predicted by the approach 
proposed in the thesis. 
The thesis proceeds in three stages:
First it will be argued that unlike more orthodox theories of the firm the balance sheet 
firm developed in this thesis suggests that firms are heterogenous with respect to the 
financial system in the following ways: the availability of outside finance is a function of 
the firm’s ‘entrepreneurial capital’, therefore the size of investments is in many ways 
linked to the size of the firm. Moreover, in the presence of ‘fundamental uncertainty’ 
firms will seek to manage their liquidity such that they can meet their commitments in the 
event of a shock to their primary business activities. It will be argued after Steindl and 
Kalecki that ‘small’ and ‘large’ firms are able to manage liquidity in different ways, with 
larger firms better able to survive the impact of shocks. 
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Second, it will be argued that firms, therefore, interact with the finance and banking 
sector in different ways. This is particularly the case in developing countries where 
finance and banking sectors are under development. Moreover, it may be the case that the 
strategies of firms in developing countries may differ from firms in developed capitalist 
economies with mature financial sectors (the concern of Steindl and Kalecki). Firms may 
also adapt their strategies in response to the development of financial institutions. 
Third, as developing countries lack large concentrations of entrepreneurial capital, and 
financial services are underdeveloped then there is a case for government intervention in 
the allocation of rents and the financing of large firms undertaking capital intensive 
projects. Assuming that the distinctions between large and small firms are valid then this 
has implications for government policy with respect to the firm sector, and particularly 
with regard to the financial activities of state supported firms and other large firms as the 
finance sector develops. As post-Keyensian models tend to invert the relationship 
between savings and investment this has further implications for the financing of the firm 
sector, depending on the distribution of profits in the economy.
These ideas will be explored in the context of Vietnam, a country that has gradually 
undertaken substantial reform of its enterprise sector and finance and banking sector and 
that has experienced recent large inflows of foreign capital. The Vietnamese government 
has also supported a state owned enterprise sector that is gradually being granted 
autonomy. State firms are, over time, being forced to become less reliant on the state for 
finance and liquidity and begin to operate in response to market signals. Moreover, state 
firms, themselves, are far from homogenous and are responding to economic and 
financial development in different ways.
As this thesis is not a straightforward test of a hypothesis, but an exploration of the 
import of a set of theoretical ideas a particular methodological approach will be followed. 
This will be presented in the next section and will be followed by an outline of the thesis.
1.1. Methodology
A key methodological debate in economics is that between positivism and critical 
realism. The debate rests on the epistemological and ontological distinctions between 
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different approaches to the study of economic life. Table 1 presents the differences 
between positivism and critical realism.
Table 1: Positivism and Critical Realism
Source: Adapted from Courvisanos and Mackenzie (2011)
Critical realism is most closely associated with the work of Roy Bhaskar (1978). A 
distinctive feature, and the departure from more positivist approaches is the emphasis on 
the underlying mechanisms that cause events, rather than the events themselves 
(Courvisanos and Mackenzie 2011).
Rather than locate the field of study in a single, objective reality critical realism asserts 
that there are three levels to reality - the real, the empirical and the actual. Empirical 
observations - observed phenomena - are understood to be related to underlying 
structures that need to be understood if phenomena is to be explained. Positivist 
approaches, on the other hand, are content with observed relationships between (sense 
observed) empirical phenomena. Causality is induced from event regularities, and there is 
no attempt to identify causal mechanisms (Courvisanos and Mackenzie 2011).  Second, 
whilst positivist approaches in economics tend to call upon a limited range of research 
methods, critical realism advocates that the choice of method should depend on the object 
of study (Lawson 2003). Third, the analyst brings with them ideology and experience. 
Whilst the world is considered to be separate and independent of the observer, impartial 
Ontology
Epistemology
Axiology
Causation
Generalisation
Primary mode of inference
Positivism
Single objective reality
Knower and knowledge are 
independent
Inquiry is value free
Detectable through detection of 
event regularities
Time and context free 
generalisations from event 
observation possible 
Induction
Critical Realism
Domains of real, actual and 
empirical
Knower inseparable from 
transitive dimension of knowledge
Inquiry is value-laden but not 
value-bound.
Causation unrelated to event 
regularity, but explained by 
underlying causal mechanisms and 
how they produce observable 
events.
Generalisations from underlying 
causal mechanisms more reliable 
than from event observation
Retroduction
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observation is impossible. Finally, the social world is assumed to be ‘open’  (‘event 
regularities are not ubiquitous… due to the multiple, and perpetually shifting mix of, 
causes of events’ (Lawson 1999)), although event regularities are assumed to occur 
‘under specific conditions, in certain realms’ (Lawson 1999). Because the social world is 
not and cannot be ‘closed’, event regularities cannot be explained using analytical tools 
that are themselves confined to closed systems. In essence statements of the type ‘if event 
x, then event y’, are non-sensical (Graca Moura and Martins 2008). Nevertheless, critical 
realists do not deny that event regularities do occur. They are, ex-post, regularly 
observed. There may, however, be different causes, and event x need not always and 
everywhere give rise to event y, for reasons to be found in the underlying structures of the 
social realm. These are termed ‘demi-regularities’.
The primary objective of critical realist analysis, therefore, is the uncovering of the 
fundamental causes of phenomena or ‘retroduction’:
‘What emerges as essential in science, then, is not the framing of 
event regularities but rather the movement from observations on 
specific phenomena to hypotheses about their underlying causes.’ 
(Graca Moura and Martins 2008, p. 205)
Despite the emphasis on open systems critical realists do accept that some degree of 
‘abstraction’ is often necessary, and have been criticised accordingly (Blaug 2003). 
Critical realism’s notion of ‘abstraction’ however does not imply the exclusion of that 
which is not under study. Instead, phenomena of interest is brought ‘into focus’; crucially, 
what is out of focus is still understood to have influence. Mainstream economics, on the 
other hand, is criticised for ‘isolating’ aspects of the social world, and so denying the 
possible impact of excluded phenomena (Lawson 1999). This is defended on the grounds 
of ceteris paribus, or the need to develop certain concepts prior to their analysis in the 
social sphere  (Blaug 2003). Proponents of critical realism in turn argue that only if 
ceteris paribus is realistic is this permissible, and it rarely is (Graca Moura and Martins 
2008). Moreover, whilst modelling something in an artificial closed system may have 
some merit it makes no sense then to apply it to an open system (ibid.). This leads 
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proponents of critical realism to deny certain methodologies, in particular econometrics, 
abstract mathematics and models.
Some post-Keynesians, chiefly Lawson (1999) and Dow (1999) adopt critical realism in 
order to distinguish themselves methodologically from mainstream economics, and also 
to provide themselves with greater coherence as a school. This has met with opposition 
on a number of grounds. Walters and Young (1999) argue that economists such as 
Davidson and Lavoie included in the post-Keynesian cannon are essentially realist: their 
concerns are primarily substantive theoretical issues and the relationships between 
empirical phenomena. For one reason or another they have not engaged in 
methodological debates or explicitly explored underlying structures in order to explain 
their observed relationships between empirical variables. Others - Straffa and Kalecki are 
named - also use deductive techniques, and so would be excluded from the the post-
Keynesian school if critical realism was determined to be its methodological basis. 
As this thesis draws closely on the work of Kalecki it is worth considering further his 
merits as a critical realist. Whilst it is true that he did develop mathematical models and 
make use of econometrics, as Walters and Young (1999) argue he had much in common 
with critical realist approaches. On one level his analysis of the macro economy drew 
heavily on manipulation of national accounting identities (also called upon in this thesis). 
These, whilst essentially empirical observations, can be considered as ‘abstractions’ in the 
sense described by Lawson (1999). Kalecki himself also understood the parameters of 
such equations to take on different meaning depending on the institutional structure in 
question. For example, in responding to Polish critics who argued that his extended 
Harrod Domar model was an attempt to develop a ‘universal theory of growth’, Kalecki,
‘noted that, on the contrary, ‘to each social system there 
corresponds an appropriate theory of growth’, a claim that he 
supported by ‘showing that the same formula for the rate of 
growth of national income should be interpreted in a different 
fashion depending on the social system we deal with’. In a 
socialist economy the three coefficients m, a and u were all 
determined on the supply side, the first two by the decisions of 
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the planning authorities. In a capitalist economy, in contrast, both 
u and m were demand-determined, to a greater or lesser degree. 
‘The formula will remain entirely correct in a laisser-faire 
capitalist economy’, he concluded, ‘but the interpretation of the 
coefficients is quite different”
(Jefferson and King 2011, p. 968)
Jefferson and King go on to identify Kalecki’s ‘basic methodological principles’ 
as to:
‘always deal explicitly with a capitalist system, not with a 
classless, non-monetary, simple commodity-producing economy; 
use formal analysis where it is useful, including mathematics, 
charts and diagrams and statistical analysis; but never forget that 
these techniques are employed in connection with the real 
problems of a real capitalist economy’.
(Jefferson and King 2011, p. 966)
Jan Toporowski (1991) suggests further that Kalecki’s theoretical arguments are ‘directed 
by plainly empirical considerations’, and deployed in order to ‘identify the determinants 
of those variables and processes that were of crucial importance to policy-
makers’ (Toporowski, 1991, p. 93, quoted in Jefferson and King 2011). 
One difficulty adopting Kalecki’s theories in empirical study is that the analyst has a 
good idea as to underlying causality behind observed relationships, and moreover, as 
suggested above although Kalecki’s economic models are abstract in the critical realist 
sense they are intended to represent the capitalist economy as a closed system (as defined 
by Lawson). This notion that a social system can contain fixed relationships, or event 
regularities comprises an essential component of Andrew Brown’s critique of critical 
realism in economics and his concept of ‘systematic abstraction’ (Brown et al. 2002, 
2007).
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Whilst sympathetic to critical realism and its aims Brown et al. argue that there are 
methodological difficulties in the ‘synthesis stage’ of analysis: 
‘Lawson’s account of abstraction is, in our view, highly 
insightful, offering much to critical realism and to social theory 
more generally. It is an account that is intimately bound up with, 
and serves to illuminate from a new angle, the general critical 
realist approach to method in social science. Our key argument, 
however, is that the critical realist account of abstraction, and 
hence the critical realist method in general, is slanted in focus 
(this applies not just to Lawson, but to all critical realist literature 
on the topic). Overriding emphasis is given to the ‘abstract’ stage 
of science, namely the movement from the apparent to the real. 
The scientist who seeks to reconstruct the concrete using 
knowledge gained from abstract sciences is little helped by 
critical realism. In alternative Marxist terminology, critical 
realism, insofar as it offers insight on method, emphasises the 
‘method of enquiry’ to the neglect of the ‘method of 
presentation’. The aim is to locate the ‘real essence’ of 
phenomena; the corresponding ‘synthesis’ moment of science 
involved in reintegrating the concrete is relatively ignored.’
(Brown et al. 2002, p. 779)
Instead, they argue that rather than isolate ‘localised’ demi-regularities the analyst can 
identify ‘system wide’ event regularities that are ‘defined over a collection of individuals 
across the capitalist system, rather than being restricted to a particular individual or local 
group of individuals’ (Brown 2007). The crucial distinction is that such system wide 
event regularities define the system - Brown is concerned with those that characterise the 
Capitalist system. In their absence the system would collapse:
‘Collective event regularities can be shown to contradict the 
critical realist analysis of event regularities. Consider the example 
of ‘purchasing power’. For any individual commodity, to be sure, 
Chapter 1: Introduction 25
the purchasing power that it confers upon its owner need not be 
actualized, i.e. the commodity may not be sold. Therefore, from 
the immediate, local perspective of individual commodity 
owners, the sale of commodities is not an absolutely strict event 
regularity. But if commodities in general did not exchange at 
appropriate ratios, for more than but a few days, then the 
distribution of resources that must occur if the necessities of life 
are to be maintained, in a commodity producing economy, would 
not in fact occur and the social system would collapse, the 
purchasing power of commodities along with it. Thus the 
collective actualization of purchasing power, i.e. the widespread 
exchange of commodities across the system as a whole, is a 
strictly regular occurrence for the duration of the existence of 
capitalism.’
(Brown 2007, p. 509)
This leads Brown to take issue with the critical realist assertion that social reality is many 
layered. Instead, ‘the conclusion to be drawn, when taking a system-wide and historical 
perspective on capitalism, is that the term ‘social structure’ refers both to social relations 
and to social practices (and vice versa). Contra critical realism, social relations are not 
‘deeper’ than, underlying or interacting with, social activities. Rather, there is one single 
actuality to which concepts of ‘social relation’, ‘social activity’ and ‘social structure’ all 
refer, albeit with differences in emphasis. This actuality is the capitalist system as a 
‘whole in essence’, focused upon by systematic dialectics’ (emphasis in original) (Brown 
2007). This leads Brown to take issue with the research agenda implied by a critical 
realist perspective:
‘…[T]he essential task facing political economy is by no means 
to uncover multiple essences that are somehow ‘deeper’ than the 
ongoing activities of day-to-day life within capitalism. The 
orientation towards the method recommended by critical realism, 
according to the argument above, is quite wrong in this crucial 
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respect. Instead, political economy must reconstruct or reorder, in 
thought, familiar commonsense economic activities, relations, 
monetary forms, etc. so as to fathom their role or function in the 
self-reproducing capitalist system that they constitute. Activities, 
relations and forms initially appear in a confused and partial 
manner within the commonsense notions of everyday capitalistic 
life. Political economy must go beyond the initial confusion in 
order to comprehend how the manifold commonsense entities 
constitute a single, self-reproducing system. Economic theory 
should reveal that, and how, ongoing actualities function in the 
workings of capitalism.’
(Brown 2007, p. 514)
This is pursued in Arestis, Brown and Sawyer (2003) who take issue with the critical 
realist pursuit of ‘yet more hitherto unknown essential structures and mechanisms’ as 
explanations for observed demi-regularities. Instead, the ‘criterion of science must be the 
degree to which the theory developed successfully accounts for the many fundamental 
features of the economy, features already known to the investigator and so in no need of 
hypothesis.’ (Arestis, Brown and Sawyer 2003, p. 5) The theories are a means to shed 
light on the system under study:
‘Abstracting the mode of interconnection of structures, 
mechanisms and events, thus, does yield new knowledge to the 
investigator, but this is not some previously unknown entity, 
rather it is a new found comprehension of the function of given 
entities or aspects within the system that they constitute.’
(Arestis, Brown and Sawyer 2003, p.3)
Such an approach has striking echoes of Josef Schumpeter’s discussions of methodology 
in economics. Like Kalecki, Schumpeter is also accused of falling short of the 
requirements of a true proponent of critical realism. Graca Moura points to his attempt to 
marry concepts confined to a closed system (equilibrium and static models) to a dynamic 
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open system, and argues that the approach is incompatible (Graca Moura 2002). 
Nevertheless, if one disregards the possible shortcomings in his own analysis of business 
cycles and entrepreneurship and looks instead at his discussions of ‘pre-analytic’ vision 
and his ‘instrumentalist’ methodology there are useful insights to be gained, and these 
will serve to guide the analysis in this thesis. 
For Schumpeter any research or analysis stems from the analyst’s ‘vision’ of the world, 
that is itself derived from personal experience, academic training and so forth. This vision 
frames the stating of the problem and the method of enquiry. The analyst forms a number 
of propositions and assumptions and these guide his analysis:
‘[I]n order to be able to posit ourselves any problems at all, we 
should first have to visualize a distinct set of coherent phenomena 
as a worthwhile object of our analytical efforts. In other words, 
analytical effort is of necessity preceded by a preanalytic 
cognitive act that supplies the raw material for the analytic effort. 
In this book, this preanalytic cognitive act will be called Vision.’
(Schumpeter 1954, pp. 41)
Shionoya (2004) argues that Schumpeter introduced instrumentalism into economics, 
although his instrumentalism differs from that associated with the likes of Friedman. The 
role of the theory is to derive useful results that shed some light on the world:
'[Schumpeter] asserted that fitness to reality is a necessary 
condition for a theory to be useful. Fitness of theories to reality 
refers to the ability of theories to describe, organize, and explain a 
body of phenomena, not the predictive value alone, unlike the 
contemporary narrow version of instrumentalism.'
(Shionoya 2004, p. 133)
Schumpeter took issue with the notion that the purpose of empirical economic inquiry 
was the verification of a theory as empirically verifiable or falsifiable:
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‘We must first agree on what we mean by ‘verification.’ Any 
judgment of fact that is not analyzed and elaborated cannot 
actually prove the truth or falsity of a theoretical statement. It 
would not even be true to say that observations of statistical or 
historical facts could show us whether or not a specific theory is 
consistent with them. For a very real relationship may be so 
concealed by other factors that we can understand nothing about 
it without an analysis that digs deeply into the situation itself. 
Therefore only a more modest goal can be attained – namely, to 
ascertain how the relationships asserted by a theory are 
perceptible, or to put it differently, how much a theory contributes 
to an understanding of the situation.’ 
(Schumpeter 1954, p. xiv)
Theory, therefore, is a means to guide the researcher's exploration of available data. In 
this Schumpeter has much in common with Brown’s systematic abstraction and Arestis et 
al’s discussion of the role of the analyst. Moreover, Schumpeter also took a pragmatic 
approach to empirical analysis, recognising that data are not always comprehensive or 
reliable. Quantative data, for example, might not always be available. He suggested three 
criteria when exploring data:
“1. When our theory provides a description that allows 
quantitative expressions in principle, and when the data required 
for a test of that description are given, the theory should entail 
quantitative results that agree with the data.
2. When a theory merely gives a description that does not permit 
any quantitative expression in principle or because of the limited 
availability of data, the theory should make us realize that the fact 
in question is something to be expected by and large on the basis 
of the theory.
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3. When neither is the case, a theory should indicate the concrete 
circumstances or concrete disturbing causes as well as the 
direction and exact or approximate extent of their influences, so 
that one can understand the situation by making appropriate 
modifications.” 
(Schumpeter 1954, p. xv)
For Schumpeter, then, theory is not solely intended to predict but to organise, classify and 
reconstruct 'otherwise chaotic facts'. As for Arestis et al. in applying a ‘vision’ comprised 
of ‘masses of known structures, mechanisms and events’ the analyst can attempt to ‘see 
the wood for the trees’ (Arestis, et al. 2003, p. 5). The first step, though, is to select the 
theory and its components. The analysts then progress to available data. 
The general objective of this thesis is to understand the changing relationship between the 
firm and the financial sector in the process of economic development. However, rather 
than adopting the propositions (or event regularities) commonly associated with more 
mainstream approaches it will develop an approach to the firm derived from the works of 
a number of post-Keynesians, with a particular emphasis on Michal Kalecki and Josef 
Steindl. It will isolate a series of relationships that are sensitive to institutional 
developments in the banking sector, asset markets and also those institutions that 
determine capital flows, and explore their implications for our understanding of financial 
development in developing countries and its effect on the firm and the enterprise sector as 
a whole. It is worth emphasising that, in the spirit of critical realist approaches, it will 
always be born in mind that other factors are at play, and that it cannot be claimed that 
the topics discussed in this thesis are the only explanatory factors. 
This thesis will be structured as follows:
Although the thesis will use a post-Keynesian approach to the firm it is acknowledged 
that other approaches to the firm are also valid and have explanatory power. However, it 
will be argued in Chapter 2 that most more mainstream approaches to the firm stem from 
a set of assumptions and propositions that exclude the possibility of the the approach 
developed in the remainder of the thesis. Such approaches, it is argued, stem both from a 
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different pre-analytic vision (or visions) and, for the most part, are derived from analysis 
in closed systems. As such, if Lawson’s critique of mainstream economics is accepted, 
the application of such models to open systems has limited explanatory value. 
Chapter 3 will develop a particular aspect of the post-Keynesian firm from the works of 
Michal Kalecki and Josef Steindl, also making use of Hyman Minsky’s ‘balance sheet 
firm’. The objective of the chapter will be to identify a series of ‘event-regularities’ or 
propositions that are derived from the vision and analysis of Kalecki and Steindl. The 
chapter will suggest that strategies for liquidity management depend on firm size and 
market power. These differences are a source of heterogeneity among firm populations 
that imply the interaction between firms and the finance sector is dependent on the 
distribution of entrepreneurial capital, the type, size and availability of asset markets and 
impacts on the size and quality of investments as well as the rates of firm survival.   
Chapter 4 will present and critique the financial liberalisation hypothesis from a post-
Keynesian perspective. It will then introduce post-Keynesian literature of firm financing 
and firm funding in developing countries. It will then argue that strategies for financing, 
funding and liquidity management depend on underlying institutional structures that 
generally change over time. The outcome of financial liberalisation will depend on the 
composition of the enterprise sector and firm strategies in response to new asset markets 
and banking regulations. The outcome of Chapters 3 and 4 will be a series of propositions 
that will then be explored in an analysis of a Vietnam, a developing country that has 
undertaken a series of reforms of its enterprise, finance and banking sectors in the context 
of fluctuating capital inflows.
Chapters 5 to 7 will be an empirical study of Vietnam. The objective is not to ‘explain’ 
recent Vietnamese economic history, but to adopt Schumpeter’s methodological approach 
with the objective of exploring the validity and implications of the ‘pre-analytic vision’ 
and propositions developed in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 5 will present the developments 
in the financial sector, the banking sector and the enterprise sector since 1975. This will 
serve as an account of the changing institutional structures in Vietnam. Chapter 6 is a 
flow of funds analysis of Vietnam since the mid-1990s. This will serve two purposes. The 
first is to illustrate how changing institutions affected aggregate capital flows and the net 
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position of the enterprise sector in relation to the government, banking and foreign sector. 
It will also explore the funding, financing and liquidity management behaviour of 
different types of firm in light of institutional developments and foreign capital flows. 
Chapter 7 will look more closely at the strategies of firms in Vietnam in the context of 
financial development and enterprise sector reform. Case studies of different categories 
of firm will be used to identify the means by which firms manage liquidity and finance 
and fund investments. An analysis of of the balance sheets of firms listed on the Hanoi 
Stock exchange will explore the uses firms make of the proceeds from stock issues. 
Chapter 8 will conclude.
Chapter 2: The Abstract Firm
…‘Economic Evolution is gradual... And though an inventor, or 
an organiser, or a financier of genius may seem to have modified 
the economic structure of a people almost as a stroke; yet that 
part of his influence... [has] done little more than bring to a head 
a broad constructive movement which had long been in 
preparation. Those manifestations of nature which occur most 
frequently, and are so orderly that they can be watched and 
narrowly studied, are the basis of economic as of most scientific 
work...’
(Marshall 1997, p. xiv)
‘In the literature of economics the firm of the real world has long 
lived in that uncomfortable no-man’s-land between the high and 
dry plateaus of ‘pure theory’ and the tangled forests of ‘empiric-
realistic’ research’.
(Penrose 1995, p. 9)
2.  
2.1. Introduction
This and the following chapter are intended to introduce contrasting approaches to the 
firm in order to demonstrate (in Chapter 4) that our understanding of the impact of 
financial development and financial deepening on the economies of developing countries 
depends, in part, on the approach to the firm chosen.
This chapter argues that for non post-Keynesian approaches there are no a priori 
differences between firms in their relationship with the finance sector, and so in the 
impact of financial development on firms in a developing economy. The resolution of 
market failures in finance sectors impacts all firms equally, and a posteriori differences 
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are predominantly the result of entrepreneurial and managerial ability and historical 
accident. In approaches to the firm that are not built on theories of market failure such as 
the resource based view difference predominantly lies in the ability of the entrepreneur to 
negotiate finance with representatives of the banking and finance sectors. This approach, 
it is argued, is in the Marshallian tradition, in that it posits a ‘representative firm’, whose 
characteristics can be assumed to apply to all firms, although empirically they may differ. 
This contrasts with post-Keyensian approaches to the firm discussed in Chapter 3 that 
point to explicit differences between firms, and in the work of among others, Josef 
Steindl, Alfred Eichner and Michal Kalecki, differences between firms in the nature of 
their interaction with the finance sector. These a priori differences suggest that the impact 
of financial development on an economy will depend in part on the composition of the 
enterprise sector. 
This chapter will be organised as follows. Section 2.2 will introduce Alfred Marshall’s 
theory of the representative firm, some critiques and Marshall’s own doubts as to its 
validity. Section 2.3 will discuss three approaches to the firm, which take as their 
foundation the idea that firms primarily exist as a means for economic agents to 
overcome market failure. Adopting the terminology of Christos Pitelis and David Teece 
these are referred to as ‘market superiority’ approaches (Pitelis and Teece 2009). Section 
2.4 will outline a number of approaches that will be loosely termed ‘resource based’. 
Section 2.5 will conclude.
2.2. Alfred Marshall and the Reconciliation Problem
The notion that all firms can be understood with reference to one homogenous model of 
the firm can be traced at least to Alfred Marshall’s ‘representative firm’. From a 
methodological perspective Marshall seems to have been caught somewhere between the 
positivist position and something resembling critical realism. He took the approach that 
the economist should study the economy with a lens derived from modelling within a 
closed system. However, he also appears to have recognised that working on economic 
phenomena were other forces that were difficult to isolate, but that had an observable 
impact on economic actors. 
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Marshall believed that an economic theory should be derived from empirical observation. 
However, the theorist should be careful to distinguish one-off historical events from 
underlying and universal trends. Marshall himself contrasted his Principles of Economics 
with Trade and Industry along these lines. Principles was an exploration of the 
phenomena so frequently recurring they could be incorporated into a general model of 
economic life. Trade and Industry was an analysis of the ‘superstructure’, which 
displayed the results of ‘constructive movement’ and historical anomaly in equal 
measure. Pratten (1998) discusses these tensions in Marshall’s work, arguing that 
ultimately, 
‘Marshall's inability to escape this inappropriate image of science 
stifles any systematic elaboration of a structured ontology. 
Regarding the second volume, his initial indecision, frustrated 
progress, and final abandonment reflect the stalemate Marshall 
seems to have reached. He appears unable to move forward and 
address in a sustained manner the issues he identifies as important 
since he lacks a conception of science that would encourage such 
elaborations. At the same time he is unwilling to step back 
because of the limitations he increasingly associates with his 
statical treatment.’
(Pratten 1998, pp. 159-160)
The capitalist firm presented particular difficulties to Marshall. As a legal entity it clearly 
existed. However, it was difficult to isolate the forces it represented. Late in Principles it 
become apparent to Marshall that if firms could benefit from internal economies of scale 
then it was possible that individual or small groups of firms might come to dominate 
industries. In the process they would undermine the concept of equilibrium, the key 
organising principle of Marshall’s model. Economies of scale would ‘give a very great 
advantage to large producers’ and production could fall ‘entirely into the hands of a few 
large firms.’ If this happened ‘the normal supply price cannot be isolated’ and prices 
would instead be ‘influenced by the incidents of the campaign between rival producers, 
each struggling for an extension of territory, as scarcely to have a true normal 
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level’ (Marshall 1997, p. 316). Marshall referred to this as the ‘reconciliation problem’: 
how to reconcile the existence of equilibrium with the implications of large scale internal 
economies. He developed two solutions to the problem. One was to argue that in most 
industries firms would face such difficulties expanding the market for their output that the 
advantages derived from large scale production would disappear. The other was to equate 
the lifecycle of the firm with that of the entrepreneur. In this way individual firms would 
be unable to fully exploit any available internal economies (Hart 1996): 
‘Nature still presses on the private business by limiting the length 
of the life of its original founders, and by limiting even more 
narrowly the part of their lives in which their faculties remain full 
of vigour. And so, after a while, the guidance of the business falls 
into the hands of people with less energy and less creative genius, 
if not with less active interest in its prosperity’.
(Marshall 1997, p. 316)
At any moment ‘one can discern one particular size of firm which is in a sense normal: it 
is neither a young, growing firm, nor a decaying firm; that it is not a firm of unusually big 
size or with unusual advantages; that the normal economies that can be got in this 
industry (with the given size of the industry) are open to firms of such a representative 
size; and that the representative firm tends to increase in size as the industry 
expands’ (Marshall 1997, p.316). Marshall elaborates the point with a metaphor of a 
forest, in which a tree might grow more vigorously than others, but after some time ‘age 
tells on them all...  and [although] the taller ones have better access to light and air than 
their rivals, they gradually lose vitality; and one after another they give their place to 
others’ (Marshall 1997, p. 316). 
In the 1920s Marshall’s representative firm became the subject of the ‘cost controversy’, 
in which the implication of scale economies for equilibrium (and so Marshall’s solution 
to the reconciliation problem) was hotly debated1. In the debate Lionel Robbins argued 
that Marshall’s representative firm was a superfluous afterthought:
1. See Sraffa et al. (1930) and Harcourt and Blankenburg (2002)
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‘There is no more need for us to assume a representative firm or 
representative producer, than there is for us to assume a 
representative piece of land, a representative machine, or a 
representative worker. All that is necessary for equilibrium to 
prevail is that each factor shall get at least as much in one line of 
production as it could in any other: as much of course, including 
all advantages and disadvantages of work, hiring or investment’.
(Robbins 1928, p.28)
Robbins went on to argue that it was not a ‘statistically average firm’. It would ‘only 
emerge arithmetically under conditions when all present tendencies to change had 
reached a state of equilibrium’ (Robbins 1928). Moreover, individual firms themselves 
need not be in equilibrium, as long as in aggregate they are. Marshall himself had 
allowed for variety within the population of firms in an economy, with respect to 
entrepreneurial ability, cost structure and innovative performance (Foss 1994). 
With regard to theories of the firm the cost controversy allowed for two possible 
conclusions: that Marshall’s representative firm was excessively abstract, but unnecessary 
as long as equilibrium conditions were met2. Attention should instead be directed at 
investigating the characteristics and behaviour of the firm in an equilibrating world. Or, if 
equilibrium was impossible, and monopolistic competition dominated in a world 
characterised by internal economies then an altogether new approach should be 
developed. 
Towards the end of his life Marshall grappled with this question, asking whether his 
representative firm and the owner/ manager firm were a true reflection of the forces at 
work. Since the emergence of the joint-stock company the entrepreneur had detached 
himself from the firm, and firms could grow independently of the energies of the owner. 
‘Vast joint-stock companies’ can ‘in favourable circumstances... secure a permanent place 
in the work of production’ (Marshall 1997, p. 316). Marshall seems to have sided in the 
2. There is, however, a view that Marshall abandoned the second volume of Principles because he no longer 
subscribed to the neo-classical research programme, particularly the implications of internal returns to scale 
for static equilibrium. See (Thomas 1991) and (Moss 1990). 
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end with his initial assessment, arguing that such companies would eventually see their 
‘force’ diminish in the face of competition from younger and smaller rivals  (Hart 1996).
The significance of Marshall’s representative firm is difficult to measure. In one respect 
Robbins was right. It was simply an instrument adopted by Marshall to ensure the 
stability of his model. It was not intended as a theory of the capitalist firm. If, as Robbins 
maintained, Marshall’s model stands up to scrutiny without it, then it loses much of its 
significance. On the other hand Marshall’s own fear was that if diversified joint-stock 
companies that exhibited internal returns to scale proved to be significant manifestations 
of nature then the model developed in his Principles would require significant revision. 
The remainder of this chapter will argue that the majority of those who have concerned 
themselves with developing a theory of the capitalist firm have sided with Marshall. 
Those that did not, discussed in the following chapter, take as their point of a departure 
an altogether different economic system, with implications for our understanding of the 
economic impact of financial development.   
2.3. The Firm as an Antidote to Market Failure
This section outlines ‘market superiority’3 approaches to the firm in which the firm is 
derived from the presence of market failures. It will outline three dominant approaches, 
each of which has inspired a large literature. Section 2.3.1 will discuss the contributions 
of Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson, loosely termed the ‘Transaction Costs’ 
approach4. Section 2.3.2 will focus on the work of Harold Demsetz and Armen Alchian, 
who expanded the market superiority approach further. Section 2.3.3 will discuss the 
evolutionary approach, associated with Nelson and Winters. 
2.3.1. Coase and Williamson: Transaction Costs
In 1937 Ronald Coase sought to develop a theory of the firm that was ‘not only realistic 
in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by two 
of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea 
3. The phrase is borrowed from Pitelis and Teece (2009) 
4. Also often referred to as ‘managerial theories of the firm’. 
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of the margin and that of substitution, together giving the idea of substitution at the 
margin’ (Coase 1937, pp. 386-387). He began his analysis with the observation that the 
coordinating mechanism at work in the ‘economic system as it is normally treated by the 
economist’5 ‘does not apply’ in the firm, where a hierarchy takes precedence over the 
price system:
‘A firm, therefore, consists of the system of relationships which 
comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent 
on the entrepreneur.’
(Coase 1937, p.393)
According to Coase the entrepreneur is always calculating the costs of ‘exchange 
transactions’ and asking whether they are greater when conducted within the boundaries 
of his firm, or according to the market mechanism. Firms exist when the entrepreneur 
concludes that he can manage transactions more cheaply within the structure of a firm 
than in the open market. Size then becomes a function of entrepreneurial ability and 
limits to size subject to ‘diminishing returns to management’:
‘Other things being equal, therefore, a firm will tend to be larger:
a. the less the costs of organising and the slower these costs rise 
with an increase in the transactions organised.
b. the less likely the entrepreneur is to make mistakes and the 
smaller the increase in mistakes with an increase in the 
transactions organised.
c. the greater the lowering (or the less the rise) in the supply price 
of factors of production to firms of larger size.’
(Coase 1937, p. 397)
Despite claims to realism Coase’s firm is confined to a world defined by its degree of 
deviation from a perfect neo-classical representation of an abstract economy. Coase’s 
firm exists as a response to market failure and, like Marshall’s representative firm, it must 
5. The ‘economic system’ he referred to was that ‘given by Sir Arthur Salter’. 
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be subject to the rules that govern economic agents in a neoclassical model, albeit with 
the possibility that some assumptions are relaxed. Coase pointed to uncertainty, as 
developed by Frank Knight, as the most prominent market failure. Coase’s most 
important disciple was Oliver Williamson who sought to explain economic organization 
using the transaction as his unit of analysis. Williamson built on Coase by exploring the 
relationship between the characteristics of assets and economic transactions:
‘Although Coase was intrigued with the possibility that the 
characteristics of assets played a crucial role in the choice of firm 
or market and in the design of long term contracts, he decided 
against making this his central feature’.
(Williamson and Winter 1991, p. 6). 
Williamson’s analysis was based on three building blocks (each a form of market failure): 
A. Humans are opportunistic,
B. Humans are subject to bounded rationality,
C. Certain assets gain their value from combination with other assets. 
On their own they are worth less. Williamson termed this ‘asset 
specificity’.
All three give rise to transaction costs, and provide for the possibility that hierarchies are 
a superior organisational form to the price mechanism. Firms are the archetypal hierarchy 
and, as a coalition of economic agents bound together by a nexus of contracts, they 
provide the means to minimise transaction costs. This becomes the raison d’être of the 
firm, and, for Williamson, most if not all phenomena can be explained with reference to 
the costs involved in managing the use of assets. For example, the financing structure of a 
company will be a function of the assets jointly owned by the firm’s owners:
‘If a firm’s assets are plastic and costly to monitor, moral hazard 
costs arise with debt... Once indebted the equity holders do not 
bear the full downside losses on projects. Their incentive is to 
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increase risk taking, because the bondholders will bear part of the 
risks of the downside losses, but the equity holders get all the 
gains’.
(Alchian and Woodward 1987, p. 124)
This provides an example of some of the difficulties posed by market failure explanations 
of the firm. It is undoubtedly true that phenomena such as asset specificity, plasticity and 
moral hazard must be considered if contracts are to be of any use. Much is to be gained 
from doing so. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 3 there are other factors that 
might influence a firm’s debt to equity ratio. Moreover, the ability of a firm to finance an 
investment on the back of an existing revenue flow from a different bundle of assets may 
also have an influence. The problem for Williamson is that these other factors also need 
to be explained within the confines of the model, which can prove problematic if they 
themselves are developed from assumptions excluded from the model. 
Market superiority firms operate in a ‘specialised exchange economy’, in which the act of 
exchange according to price signals is emphasised. Production is reduced to the outcome 
of the exchange of assets and forms of knowledge subject to market failure type 
constraints. Production of goods and services for sale is relevant in as much as exchange 
transactions embodied in the production process have costs. Size is also determined from 
within the model. Like Marshall Coase found a way -  diminishing returns to 
management - to play down the impact of internal economies in economic affairs. 
Ultimately, the firm’s size depends on the physical assets held by the firm and the 
associated transactions and their costs. Its survival is predicated on the ability of its 
management to find efficient solutions to the problems of governance of these same 
transaction costs. This provides a role for management and human agency. Failure to 
maintain revenues above costs (which may or may not prove to be a function of 
managerial incompetence) will reveal an alternative form of organisation to be superior.
2.3.2. Alchian, Demsetz and the Importance of Teamwork
Like Williamson, Harold Demsetz agreed with Coase that the relaxation of central neo-
classical assumptions is an important contribution to the development of a theory of the 
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firm, specifically assumptions of perfect knowledge, competent management and 
functioning markets. However, he took issue with Coase’s opposition between market 
and firm, arguing that Coase’s non-firm is not neo-classical economics’ non-firm. Coase 
had implied that firms would only exist in the presence of positive transaction costs. If 
they were zero then there would only be single person firms responding to price signals 
to allocate resources for production. Specialisation would reign supreme, and there would 
be no need for management coordination. According to Demsetz, in the neo-classical 
system firms and markets do exist along side zero transaction costs:
‘What parades as perfect competition is a model that has much to 
say about the price system, but little to say about competition or 
the organisation of firms... what is modelled is not competition 
but extreme decentralisation.’
(Williamson and Winter 1991, p. 160)
Instead firms and markets complement each other: markets are a space for the exchange 
of goods produced by firms. If the costs of operating within the price system were to rise 
the tendency would be toward self-sufficiency, rather than the establishment of firms: 
production for oneself, rather than for exchange. Demsetz uses this argument to extend 
the role of management in the presence of an extra class of imperfect information:
“The firm’ in the theory of price is simply a rhetorical devise 
adopted to facilitate discussion of the price system... The real 
tasks of management, to devise or discover markets, products and 
production techniques, and actively to manage the actions of 
employees, have no place in the perfect decentralisation model 
because it assumes that all products, markets, production 
techniques, and prices are fully known at zero cost’.
(Williamson and Winter 1991, p. 161) 
Moreover, according to Demsetz, managers’ maximising decisions are not costless, as 
assumed by Coase and Williamson and the resources required to make such decisions 
cannot be treated as ‘not scarce’.
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Demsetz, along with Armen Alchian (1972) argued instead that the firm is actually the 
market by another name. To downplay the distinction they suggested firms should 
actually be referred to as ‘economic organisations’. In certain conditions resource owners 
are able to increase productivity ‘through cooperative specialisation’: that is they come 
together to work as ‘teams’. Team members relate to each other through contracts, which, 
bundled together become the firm. A specialist takes responsibility for ‘monitoring’ team 
members to guard against shirking. He receives the ‘residual rewards’ in return. To 
emphasise the absence of power in the system Alchian and Demsetz stated that any other 
member of the team able to realise the role more capably or at lower cost can usurp the 
incumbent residual claimant. Alternative structures - the limited liability company, for 
example - may appear different, however, all are essentially solutions to the shirking 
problem. Stephen Cheung took this approach to its logical extreme, arguing that the 
entire economy is in fact a nexus of contracts  (Cheung 1970, 1983).
Jensen and Meckling (1976) picked up on Alchian and Demsetz, suggesting that their 
approach only applied to ‘team based technology’ . They instead introduced principle - 
agent relations as the most important concept with which to understand the firm. In a 
partial response Demsetz (1997) whilst agreeing that the emphasis on agency is useful 
argued that it cannot be the whole story. Agency considerations provide justification for 
the consideration of management, but so does imperfect knowledge of prices, technology 
and other phenomena. Managers are required to make decisions to guide the firm in 
uncertain waters (‘what product should they produce, at what scale and scope, what about 
marketing and investment?’) However, market failures can still exist and provide a 
challenge for management in a one person firm or a firm devoid of opportunists6. 
Alchian and Demsetz’s approach to the market-superiority firm is a powerful one, but one 
so firmly rooted in the neo-classical model as to almost deny the existence of the firm. 
However, in extending the role of management beyond the control of costs and 
opportunistic behaviour to include more general strategic decisions taken in a world in 
6.  Demsetz offers an aircraft company as an example. Imagine a aircraft construction company with 
accumulated specialist knowledge and the means to expand. It would cost less to move into aircraft 
maintenance than transportation, as it would have to acquire unfamiliar knowledge at extra cost. The problem 
of which direction to take would still exist in the absence of principle - agent relations. 
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which prices are not necessarily known, they allow for a more realistic treatment of 
management. Whereas for Coase and, to a degree Williamson, the firm tended to be a 
means to overcome market failure, and so bring about a more pareto optimum outcome 
than would otherwise exist, Alchian and Demsetz suggest that even purely rational 
residual claimants might make the wrong strategic decisions, leading to sub-optimal 
outcomes. 
2.3.3. Evolutionary Theories of the Firm7
The economic implications of non-optimising firms are most thoroughly explored in 
evolutionary theories of the firm, which are concerned with explaining how the market 
‘selects’8 against some firms, even though no firms necessarily correspond to the pareto 
optimal ideal. An early proponent of the idea was, again, Armen Alchian (1950) who 
argued that at any one time firms in existence were those who were in some way 
consistent with the ‘environment’9:
‘Success (survival) accompanies relative superiority; and, second, 
it does not require proper motivation but may rather be the result 
7. There is something of a debate as to Marshall’s thinking on the role of evolution in economic affairs. See, 
for example, (Moss 1990), (Thomas 1991) and (Hart 2003).
8. Using the concept of evolution to explain economic phenomena has proved controversial. An early debate 
between Alchian and Penrose (1952) concerned the validity of substituting the ‘market’ for the natural 
environment on the grounds that humans, unlike animals and plants, can and do influence their environment 
in their favour.
9. Clément Levallois argues that Alchian’s argument was primarily a statistical one. He simply used evolution 
as a metaphor to facilitate his argument: 
‘Alchian’s handling of the marginal controversy was but one instance of his attempts to reconcile the existing 
analytical framework of economics with relevant aspects of economic reality, through the use of statistical 
arguments. Once this has been recognised, it is realised that Alchian’s solution to the controversy was chiefly 
a statistical one, and secondarily an evolutionary one. The main support to our claim is that Alchian used not 
one but two overlapping analogies in his paper, one of which concerned statistical mechanics. The overlap, it 
is argued, explains why Alchian’s economic natural selection lent itself so easily both to the advocates of 
maximisation and to evolutionary economists.’
(Levallois 2009)
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of fortuitous circumstances. Among all competitors, those whose 
particular conditions happen to be the most appropriate of those 
offered to the economic system for testing and adoption will be 
selected as survivors’.
(Alchian 1950, p. 213)
Despite the influence of Alchian’s theory it was, as Cyert and March argue, ‘a defence of 
orthodoxy’ (Cyert and March 1963, p. 13):
‘...since in the long run firms will survive only if they (by 
whatever process) make the deviations dictated by economic 
theory, the theory will predict the behaviour of viable firms. Since 
only the fittest survive, we need only a theory of fit.’
(Cyert and March 1963, p. 15) 
Cyert and March considered their behavioural approach an alternative to the neo-classical 
mainstream. They argued that firms might be selected against not only because of 
unfavourable winds, but because the interaction of people (even under contract) within a 
firm might bring about suboptimal outcomes. They developed a model of the firm that 
derives a firm’s problem solving ability from its operational procedures and routines, 
which in turn are embedded in the firm’s ‘interorganisational division of labour and 
assignments of decision entitlements’ (Dosi and Marengo 2007). In this way the price, 
output and resource allocation decisions (the primary concern of the study) made by a 
firm do not necessarily correspond to those of a rational profit maximising entrepreneur 
of pure neo-classical theory. Cyert and March, like later behavioural theorists, argue that 
once allowances are made for the real workings of economic organisations then it can be 
seen that firms as economic units do not behave as they are expected to in a neat neo-
classical model. This in turn provides an explanation for the prevalence of disequilibrium 
in the real world.
Similarly Sydney Nelson and Richard Winters (Nelson and Winter 1982) argue that the 
orthodox firm sidesteps issues such as the problems of economic organization and the 
retention of knowledge and falsely assumes ‘fully cooperative relations between diverse 
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economic interests’ (Williamson and Winter 1993)10. Instead they regard ‘... the 
understanding of the ongoing, inter-related processes of change in technology and 
organisations as the central intellectual problem to be confronted by a theory of the 
firm’ (Williamson 1988, p. 187). The theoretical building block is firms’ ‘routines’, which 
are the outcome of interaction between people in the firm and over time and became an 
integral part of a firm. Their emdededness means they are difficult to change, and as a 
result they might prove incompatible with the changing environment or inferior to 
competitors’ and so affect a firm’s position in the market. The inability of economic 
organisations to respond promptly and costlessly to external stimuli also suggests a 
degree of path dependence in an economy11 and provides the basis for the argument that 
the establishment of free market institutions will not necessarily lead to the desired 
results.   
Despite its claims the evolutionary theory of the firm can be understood as one more 
elaboration of the market superiority firm, although omitting less of reality than some of 
the alternatives discussed above. Indeed Nelson and Winters themselves claim the 
‘evolutionary scheme subsumes the orthodox one and delineates its proper uses’ (Nelson 
and Winter 1982, p. 73). Whilst introducing routines as a new variable with which to 
understand the operation and survival of firms in an economy Nelson and Winters 
acknowledge that other factors may play a role in determining a firm’s response to 
adversity. However, instead of pursuing these and the implications, both for their own 
theory and for neo-classical theory they ignore them:
‘In reality, a great many factors are involved in determining the 
consequences of sustained adversity - for example, the degree of 
owner versus management control, merger opportunities, tax and 
bankruptcy law considerations, the liquidity or liquidity of a 
firm’s assets, and the state of a firm’s balance sheet when 
adversity began. It is beyond the scope of our present discussion 
to sort out these factors and relate them to the likely persistence 
10. And (Williamson and Winter 1993, p. 187) for a more recent critique by Winter’s of the ‘textbook firm’.
11. See, for example, (Nelson 2008) 
Chapter 2: The Abstract Firm 46
or change in routines. One point perhaps is worth noting here: a 
firm without a viable routine is a firm without a viable truce in 
intraorganisational conflict. That consideration, by itself, affords 
abundant reason to doubt that firms behave in adversity ‘as if’ 
they were under the rational control of a single actor.’
(Nelson and Winter 1982, p. 122)
Whereas Marshall’s representative firm was a means to ensure the existence of 
equilibrium, the market superiority approaches described in this section are derived from 
the existence of market failure, and as an explanation of the sub-optimal distribution of 
resources in a market economy. Firm behaviour and economic dynamics become the 
outcome of a more nuanced understanding of human agency (bounded rationality, 
imperfect information and opportunism, for example), and sluggish responses to market 
signals are accounted for. Although the internal workings of the firm are examined, and, 
particularly in evolutionary models, the findings submitted as an explanation of the 
differences between firms, the economic functions of firms remain the same: to use and 
allocate resources efficiently. (Relative) success is a function of a firm’s ability to 
maintain revenues above costs for an indeterminate period of time. Failure equates to the 
inability of managers to respond effectively to the challenges proposed by the approach in 
question. As Nelson and winters hint other factors might come into play, but these are 
‘beyond the scope of the discussion’. However, as will be argued below, and in the 
following chapter such factors cannot simply be ignored.
2.4. Capabilities Approach
One approach that refuses to limit itself to the confines of a model is the ‘resource based 
view’ (RBV). Originating in the work of Edith Penrose (Penrose 1959) the RBV spawned 
a large and diverse literature. Penrose’s ‘resources’ have now been joined by 
‘capabilities’12 and ‘dynamic capabilities’13. The literature has also generated a large 
12. See, (Teece et al. 1997b), (Teece and Pisano 1994), (Grant 1991), 
13. Unless otherwise stated the term ‘resource based view’ will refer to all variants of the approach for the 
remainder of this chapter.   
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strategic management literature14. The RBV provides an explanation for how and why 
firms grow, and has fuelled a wide literature on ‘learning’, which in turn provides a 
convincing explanation of how economies are able to develop over time. William 
Lazonick, for example, drew heavily on the approach to argue for the decline and fall of 
industries and economies15 and to argue for the importance of the firm as a learning 
institution in capitalist development16. 
The resource based approach to the firm, defines firms as administrators of ‘bundles of 
resources’. Assets bundled together provide greater scope than they would individually. 
However, less tangible assets such as technological know-how or organizational 
capabilities can now be considered. By focussing on capabilities, which are as much a 
‘social’ as a physical asset, the approach pulls back from an analysis of firms in terms of 
what they produce, emphasising instead how they produce things. Firms can, therefore, 
gain competitive advantage in different product markets requiring similar capabilities, 
and are not constrained by the limits to one industry:
‘...with a different concept of the firm one can recognise that a 
‘firm’, when appropriate resources are available, can produce 
anything for which a demand can be found or created, and it 
becomes a matter of taste or convenience whether one speaks of 
the ‘market’ or of the resources of the firm itself as the 
consideration limiting its expansion’.
(Penrose 1959, p.13)
Penrose herself sought to develop a theory built on empirical observation, recognising 
that: 
‘In the literature of economics the firm of the real world has long 
lived in that uncomfortable no-man’s-land between the high and 
14. See, for example, (Barney 1986; Grant 1991; Barney 1995, 2001; Pitellis and Teece 2009).
15. See (Lazonick 1983; Lazonick and Elbaum 1986)
16. See (Lazonick 2002, 2004)
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dry plateaus of ‘pure theory’ and the tangled forests of ‘empiric-
realistic’ research’.
(Penrose 1995, p.9)
She famously stated that ‘...we shall not be involved in any quarrel with the theory of the 
‘firm’ as part of the theory of price and production, so long as it cultivates its garden and 
we cultivate ours’, citing Hicks’ proposition that to dislodge the firm from its key 
position in economic theory would ‘involve the wreckage’ of ‘the greater part of 
equilibrium theory’. She argued that for the sake of equilibrium theorists of the firm had 
required ‘there be something to prevent the indefinite expansion of output’17. Penrose and 
later theorists undermined the edifices of ‘equilibrium theory’, placing the firm and the 
results of its actions at the centre of the story:
‘The very nature of the economy is to some extent defined in 
terms of the kind of firms that compose it, their size, the way in 
which they are established and grow, their methods of doing 
business, and the relationships between them’.
(Penrose 1959, p. 9)
The neo-classical approach to addressing the question of the firm is challenged in other 
ways:
‘That a firm has boundaries follows from the nature of the 
categories we think in, however, not because we can clearly 
observe them in reality. The boundary of the firm is what 
distinguishes it from the market and therefore must ‘exist’ 
whether or not it is ‘real’ since the firm/ market dichotomy has 
been perhaps the major building block of an economist’s 
analytical thinking’.
(Penrose 1959, p. xvi)
17. She included Kalecki’s ‘increasing risk’ as a type of uncertainty.
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In challenging the opposition between market and firm RBV theorists developed 
explanations for cooperation between firms, rather than pure competition18.  
Penrose also took issue with the standard view of firm financing. The RBV assumes firms 
are committed to profit maximisation (albeit over the long term). However, the 
assumption of profit maximisation does not follow from a standard maximisation 
function, rather from the proposition that firms prefer to fund investments and so 
expansion with retained incomes, a cheaper source of funds, as ‘managers [have] no 
desire to pay out to shareholders’:
‘If profits are a condition of successful growth, but profits are 
sought primarily for the sake of the firm, that is to reinvest in the 
firm rather than to reimburse owners for the use of their capital, 
or their ‘risk bearing’, then, from the point of view of investment 
policy, growth and profits become equivalent as the criteria for 
the selection of investment programmes. Firms will never invest 
in expansion for the sake of growth if the return on the 
investment is negative, for that would be self defeating. Firms 
will never invest outside of the firm except eventually to increase 
the funds available for the investment in the firm. To increase 
total long-run profits of the enterprise in the sense discussed here 
is therefore equivalent to increasing the long run rate of growth. 
Hence, it does not matter whether we speak of ‘growth’ or 
‘profits’ as the goal of a firm’s investment activities.’
(Penrose 1959, p.30)
Penrose went a long way to developing an alternative approach to the theory of the firm. 
Her followers were able to develop explanations for firm boundaries, existence and 
18. See (Best 1990), (Foss 1997).
Chapter 2: The Abstract Firm 50
internal organisation that did not take market failure as their starting point19. Unlike 
alternative approaches the resource based approach is, on the whole, not explicitly 
constrained by the parameters of the model it inhabits. As Penrose makes clear firms can 
and do exploit economies of scale and scope, large firms have the advantage over small 
firms and diversification serves a purpose. However, there is little suggestion that scale 
might have implications for the economy at large. In this sense it conforms to Marshall’s 
own view that ‘the history of the individual firm cannot be made into the history of an 
industry any more than the history of an individual can be made into the history of 
mankind’ (Marshall 1997, p. 275). The RBV shares other similarities with Marshall and 
the approaches discussed above. Despite the possibilities for scale and heterogeneity all 
firms have the same ‘economic function’, which is:
‘...assumed simply to be that of acquiring and organizing human 
and other resources in order profitably to supply goods and 
services to the market.’
(Penrose 1959, p.xi)
Growth and development is assumed to be a function of entrepreneurial success: 
‘Enterprise or Entrepreneurship as it is sometimes called, is a 
slippery concept, not easy to work into formal economic analysis, 
because it is so closely associated with the temperament or 
personal qualities of individuals. This extremely personal aspect 
of the growth of individual firms has undoubtedly been one of the 
obstacles in the way of the development of a general theory of the 
growth of firms’’.
(Penrose 1995, p. 2)
Firms fail when they cannot sustain profitability, and maintain revenues above costs. 
Firms of all sizes in all industries are in the same circumstances. As success is related to 
19. See (Barney 1996; Barney and Arikan 2001; Barney et al. 2001), (Teece and Pisano 1994; Teece 1996; 
Teece et al. 1997a, a; Loasby 1998; Pitelis 1998; Loasby 2000; Pitelis 2000; Lockett and Thompson 2001; 
Winter 2003)
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entrepreneurial ability and access to funds is downplayed as a determinant of survival 
success and entrepreneurial ability have a linear relationship. 
The potentially close relationship between the RBV and more mainstream approaches is 
demonstrated by a number of Penrose’s followers, particularly when applying the 
approach in more macro studies20. There have also been a number of attempts to 
consummate the relationship. Montgomery (1995), for example, examines similarities 
and differences between the evolutionary and capabilities approaches. Pitelis and Teece 
(2009), is the most far reaching and demonstrates the persistence of the relationship 
between the neo-classical model and the theory of the firm. Christos Pitelis and David 
Teece argue that ‘Market-failure - Firm Superiority-based theories of the firm’ fail to 
‘explain why firms exist from the situation of ‘no-firms at all’ and fail to ‘capture the role 
of the firm as a market creator and co-creator, and not just a protector/guardian of value 
already existing.’ In the absence of markets for ‘know-how’ entrepreneurs in possession 
of a good idea might instead establish a firm to develop a product and extract maximum 
value from it. Pitelis and Teece attempt to integrate the essential elements of dominant 
theories of the firm into one:
‘[the objective, nature and essence of the firm] is to reduce the 
diagnosis, configuration and leveraging of knowledge assets and 
organisational capabilities to allow the principals of these 
organisations to effectuate the capturing of value (profit) from 
both the creative and routine operations of the business 
enterprise. While the superiority of organization (the firm) in this 
context can be partly explicated in terms of its transaction-cost 
reducing properties, the advantages of organization (over the 
market) go well beyond savings in transaction costs. They include 
combining co-specialized assets and capturing value from 
intangible assets where business models that involve pure market 
transactions (e.g. licensing) simply won’t work because of the 
absence of properly functioning markets... ‘the need to 
20. See (Montgomery 1995) for a brief discussion. Also see (Barney 1986) and (Best 1990).
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orchestrate co-specialised and complementary assets could be 
seen as a raison d’être and the genesis of the firm, not only 
because of market failure, but also because the very creation of a 
credible player (firm) with a chance to realise its objectives by 
shaping, extending and especially creating markets, presupposes 
the co-assembly of co-specialised and complementary assets, 
capabilities and skills.’
(Pitelis and Teece 2009, p.23)
In a similar fashion to the approaches outlined in Section 2.3 Pitelis and Teece look to 
subsume the dominant aspects of established theories into their own. They accept the 
market failure based arguments, but claim they do not go far enough. Missing markets are 
not simply a market failure. They are the ‘raison d’être’ of the firm and the source of 
value for firms. Nevertheless, the RBV continues to implicitly assume that differences 
between firms lie in their ability to take advantage of or create market opportunities; and 
that firms can otherwise be regarded as homogenous, at least when they are considered as 
abstract economic entities. 
2.5. Conclusions
This chapter has outlined two prominent approaches to the firm that have emerged since 
Marshall developed the concept of the ‘representative firm’. ‘Market-superiority’ 
approaches are explicitly neo-classical in nature, and although a number of concessions 
are made to reality, the overall effect is to flesh out the representative firm. Like 
Marshall, theorists shy away from structural phenomena that, although observable, if 
included in a general theory of the firm would undermine the logical structure of an 
economic model with equilibrium as its foundational principle. They do not, for example, 
challenge assumptions of constant returns to scale and the neutrality of finance. Instead 
the approaches imply that if a new technology, management technique or managerial 
talent could overcome or alleviate the market failures that form the basis of the approach 
in question then the economy would tend closer to its pareto optimal equilibrium. This 
has very specific policy implications, which will be explored in later chapters. The 
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second set of approaches is based on the ‘resource based view’ originating in the 1950s 
and the work of Edith Penrose. Penrose explicitly rejected some of the foundational 
assumptions of the neo-classical model, and, in emphasising the act of production rather 
than exchange and introducing the concept of ‘resources’, gave life to a large and 
vigorous programme of study. However, it is the purpose of this thesis to argue that the 
theory of the firm should consider a number of alternative factors if the firm and its role 
in economic affairs are to be properly understood. Whilst the RBV goes some way in this 
regard, notably in incorporating economies of scale and scope, recent attempts at a 
synthesis of approaches suggest it too is being used to shed light on the representative 
firm. 
It is the contention of this thesis that the predominant theories of the firm can only make 
a limited contribution to theories of financial development, as they are essentially 
Marshallian in nature, or rooted in theories of market failure. The implication is that 
policies that promote financial deepening - the increased provision of financial 
instruments and the alleviation of market failure in the finance sector - will affect the firm 
sector only in as much as all firms will find it easier to perform, and those who had 
somehow been protected by such market failure would face more accurate price signals. 
This, it will be argued, is in contrast to post-Keynesian theories of the firm that suggest 
that there are fundamental differences between firms in terms of their ability to access 
finance and manage liquidity, and that these differences will affect a firm’s chances of 
survival and ability to make desired investments. Whilst this approach does not preclude 
the approaches discussed in this chapter it suggests that some firms will be more able 
than others to take advantage of opportunities as well as withstand shocks to their 
primary activities. As such the composition of the firm sector will go some way to 
determine the impact of financial reform. 
3.
Chapter 3: The Balance Sheet Firm
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter will develop an approach to the financial behaviour of firms that will then be 
used in subsequent chapters to analyse the dynamics of the relationship between 
individual firms and the enterprise sector as a whole during periods of financial 
development. The approach developed makes use of Hyman Minsky’s ‘balance sheet’ 
approach, which is used to organise insights from the work of Michal Kalecki, Josef 
Steindl and other economists working in the post-Keynesian tradition. Post-Keynesian 
approaches tend to emphasise mark-up pricing, the prevalence of oligopoly in capitalist 
economies, and fundamental uncertainty as a determinant of firm strategies with regard to 
the future. With reference to the work of Kalecki, Steindl and Minsky it is argued that 
firms differ in terms of sources of investment finance and the means by which firms 
manage liquidity and engage in asset markets over the course of the business cycle. 
Michal Kalecki and Josef Steindl in both their theoretical and empirical analysis point to 
substantial differences between ‘small’ firms and ‘large’ firms, and also between firms 
that have secured a monopolistic or oligopolistic position and more ‘marginal’ firms that 
have less power to set prices. Although Steindl and Kalecki are chiefly concerned with 
firms in mature capitalist economies this chapter argues that their insights can also be 
applied to firms in less developed economies in an effort to determine how firms might 
behave in the absence of certain financial institutions and as the finance sector develops. 
This chapter will first briefly discuss post-Keynesian approaches to the firm, before 
introducing the work of Kalecki and Steindl. As both argue the firm’s balance sheet 
evolves over the course of the business cycle, both in response to changing asset and 
other prices and also to the firm’s operations in asset markets, the chapter will then 
introduce Minsky’s ‘balance sheet firm’ as a lens through which to organise Steindl’s and 
Kalecki’s insights. The chapter concludes by arguing that the departures from the 
Marshallian firm - in particular the rejection of there being a democracy of 
entrepreneurship, and the importance of the critical relationship between the firm and the 
finance sector - can prove a useful analytical starting point for our understanding of the 
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development and behaviour of the enterprise sector in a developing economy at various 
stages of financial development.       
3.2. Post-Keynesian Firm
This section will briefly discuss the ‘post-Keynesian’ approach to the firm. It will provide 
the basis of a more detailed discussion of the balance sheet firm, an approach that will be 
derived from the work of Minsky, Steindl and Kalecki. The difference between the two 
will lie in the emphasis the latter gives to the ability of the firm to manage its liquidity to 
ensure survival.
Post-Keynesian approaches to the firm tend to emphasise fundamental uncertainty21, the 
prevalence of oligopolistic competition in most capitalist economies, and the tendency for 
prices to reflect a mark-up over the costs firms face. Hall and Hitch, in a seminal 1939 
paper, reporting the results of interviews with the managers of thirty eight firms (Hitch 
1939) demonstrated that firms did not operate according to neo-classical principles 
(either consciously or unconsciously). Instead, they concluded, that the vast majority of 
business men, ‘when quoting prices, did not think explicitly in terms of marginal 
revenues and costs, and that a general method of pricing was to add a margin as for net 
profit to average short term costs’ (Andrews 1951). One of their more significant 
contributions was that cost plus pricing was not simply the preserve of large, 
monopolistic firms but the majority of firms. PWS Andrews conducted a number of 
similar empirical studies of business across the United Kingdom. He too found that 
business men made no explicit reference to marginalist economics. Although he accepted 
this did not necessarily imply the rejection of the doctrine, he found that as his studies 
progressed ‘this way of thinking became progressively less tolerable’ (Andrews, 1951). 
Whilst post-Keynesian firms are assumed to have some power over the prices they set, 
their long term survival is thought to depend on its ability to control its environment. ‘For 
any organisation, as for any organism, the goal or the objective that has any a natural 
assumption of preeminence is the organisation’s survival’ (Galbraith 1972). In an 
uncertain world the post-Keynesian firm seeks power ‘over its suppliers of materials, 
21. See, for example, Lavoie (1992), Davidson (1994, 1996) and Dunn (2008), particularly Chapter 10. 
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over its customers, over the government, over the kind of technology to be put in 
use’ (Lavoie 1992). Power stems from size, and size from the rate of growth. The 
objective, therefore, is to maximise the rate of growth, which, ironically, given the 
criticism of neo-classical approaches, requires maximising profits. However, this does not 
necessarily correspond to the neo-classical notion of maximising short run profits (Kregel 
1990).
One determinant of a firm’s ability to survive unwelcome and unforeseen shocks is the 
degree to which it is financially dependent on other economic actors. This need not be a 
concern to firms operating in a world of certainty. ‘In such a world, for instance, firms 
always have access to all of the financial capital that they require provided their 
investment project is expected to be profitable. The source of financing is 
immaterial’ (Lavoie 1992, p. 99-100). For the entrepreneur envisaged in much post-
Keynesian analysis, on the other hand, external finance is complementary to retained 
earnings, not a substitute for it. ‘Organisations can safeguard their financial independence 
either by generating themselves the funds which are necessary for their expansion 
projects, or by staying within the borrowing norms that are set by the system’ (Lavoie 
1992, p. 103). In this the post-Keynesian firm resembles the Penrosian firm described in 
Chapter 1, and similarly Sweezy and Baran’s corporation which also aims at and 
‘normally achieves’ financial independence through the internal generation of funds 
(Sweezy and Baran 1967). 
Nevertheless, whilst power and financial independence are objectives for most if not all 
capitalist firms neither is always attainable. This gives rise to the distinction between 
firms that have achieved some pre-eminence and smaller, less powerful firms. A number 
of theorists argue that economics should incorporate such fundamental differences 
between firms, and model the impact of larger, more powerful firms differently. Albert 
Eichner, for example, posited that as modern capitalist economies are dominated by large 
corporations or ‘megacorps’, so economic models should be built with the megacorp as a 
fundamental unit (Kregel 1990, Shapiro 1990, Eichner 2008). Unlike the neo-classical 
firm the megacorp is a large, diversified corporation run by salaried professional 
managers, with a skilled workforce at their command. It’s objective is long term 
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expansion. As expansion and obtaining market share depended on investment, megacorps 
set the mark up over costs such that it provides the firm with the funds required for 
planned investment. One implication of the megacorp’s pursuit of profits is the important 
role of corporate saving in the economy, which is at least as significant as household 
saving. In this vein Eichner sought to marry his megacorp with Kaleckian macro 
economic models in which investment drove savings (Deprez 1991). For Eichner 
megacorps set prices to generate profits to finance investments. (Kregel 1990). Assuming 
that oligopolistic sectors dominate the economy, and smaller firms are less able to impose 
a mark-up over costs due to a lack of market power, then if households do not save, 
savings is an outcome of the population of megacorps’ decision to invest. 
In this thesis the distinction between large and small firms and their economic 
contribution is crucial, as is the notion, pursued in later chapters, that the level of 
investment of large firms has a bearing on the level of profits and so savings in an 
economy. However, this thesis will not specifically adopt Eichner’s megacorp as a means 
to explore financial development in less developed countries as its distinguishing feature 
is the sophistication of its management and workforce. Instead, this thesis will build on 
the work of Michal Kalecki and Josef Steindl, who also emphasise firm size as a 
determinant of economic behaviour. 
3.3. Using Kalecki and Steindl
Like Eichner, Sweezy and Baran and Galbraith, Michal Kalecki and Josef Steindl put 
large firms centre stage. Kalecki dismisses ‘diseconomies of large scale’ as a limit to the 
size of the firm as it is ‘rather unrealistic. It has no technological basis because, although 
every plant has an optimum size, it is still possible to have two, three, or more 
plants.’ (Kalecki 1971a, p. 105). He accepts that the size of the market can limit the size 
of the firm, ‘but it leaves unexplained the existence of large and small firms in the same 
industry’. 
Kalecki distinguishes between firms in two main ways. First, in terms of the type of 
industry they inhabit, and second, in terms of access to finance. Whether a firm inhabits a 
‘competitive’ or ‘oligopolistic industry’ determines the sort of pricing policy open to it: 
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mark-up pricing or demand determined pricing. The policy adopted is a function of the 
good or service produced, its price elasticity of demand and of market institutions. The 
ability to mark up prices enables a firm to generate and sustain retained earnings. Again, 
Kalecki’s view of pricing finds much empirical support from other post-Keynesian 
studies22. This in turn determines a firm’s access to external finance as well as the size of 
investment it can undertake. Here, building on the work of Marek Breit, Kalecki 
introduced the concept of ‘increasing risk’, in which the greater the ratio between debt 
and equity the greater the risk of a firm’s insolvency, and the more expensive is external 
credit (Toporowski 2005b). Large firms can both access more credit and make larger and 
less risky investments:
‘A firm with large a entrepreneurial capital could obtain funds for a 
large investment whereas a firm with small entrepreneurial capital could 
not. Differences in the position of firms arising out of differences in 
their entrepreneurial capital are further enhanced by the fact that firms 
below a certain size have no access whatever to the capital market’.
(Kalecki 1971, p. 106) 
Expansion is therefore dependent on ‘the accumulation of capital out of current profits’. 
Firms can then make new investments without ‘encountering the obstacles of the limited 
capital market or ‘increasing risk” (ibid. p. 107). Savings from current profits can be 
directly invested in the business and make possible larger loans. The amount of a firm’s 
entrepreneurial capital will determine the ‘amount of rentier capital’ the firm can access 
in the capital market: 
‘The limitation of the size of the firm by the availability of 
entrepreneurial capital goes to the very heart of the capitalist system. 
Many economists assume, at least in their abstract theories, a state of 
business democracy where anybody endowed with entrepreneurial 
capital can obtain capital for starting a business venture. This picture of 
the activities of the ‘pure’ entrepreneur is, to put it mildly, unrealistic. 
22. See Lavoie (1992) for a discussion of the difference between ‘mark-up’ pricing and ‘full-cost’ or ‘target-
return’ pricing.
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The most important prerequisite for becoming an entrepreneur is the 
ownership of capital.’ 
(Kalecki 1971, p. 109)
Josef Steindl develops Kalecki’s ideas in Small and big business: Economic problems of 
the size of firms (Steindl 1945). In a critique of Marshall’s representative firm Steindl 
argues that firms need not be restricted by the size of a single industry and that large 
firms have an inherent advantage over smaller firms. Steindl takes issue with Marshall’s 
assertion that because ‘the rise from unpropertied worker to small entrepreneur and from 
then to big entrepreneur is possible’ and ‘ability always finds capital [and] inability loses 
it’ that there will be a ‘broad movement from below upwards’ (Steindl 1945, p. 9).
Steindl tests Marshall’s propositions in a statistical analysis of the US economy. He finds 
little to support Marshall: the ‘rate of growth of corporate enterprises will have to be 
several thousand fold to reach the size of large firms’ (Steindl, 1945, p. 36). This takes 
time and the ‘high death rate’ makes it unlikely. He also finds in favour of the impact of 
the principle of ‘increasing risk’ on the growth of firms. Inadequate net worth among 
small firms, a costly long term credit market and so reliance on short term credit, coupled 
with the finding that large firms have less difficulty accessing all forms of credit are 
sufficient for Steindl to proclaim there is no evidence for a ‘broad movement upward’. He 
had come to a similar conclusion in a statistical analysis of the Austrian economy in the 
1930s where he found that small firms struggled to grow beyond a certain size (Steindl 
1965). 
In this respect Kalecki and Steindl differ from some other post-Keynesians, who 
essentially see both large and small firms in the same light, although the latter may yet 
lack the ‘control over future events, its financial requirements, the quality of its labour 
force, the prices of the industry and the possibility of takeovers (Lavoie 1992). Steindl 
also emphasises the importance of sufficient entrepreneurial capital and the ability to 
manage shocks to both the ability to survive and to reach large size (Steindl 1945).  
Steindl argued that large firms come into existence either as newly formed joint-stock 
companies or through merger. The former ‘presupposes’ wealthy entrepreneurs and the 
latter, whilst an observable fact, includes takeovers, often themselves an expression of 
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oligopolistic power. PWS Andrews made a similar observation, arguing that most new 
entrants to specific industries were from ‘other lines of industry’, rather than ‘brand new 
businesses undertaken with all the uncertainties involved’ (Andrews 1951, p.141). The 
high turnover of small firms and the large capital required to establish large firms led to 
Steindl to the conclusion that there is an ‘elastic supply of small entrepreneurs’ and a 
small and ‘inelastic supply of large entrepreneurs’. Contradicting Marshall and in the 
spirit of Kalecki large entrepreneurs must be backed by capital. Moreover:
‘If certain economies are available for a certain size of plant then only 
those firms that are big enough to afford the capital investment can 
make use of these economies; any smaller sized firms - size of a firm is 
measured in terms of capital here - will not be able to do so. On the 
other hand, if there are economies open to small plants - and a technical 
development may sometimes favour small scale equipment - then any 
bigger firm may make use of them just as well as a small firm, because 
there is nothing to prevent it from investing in a number of smaller 
plants. From this asymmetry it follows that small firms can never (in the 
long run) earn higher profit rates than big firms - because all technical 
advantages which are open to them are open also to big firms; whereas 
big firms may earn higher rates of profits than small firms because some 
advantages open to them are not open to small firms.’
(Steindl 1945, p. 10)
Steindl does, however, suggest ways in which larger firms can lose their advantage. Large 
firms might suffer ‘from the existence of imperfect competition (Steindl 1945, p. 11), 
particularly if the firm has to extend its market in one and the same industry. The way out 
is to extend into ‘new lines’, however this carries initial costs. A large firm might seek a 
lower rate of profit because it chooses to do so by the ‘exchange of greater safety against 
a higher profit rate’ by reducing ‘the proportion of borrowed capital’:
‘The greater safety for bigger firms will, however, mean that the 
frequency and extent of their losses will be reduced, and that on the 
average they will be more successful than the smaller ones.’
(Steindl 1945, p. 11)
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If, on the other hand, there are differential lines open to different ‘size classes’ of 
entrepreneurs and large entrepreneurs ‘are restricted in number’ then ‘a hierarchy of 
profit rates will be established, with a smooth increase of profit rates as size of the 
enterprise, measured in capital, increases’ (Steindl 1945, p. 12). Lines with the ‘greatest 
scale economies available’ will offer entrepreneurs capable of exploiting them a ‘more 
than ‘normal’ profit’. 
Confined only to the small scale lines allowed them small entrepreneurs operate in a very 
different world. Given the restrictions on access to finance, the importance of maintaining 
a relatively liquid position and the elastic supply of entrepreneurs threatening entry 
forcing profits down Steindl is led to the following conclusion:
‘...the small entrepreneur by the very nature of his position conforms to 
a gambler; that is he is taking rather high risks for a low expectation of 
profit.… He is, however, willing to bear this risk at a very low 
remuneration. This is due to the fact that small entrepreneurs are 
desperately trying to maintain themselves in their social status, rather 
than become employees (to become rentiers is no practical alternative 
for them, because their capital is too small for this purpose).’
(Steindl 1945, p. 31)
Steindl even goes so far as to ask ‘what factors make for the continued existence of small 
firms?’. He cites four reasons. First, the gradual emergence of large entrepreneurs (‘big 
scale entrepreneurial capital does not spring from the ground’). Second, and in an 
interesting twist on the creation myth of the neo-classical firm, is the presence of 
imperfect competition and imperfection in the labour markets. These can include ‘rational 
factors’ such as transport costs ‘which can hardly be eliminated’, and the ‘irrational 
factors’:
‘...there may be an individuality of product to which consumers really 
attach a significance... the differentiation of the product and attachment 
of customers to particular firms may simply be due to irrational factors; 
that is force of habit, ignorance of relevant facts, or laziness. The 
irrational facts are probably the most important; they account for a 
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considerable cost to society without offering any advantage (gardening 
tools can be standardised without harm to individualists).
(Steindl 1945, p. 59)
Third is the ‘gambling attitude of small entrepreneurs’, and fourth is the state of 
competition in the industry, which will be discussed below.
Presciently Steindl also discusses the ‘vertical disintegration of certain processes, parts of 
which can be performed on a small scale’. Again Steindl takes issue with Marshall who 
claimed the process would provide further opportunities to small firms. Instead small 
firms, ‘being numerous and small partners in a bargain with a few big firms, are 
economically quite weak and their independence is largely fictitious’. Steindl concludes 
that at worst small firms are a ‘waste’ of energy and resources. In another nod to 
Marshall’s discussion of business groups and the modern literature on industrial 
agglomeration small firms should seek to eliminate the disadvantages of small scale by 
‘some kind of cooperation’. 
Steindl (1975) discussed the dynamics of competition in a capitalist system. He argued 
that the rate of internal accumulation, available productive capacity, the utilisation of that 
capacity and the rate of growth of the industry relative to the rate of growth of internal 
accumulation are the crucial variables that explain competitive firm behaviour. He 
identified four ‘phases’ of competition:
A. If an industry is expanding rapidly marginal firms make little or no profit, 
small firms can enter relatively easily and ‘progressive’ firms can expand 
without taking market share from marginal firms.
B. If the expansion of the intra-marginal firm (or the progressive firm) is to 
exceed the rate of growth of industrial demand then the intra-marginal firm 
must make ‘extra sales effort’ to gain market share. Rising costs will reduce 
profits, but intra-marginal firms will ‘maintain a differential advantage’. This 
‘moderate competitive pressure’ will lead to the relative concentration of the 
industry as the marginal firms are squeezed.
C. If the accumulation of large firms surpasses the rate of expansion of the 
industry by enough to require diminished absolute size for marginal firms 
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then large firms’ sales efforts will be so intense smaller firms will lose sales. 
In response firms are forced to cut prices or increase costs by engaging in 
quality competition or intensive advertising. The highest cost firms are 
ultimately eliminated, leading to a state of ‘absolute concentration’.
D. The onset of oligopoly. Competitive pressures and internal accumulation 
interact to regulate the level of excess capacity in the industry.
(Steindl, 1975, p. 87)
Although, as Steindl himself, admitted ‘maturity’ did not lead inexorably to ‘stagnation’, 
his account of competition reinforces the distinction between large and small firms, as 
well as suggesting firms capable of product or process innovations have both a 
competitive edge and a greater chance of survival. In the event of falling demand firms 
are forced to find ways to expand sales to ensure their capacity is utilised, so as to keep 
average costs down, and to ensure they have sufficient cash flow to cover capital costs. 
This reveals the level of demand and costs to be the main drivers of competitive 
behaviour. It also suggests that ‘competition depends on sales effort, rather than the 
number of firms in the market’:
‘The key question is not what firms do, or what they are forced to do, 
competing with each other in a state of relatively constant overall 
market demand, but what firms do in response to changes in their 
demand, or sales of their respective output’.
(Toporowski 2005, p. 94)
For Steindl large scale economies grant firms an advantage: 
‘They are basic, because without them firms would hardly grow to the 
size at which they are able to exercise monopoly power, by becoming 
‘price leaders’, combining with others in the formation of a cartel, or by 
amalgamation’.
(Steindl 1945, p. 21)
Size, or more importantly, access to (preferably internal) finance enables firms to invest 
in advertising, product differentiation and innovation; all of which should enable it to 
take more of a share of a diminishing market. This suggests that firms continue to 
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compete in oligopolistic markets. It also suggests that technical change is an important 
factor. Steindl identified ‘progressive firms’ (which need not be the largest firms) able to 
lower costs, increase profit margins and so increase the rate of internal accumulation. 
Technological investments are also a way for firms to diversify into other markets. 
However, diversification is a sometimes confused strand running through Steindl’s work. 
One of Steindl’s critiques of Marshall is the identification of firms with single industries. 
Firms can instead seek out ‘new lines’ to sidestep the restrictions of falling demand for 
their products. Steindl argues that this might be difficult because ‘entering a new industry 
will involve the acquisition of an entirely new market and goodwill, of new experience 
and new organization. All this is more difficult than expanding an existing business 
within an industry (Steindl 1975, p. 68). In Steindl (1975) Steindl begins with by 
assuming that firms operate in single industries. He then relaxes the assumption:
‘The conclusion is that the actual or potential flow of newly formed 
funds between industries will indeed do something to limit the 
inequality of profit rates between industries; but it will fulfil this 
function only slightly.’
(Steindl 1975, p. 68)
In the introduction to the second edition of the book (Steindl 1975) Steindl corrects 
himself, arguing that one reason the post war economy did not stagnate was firms’ ability 
to diversify their activities:
‘There are still other elements in the postwar situation that are new. The 
big corporations generally have spread their activities to several lines 
each. Impediments against the flow of funds between industries would 
therefore play no role today. This again favours investment...’
(Steindl 1975, p. xii)
and a few pages later:
‘Oligopolistic firms, in recent years, have had more and more recourse 
to other forms of competition:… new products enable firms to transcend 
the given market and find the open field for expansion which they are 
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seeking... Direct investments abroad may again offer an escape from the 
narrow oligopolistic situation.’
(Steindl 1975, p. xiv)
This suggests that firms can further mitigate against increased pressure on sales in a given 
industry by developing the capacity to expand into ‘new lines’.
The work of Kalecki and Steindl leads Toporowski (1993) to argue that different 
‘categories’ of firms play differing roles in the economy. Small and medium sized 
enterprises and households tend to account for the majority of employment. ‘However, 
the dynamics of an economy, i.e., economic growth and inflation, are determined broadly 
by the scale of investment undertaken by corporations, which account for the vast 
majority of investment in an economy’ (Toporowski 2009). Toporowski further 
distinguishes between capital intensive firms with high price elasticity of demand 
(Category I) and less capital intensive firms facing inelastic prices (Category II) 
(Toporowski 2005a). The former, mostly operating in primary and large scale industries 
tend to expand output rather than increase prices in response to rising demand; whilst the 
latter raise prices. This is chiefly a consequence of available under-utilised capacity and 
the need for Category I firms to lower average costs with increased production.
Steindl, Kalecki, Toporowski, like Eichner, emphasise the differences between 
large firms and small firms and their impacts on the wider economy. In summary 
large firms with access to greater 'entrepreneurial capital' have improved access to 
capital markets and bank loans. They are therefore better able to take advantage of 
large scale investment opportunities and benefit from economies of scale. The 
possession of entrepreneurial capital and the ability to diversify into new lines 
also provides large firms with a greater chance of survival in the face of shocks to 
their primary markets. As a lack of entrepreneurial capital is assumed to limit the 
rate of growth, access to funds and the chances of survival Steindl and Kalecki 
argue that large firms are more likely to be born from existing firms or large 
concentrations of entrepreneurial capital rather than be the outcome of long term 
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growth.   
The following section will introduce Hyman Minsky’s balance sheet approach to the 
firm, a useful tool to examine firms’ interaction with the finance sector, and their 
response to changes in demand.   
3.4. Minsky’s Balance Sheet Firm
Hyman Minsky’s account of the importance of balance sheet management provides the 
framework to best understand the ways in which firms manage cash flow in response to 
changing circumstances. In his PhD thesis Minsky dismissed profit maximisation as the 
‘unique behavioural principle’, and argued that ‘the problem of the financing technique to 
be used by the firm [or] the problem of balance sheet structure’ was of similar 
significance (Toporowski 2008). Later Minsky placed ‘the problem of balance sheet 
structure’ at the centre of his analysis. 
Minsky’s primary concern was to explain the source of economic instability. Balance 
sheets are ‘both a resumé of past economic activity and a reflection of current decisions’, 
and a ‘statement of [an economic unit’s] assets and liabilities, of its ownership interest in 
and claims upon other economic units and of other economic units’s ownership interest in 
and claims upon it’. Financial assets originate as liabilities and so represent ‘past 
behaviour’, and debt contracts ‘result in a division or partitioning of the risk and 
uncertainty inherent in any economic activity. The alternative financial techniques by 
which a unit can acquire control over real assets are significant determinants of how 
uncertainty is partitioned’ (Minsky 1964, p. 185). Business firms have to decide how to 
finance investments. They (and households) evaluate possible (un)favourable outcomes 
and want to protect against them. So ‘in making its decision the economic unit combines 
its evaluations of the situations, its own attitude toward uncertainty and the price at which 
it would acquire protection against the unfavourable and its share of favourable 
outcomes.’ (Minsky 1964, p. 186) An economic unit’s asset and liability structures reflect 
these choices. 
Firms issue debt and liabilities (which households own) in order to acquire control over 
real and financial assets necessary to carry out activities. Debt is for the risk averse (as 
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they will always receive payment) and equity is for the risk takers. ‘Corporation finance 
and private portfolio management are the two anchors for the behaviour of the financial 
system’. Financial institutions - defined as ‘business organisations whose assets are 
almost all ‘intangible assets’ - stand between the business firm and the households. They 
generate liabilities acceptable to the risk averse and purchase liabilities from unsteady 
firms:
‘The study of finance is the behaviour of economic units when 
confronted with specified types of uncertainty, and financial 
institutions and usages are ways in which the uncertainty borne 
by a unit can be adjusted to the unit preferences’ 
(Minsky 1964, p. 188)
Minsky defines assets as tangible or real (residential and non-residential structures, land, 
producers’ durables, and inventories) and intangible or financial (debts and equities). 
Debts are a commitment to make payments at specified date, at the initiative of the holder 
of debt or contingent on some future eventuality.
In order to manage its commitments a firm must ensure that it has sufficient money to 
‘meet its obligations at the time they are due’. In his analysis of ‘money flows’ Minsky 
identified three ‘transaction types’, each associated with three ‘accounts’: the balance 
sheet account, the income account and the portfolio account.
Financial and physical assets are an economic unit’s ‘portfolio’. Economic units are the 
beneficiaries of commitments of other units on these assets. Financial and tangible assets 
can be exchanged for money and money for assets. Transactions that involve financial 
and tangible assets are called portfolio transactions. During a period of growth there are 
portfolio transactions in existing and new assets. ‘Surplus or portfolio changing units’ 
acquire financial liabilities from deficit units. As a result two things happen: the ‘value of 
equity assets changes to reflect expectations that growth will continue’, and ‘deficit units 
have to finance an increasing portion of their activity by debt instruments acceptable to 
financial intermediaries’. 
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A firm’s income account corresponds to receipts from the sale of goods and services, 
payments on wages and salaries, gross investments and tax payments. For most firms 
money flows primarily stem from current income producing activities (the sale of goods 
and services). Economic units receive money as a result of their ‘participation of current 
income’ (Minsky 1964, 250), and money flows out as purchases of goods and services.
Money inflows on the ‘balance sheet account’ are, for Minsky, ‘not significant for 
business firms apart from trade credit’. Outgoings correspond to interest and principle 
paid on debts and dividends on equities. The ability to pay in turn depends on final 
demand for a firms products. Finally the ‘portfolio account’ corresponds to ‘receipts from 
bank borrowings and the sale of securities to other units and government securities’. 
Minsky used balance sheets to explain how an economic unit could find itself in ‘a 
situation where it does not have sufficient money on hand to fulfil its currently due 
commitments and there is no good prospect that it will be able to fulfil its commitments 
in the near future’ (Minsky 1964, p. 252). He argued the ‘path to financial distress related 
to the profit and loss statement of an economic unit’ (Minsky 1964, p. 254). A distressed 
firm’s hope for survival depended on its ability to ‘engage in portfolio transactions’: issue 
liabilities or dispose of assets.  ‘Both have limits; either the acceptability of its liabilities 
decreases or it runs out of assets’. Minsky identified one exception: a firm ‘investing in 
the future’ may have expected future earning power sufficient ensure the continued 
acceptability of its liabilities.
3.5. Kalecki and Steindl as Minsky’s Balance Sheet Firm
Minsky’s distinction between a firm’s income account, balance sheet account and 
portfolio account provides a useful lens with which to analyse firm differences and the 
influence of the finance sector on firm behaviour.
Minsky himself was concerned to explain how firms might become distressed in the 
event of a fall in demand (a reduction in money flows to the income account) and also 
how the changing values of a firm’s assets and liabilities could both impact on its own 
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chances of survival and on the stability of the economy at large23. Firms are forced to 
respond to changes in demand for their output by running down reserves, issuing 
liabilities and managing or restructuring their portfolio account. 
Minsky (1964) spells out the impact of a boom on the balance sheets of households and 
business firms. A boom driven by increased business and household investment depends 
on the creation of new money ‘or the substitution of debts (and possibly equities) for 
money (velocity changes)’. As a result businesses will have a higher proportion of debt to 
income, and so interest rates will rise. Business firms will be committing a higher 
proportion of their incomes to servicing their increasing liabilities. Increases in the prices 
of financial and real estate assets will provide firms with capital gains and the ability to 
support more debt. In the event of a downturn the value of equity and real estate can fall, 
‘wiping out the protection of the lender’. Portfolio transactions will also increase relative 
to income and balance sheet flows. ‘So systematic changes to the financial structure take 
place during a sustained boom. Balance sheet money flows increase relative to income. 
The value of equity and real estate assets rise relative to current income imputed to them, 
money flows on portfolio account increase relative to money flows on balance sheet and 
income account, and transaction velocity increases relative to income velocity’ (Minsky 
1964).
Minsky distinguished between firms in terms of their vulnerability to falling asset prices 
and their ability to fulfil financial commitments in the event of reduced cash flows. Firms 
with a larger debt component in their balance sheets and so a smaller ratio of net worth to 
total debt will be more likely to face financial distress. This is analogous to Kalecki’s 
concept of increasing risk. If the market value of assets decline, depending on whether 
they are forced or required to sell, units will have a realised or unrealised capital loss. A 
loss in net worth will impact on a firm’s ability to borrow. A forced sale will lower the 
price of the asset. If a number of units are in the same position then there will be a 
exaggerated impact on the price of the class of assets sold. The ability to sell and the 
price received will also depend on the assets are ‘special rather than general purpose’24. 
23. See Minsky (1992)
24. This has interesting echoes of Williamson’s accept specificity.
Chapter 3: The Balance Sheet Firm 70
The balance sheet approach provides an opportunity to elaborate the work of Kalecki and 
Steindl. Both argued financial assets are an alternative to fixed investments (whose 
attractiveness will wax and wane with the business cycle) as well as a form of indemnity 
in the event of a fall in demand for goods and services produced (Steindl 1945 and 
Kalecki 1971).
For Kalecki large size gives firms the opportunity to make large investments and so 
accumulate large amounts of entrepreneurial capital and to access, if required, larger 
loans on more favourable terms. However, firms will tend to limit the use of the capital 
market because ‘of the increasing risk involved in expansion’ (Kalecki 1971, p. 106). The 
more a firm borrows the greater the danger of insolvency in the event of failure. Large 
firms with more retained earnings than they care to invest in fixed assets, or who wish to 
hedge against failure might instead invest a proportion in securities meaning that in the 
event of failure they will still be able to draw some income (Kalecki 1971). As small 
firms suffer from inadequate internal reserves they must maintain a selection of liquid 
assets as security or expose themselves to the possibility of insolvency. Kalecki argued 
that firms that did attempt to access proportionately large amounts of external capital 
would struggle. Those, for example, floating a bond issue ‘which was too large in terms 
of its entrepreneurial capital’, would find it undersubscribed. Raising the interest rate paid 
would only cause investors to doubt the firm’s solvency (Kalecki 1971, p. 106). Smaller 
firms attempting to undertake projects with high costs of production and distribution are 
‘driven to supplement their own capital by extensive short term borrowing at 
unfavourable terms’. 
Steindl (1945) analyses the impact of holding financial assets on the rate of profit on 
equity. Steindl utilises the gross and net gearing ratios. The latter being the proportion of 
business capital to equity. The former being the proportion of total assets to equity. 
Steindl shows four things. First, that with high gearing ratios firms will make more 
spectacular losses in the event of failure. Second, both the gross and net gearing ratios 
decrease with size. Third, larger companies are more likely to invest in interest bearing 
securities, further offsetting any risk they bear. Fourth,
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‘The consequences of a high gearing ratio for small firms are reinforced 
by two further factors: the smaller firms often rent buildings etc. (which 
would normally be owned by big ones), which means nothing else but a 
borrowing of these capital items in natura. The rent provides a fixed 
charge, like interest, with similar effects on the risk. More important, the 
relatively greater indebtedness of the small firms takes for the most part 
the form of short-term debt. This makes the risk even greater (if no 
renewal of credit is obtained the firm will have to engage in forced 
selling).
(Steindl 1945, p. 45)
Large firms will therefore receive part of their income in dividends, that will be only a 
part of a company’s total profit. As a result ‘very big companies have greater stability 
from a large income from dividends which is, however, lower than the profit rate in a 
successful company, especially in times of good business’ (Steindl 1945, p. 47).
In Minsky’s terminology large firms will expand their portfolio account, enabling firms 
to mitigate against losses in the event of a downturn. Firms can also either tap income 
from financial investments (interest or dividends), or they can restructure their portfolio 
accounts and balance sheet accounts to manage the effects of a fall in revenues in the 
income account. Although Minsky himself did not explicitly distinguish between firms by 
size the observations of Kalecki and Steindl indicate that large and small firms will differ 
in their ability to manage their portfolio and balance sheet accounts. Smaller firms are 
limited in their ability to manage cash flow; having to rely on the sales of their goods and 
services (Toporowski 2009). Essentially, their operations are confined to the real 
economy, with little recourse to the financial sector for loans, equity or alternative 
income generating investments. Large firms, however, can restructure their balance 
sheets in order to refinance investments, allowing firms to ‘top up the liquidity of 
reserves’ and ‘readjust the structure of the financial liabilities that corresponds to [their] 
productive assets’ (Toporowski 2000). By developing their portfolio account they can 
generate cash flow (from dividends) and manage liquidity (through the sale of assets). 
Financial assets can play the role of a hedge against a decline in the firm’s position in the 
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real economy. However, they can also be a straight (and more liquid) alternative to 
investments in fixed assets. This will be discussed further below. 
As we have seen Steindl and Kalecki differentiate firms in more ways than size alone. 
Pricing policies, price elasticities, technological capabilities and capital intensities, will 
all to a greater or lesser degree affect a firms ability and need to accumulate internal 
reserves, access capital markets and manage a fall in demand through changes in output 
or price. In oligopolistic industries, for example, in contrast to Steindl’s more secure 
progressive or intra-marginal firms, marginal firms will struggle to respond to falling 
market share with cost reducing innovations, sales effort or, by venturing into new lines. 
Such firms will likely have greater need to restructure their balance sheets and access 
external loans, but will be less able to do so. Large capital intensive firms are those most 
likely to face higher debt or equity servicing costs (balance sheet account outflows) in a 
recession, as they tend to make ‘the largest calls on the capital market in a boom’. 
Toporowski’s ‘Category II’ firms, on the other hand will have fewer commitments 
(Toporowski 2005a).
All of this suggests that a distinguishing feature of the large firm that emerges from the 
work of Kalecki, Steindl, Minsky and Toporowski is its greater autonomy as an economic 
unit in the face of exogenous dynamics. Such firms are able to respond by managing 
more than their real economy operations.
This then lead to the possibility that investments by large firms in financial assets has a 
bearing on the level of investment in the economy and the economic stability. Kalecki 
and Steindl argue firms are more likely to engage in financial market operations at certain 
points in the business cycle. Along with Minsky they argue that relative returns to 
investments in the real economy and the finance sector change as the business cycle 
progresses. Minsky argued that ‘key to the business cycle is a widening gap between 
capital asset prices and investment output’ (Minsky 1964). For Minsky, as ‘financial 
constraints are relaxed’ financial innovation takes hold.  In a similar vein to Kalecki and 
Steindl firms develop an increased dependence on outside finance and debt leveraging for 
investment.  As a result cash flow commitments due to debt grow at a faster pace than 
investment increases productive capacity. This eventually leads to a shift in incomes from 
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entrepreneurs to rentiers, that in turn leads to a decrease in investment, and so a reduction 
in profits. Kalecki suggests that as the business cycle approaches its crest firms 
themselves (and so entrepreneurs) will begin to purchase higher yielding securities. In 
Minsky’s terminology, firms will begin to grow their portfolio accounts, possibly at the 
expense of investments in fixed capital assets. They do this because of both changing 
relative prices, but also the greater availability of financial instruments, that, according to 
Minsky, inevitably occurs over the course of a boom.  
The investments firms make will therefore have an effect on the structure of the economy. 
Financial assets need not simply be a means to hedge against any uncertainty attached 
inherent in real world transactions. Instead they can be an end in themselves. The levels 
of investment in physical assets can directly impact on the profits of other firms. In 
developed economies reduced investment in physical assets will impact on levels of 
employment and profits, with implications for the business cycle. In developing countries 
the impact can be more serious, as scale investments in physical assets are a driver of the 
industrialisation process. While Kalecki saw such reductions in fixed investments as a 
cyclical and so temporary phenomenon Steindl, Minsky and Toporowski laid greater 
emphasis on the transient nature of institutions. Steindl (1975) saw the investment 
decisions of firms leading to the decline and stagnation of the US economy. The driver 
was the behaviour of large firms themselves. Minsky, on the other hand, suggested that 
changes in the finance sector and the relationship between firms and the finance sector 
could limit the sorts of investments firms might safely make (Minsky 1991). Toporowski 
pointed to both developments in the finance system and the behaviour of firms; arguing 
that with financial development large firms could as profitably invest in financial assets 
as real assets (Toporowski 2010). Both Minsky and Toporowski raise the possibility that 
fixed asset investments might be a function of financial institutions and their evolution as 
well as the mix of firms operating in the economy.  
This suggests that both economic analysis and policy should consider the economic 
functions of different firms. It is not enough, as orthodox economics does, to focus on 
developing ‘market institutions’, with little consideration (beyond competition and anti-
trust law) to the mix of firms existing in the economy and the distribution of ‘large 
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entrepreneurs’. Firms provide significantly different functions, depending on size, 
industry and capability. Large scale investments are to come from large firms. Smaller 
firms are more likely to provide the majority of employment. However, the sorts of 
investments firms make and the impact on factors such as technology acquisition, 
investment, employment is as much a function of output demand, the development of the 
finance sector and relative asset prices as it is a managerial solution to a maximisation 
problem.  
3.6. Summary and Conclusion
For post-Keynesians a world of fundamental uncertainty suggests that firms must prepare 
for the unexpected and the providers of finance must compensate for the possibility of 
default. The ability to access finance, achieve financial independence and increase the 
likelihood of survival is therefore associated with larger firms that both possess 
entrepreneurial capital, can exploit economies of scale and develop diversified portfolios 
and alternative sources of income. The investment behaviour of large firms is therefore 
more likely to determine overall levels of investment, savings and the stability of 
financial markets. The following chapter will argue that these insights, whilst developed 
from analysis of mature capitalist economies, can also increase our understanding of the 
relationship between the enterprise sector and the financial sector. In particular without 
dedicated services for small sized firms financial sector development will have only a 
limited impact on the ability for smaller firms to grow and survive. Second, in countries 
in which there are limited concentrations of entrepreneurial capital large firms are 
unlikely to emerge in any great number from the private sector, nor, in countries with low 
levels of development will equity markets be sufficient to bring into being large joint-
stock companies. Third, firms can be broadly categorised as those that only operate an 
income account and those that also operate a portfolio account. In developing countries 
with under developed asset markets - bond, equity or real estate for example, - large firms 
will have difficulties building a portfolio of sufficiently liquid assets that also provide a 
return. The argument developed above is that such assets provide firms with the means to 
withstand shocks to cashflow from their primary activities, either in the form of 
diversified cashflow or saleable assets. This suggests that firms will refrain from large 
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capital investments and instead, if they are able to generate savings, diversify their 
activities. Fourth, firms need not manage their portfolio account solely to manage their 
liquidity. Instead, they can in the event of asset market inflation, seek speculative returns 
through their current account. This has implications for economic stability as financial 
development takes place. 
The next chapter will examine the literature of finance and development more closely. It 
will argue that more orthodox approaches typified by the financial liberalisation 
hypothesis are ill-equipped to speak to the issues raised by the discussion in this chapter. 
Instead, post-Keynesian critiques of the financial liberalisation hypothesis will be 
followed an attempt to marry the balance sheet firm to a simple Kaleckian model. 
4.
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Chapter 4: Financial Development and the Balance Sheet Firm
4.1. Introduction
This chapter will locate the balance sheet firm in the wider financial development 
literature. Section 1 will discuss the Financial Liberalisation Hypothesis (FLH), 
associated with Ronald McKinnon and Edward Shaw. According to the FLH the 
liberalisation of the banking system and financial markets in developing countries will 
facilitate the better mobilisation and allocation of savings. As less developed countries 
(LDCs) are assumed to suffer a savings constraint liberalisation should improve a 
country’s prospects for economic growth. Section 2 will discuss post-Keynesian 
approaches to financial development. Post-Keynesian thought inverts a number of the 
propositions underpinning the orthodox theory. Investment leads to savings, rather than 
the other way round and in theories of endogenous money bank loans become deposits, 
thus increasing the money supply. As economies develop banks go through a series of 
stages in which they progress from the role of simple intermediary - collecting and 
allocating savings - to extenders of credit that need not have an equivalent backing of 
prior savings. Although not an essential prerequisite for investment savings takes on a 
crucial role in ‘funding’ investments. Financial intermediaries - bond markets and stock 
markets in particular - are used to channel savings to firms looking to convert short term 
bank debt to long term debt in order to reduce their financial commitments, and so 
vulnerability to unforeseen shocks. The opportunity to fund investments should reduce 
levels of risk at both the micro and the macro level. As far as it goes this Keynesian 
refutal of the orthodox position provides a useful basis for the analysis of finance and 
development. However, as discussed in Chapter 3 Keynesian theory provides further 
insights into the behaviour of firms with regard to financing and liquidity management, 
which can provide further insight into the relationship between financial development 
and economic growth. These are discussed in Section 3. The principle of increasing risk 
(PIR) suggests that there will be a limit to the amount of finance extended to firms by 
banks, and the price at which firms can access credit will be a function of banks’ 
perception of the riskiness of the loan. More concretely, the more ‘entrepreneurial capital’ 
available the cheaper and larger the available loan. This suggests that the structure of the 
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firm sector should have a bearing on the levels of lending and depth and level of 
investment. The balance sheet firm also suggests that in the absence of formal funding 
opportunities shallow diversification strategies would be more favourable to firms with 
the means to grow. Post-Keynesian thinking suggests the development of financial 
markets provides more than one more intermediary between savers and investors. Issues 
of stock would, for firms, be a means to recapitalise following fixed capital investments, 
rather than a direct source of finance for investment. In the event of over-inflated markets 
firms might also be expected to become ‘over capitalised’, and, for a period of time, seek 
returns managing current assets on their balance sheet. All of this suggests a role for the 
state in the early stages of economic development. One strategy for LDCs lacking large 
concentrations of private capital and the financial institutions capable of funding firms is 
to create state owned enterprises (SOEs). SOEs could then make large investments with 
by state sanctioned loans. However, they would still face similar issues to private firms 
and would require the state to determine the degree to which it intervened to manage firm 
liquidity. In economies in which the state seeks to divest some part of the state owned 
enterprise sector and grant firms a degree of autonomy the sorts of behaviour anticipated 
by the balance sheet approach will have potential ramifications for the wider economy.
Section 4 summarises the discussion in a series of ‘propositions’ that will be explored in 
Chapters 4-6 in a study of Vietnam. Section 5 concludes.
4.2. Financial Liberalisation Hypothesis
In many macroeconomic models the role of financial institutions is neutral25. Banks and 
other financial institutions are omitted, and instead a direct link between savers and 
investors is assumed. The supply of savings by households is determined by their inter-
temporal preferences, and is inversely related to the interest rate. The demand for 
investment is a function of the (diminishing) marginal product of capital (MPC). 
Equilibrium is at the rate of interest at which the supply of savings is equal to its demand, 
a function of household thrift and productivity. An excess demand for funds will tend to 
raise the interest rate above the MPC. Conversely, an excess of savings will confront a 
25. See for example Woodford (2002). 
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falling interest rate. An exogenous shock, such as a technological improvement that raises 
the marginal product of capital, would bring about an increased demand for capital, and 
so savings. Assuming that consumers’ preferences remain unchanged, an increase in the 
interest rate will lead to a concomitant decrease in consumption and increase in savings, 
so providing producers with required funds.
In a liberalised economy with well working financial institutions savings, regulated by 
the interest rate, will flow freely to investors. At full employment income will be 
allocated according to marginal returns to factors of production, a function of relative 
factor scarcities. There are, however, a number of approaches dating to at least 
Schumpeter (1911) that propose ways in which the financial sector can have real effects. 
New Keynesian models, for instance, focus on the impact of market failures on the ability 
of financial intermediaries to properly perform their economic function. The classic 
example is Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) who argue that the presence of market failures in the 
financial and banking system could make a policy of financial liberalisation less efficient 
than one of repression. The prospect of moral hazard or adverse selection might mean 
higher interest rates attract less efficient investors. Immature banking systems in LDCs 
might well be particularly prone to market failure, as they lack the expertise to monitor 
projects. In particular informational asymmetries between lenders on the one hand and 
borrowers on the other may impact on the real economy. If lenders cannot determine the 
riskiness of borrowers they will tend to pay a price for securities that represents the 
average quality of firms or risk of default - a price that is lower than the market price for 
reliable firms, and higher than for riskier firms. Alternatively firms with riskier projects 
will be more willing to pay higher rates, and so discourage lending at higher rates. More 
recent models concerned primarily with developed economies focus on sticky prices, 
including interest rates, but also assume a neutral, if not absent financial sector 
(Woodford 2003).
An alternative, but related proposition is that financial repression can lead to sub-optimal 
outcomes in already savings starved economies. The financial liberalisation hypothesis 
(FLH), posits that financial liberalisation leads to a more efficient allocation of scarce 
capital (Goldsmith 1969). The argument was articulated most fully by McKinnon (1973) 
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and Shaw26 (1973) in two complementary contributions. ‘Less developed countries’ 
suffered from financial repression, in which state intervention in banking and finance 
sectors restricted the opportunities for resource starved economic units to make use of 
financial services. Financial repression refers to interest rate ceilings, high reserve 
requirements and quantitive restrictions, all of which enable state favoured firms in 
‘urban enclaves’ to benefit from privileged access to cheap credit, resulting in an 
inefficient allocation of savings, low levels of total savings and ‘fragmented’ economies, 
in which those with resources have no way of channelling funds to those with viable 
projects but no funding (McKinnon 1973). Small rural firms are confined to small scale, 
low technology production as they cannot afford to make the relatively large discrete 
investments in new technologies and infrastructure27. If they save they tend to save 
inventory or other physical assets. They would be better off, argued McKinnon, if they 
saved money balances. He therefore proposed the extension of ‘financial institutions’ to 
rural areas and the setting of (higher) market determined interest rates, which would serve 
the dual purpose of attracting savings and discouraging the sorts of inefficient 
investments that typify the urban enclave. Financial liberalisation further increases 
economic efficiency in a number of ways: households are presented with a wider 
selection of financial assets and instruments, financial intermediaries can pool savings 
and package loans in ways more suited to borrowers, and they can monitor the 
performance of projects, reducing risk for savers and encouraging specialisation.
A number of studies have sought to test the various facets of the FLH. These have 
examined the relationship between financial deepening and growth, the elasticity of the 
interest rate with respect to savings and growth, and the claim that firms treat financial 
and real assets as ‘complementary’.  
4.2.1. Financial deepening and Growth
26. Ed Shaw was an advisor the the Korean government as they underwent financial reform in the 1970s 
(Woo 1991).
27. McKinnon’s example was a green revolution; a liberal financial sector would enable farmers to save in 
order to purchase new seed varieties or technology.  
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Such studies tend to find a strong correlation between economic growth and financial 
development, measured using a proxy or proxies for financial deepening. In a cross 
country study of 35 countries Goldsmith (1969) found countries that experienced rapid 
growth tended also to have above average rates of financial development (measured as 
bank assets to GDP). King and Levine (1993b) analysed 80 countries between 1960 and 
1989 and again found economic growth was positively correlated with financial 
development. They also found that levels of financial development were a predictor of 
subsequent rates of growth, physical capital accumulation and economic progress, 
concluding that ‘finance seems importantly to lead economic growth’. Cooley and Smith 
(1991) found that financial markets promoted specialization and technological 
innovation. Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) pointed to the relationship between financial 
development and capital accumulation and productivity growth. Focussing exclusively on 
dominant manufacturing sectors Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that ‘financial 
development has a substantial supportive influence on the rate of economic growth and 
this works, at least partly, by reducing the cost of external finance to financially 
dependent firms’. Whilst accepting the correlation between financial development and 
GDP growth a number of studies view financial development as an outcome of the 
development process, rather than a driver. Robinson (1952), for example, argued that at 
high rates of economic growth there is a greater demand for new and more sophisticated 
financial instruments. 
Arestis and Demetririades (1996) questioned King and Levine’s claim that finance led 
growth, arguing that King and Levine’s findings were not as strong as they claimed. They 
and Demetririades and Hussein (1996) showed that the relationship between financial 
development and growth is more nuanced and depends on the sorts of financial 
institutions and policies in place in individual countries. 
Manning (2003) re-examines studies that find a relationship between economic growth 
and financial development, and concludes that the findings are not as robust as claimed. 
He suggests further that growth can just as easily be correlated with political, legal and 
institutional factors, particularly in Asian countries where country studies point to the 
importance of non-financial factors in periods of rapid growth. Similarly, Arestis and 
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Demetriades (1999) argue that much of the FLH literature ignores or downplays the 
importance of institutions such as the legal system (for establishing and enforcing 
contracts and property rights), the state’s role in inspiring ‘confidence in money’s 
capacity to retain value’, banking supervision, central banks and stock markets. Whilst 
cross country studies can provide evidence at a general level variations can often be 
explained by reference to dynamics in individual countries. 
4.2.2. The elasticity of the interest rate with respect to savings, investment 
and growth
The key claim of McKinnon and Shaw is that financial repression corresponds to a low 
(relative to equilibrium) real rate of interest (which could be negative) which discourages 
saving. Higher interest rates, an outcome of liberalisation would encourage units to save 
by placing money balances in financial institutions. There is substantial evidence money 
balances and physical assets are complementary28, however other posited relationships 
are more problematic. 
A number of studies have tested the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to either 
savings, investment or growth, and whether higher interest rates have a positive effect on 
saving. Modigliani (1986) found there was a relationship between the saving ratio and the 
interest rate. Fry (1988), in an influential study, also found a relationship. However, this 
was then questioned by Giovanni (1983) and Gupta (1987), who pointed to regional 
variations in his results. Fry himself later admitted that ‘if an effect exists at all it is 
relatively small’ (quoted in Arestis and Demetriades (1997)). The relationship between 
the interest rate and saving has also been questioned in a number of further studies. Gupta 
(1987) studied 22 Asian and Latin American countries, and found little to support the 
relationship, concluding that the most important determinant of savings is income. In a 
study of Asian countries Giovannini (1983) also found little evidence that higher interest 
rates called forth higher savings. The World Bank (1989) made similar findings, as did 
Nissanke in a study of Africa (1990), and De Mel and Tybout (1986) in Uruguay.
28. See Ajewole (1989), Thornton (1990), Khan & Hasan (1998) and more recently Odhiambo (2004) in 
Kenya.
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Warman and Thirlwall (1994) studied the relationship in Mexico between 1960 and 1990. 
Whilst higher interest rates were correlated with increased financial saving, savings also 
grew in periods of negative interest rates. Significantly financial saving was most closely 
correlated with income, and increases in financial saving did not necessarily imply an 
increase in total saving. Moreover, an increase in the level of financial savings also might 
not necessarily lead to increased efficiency (Warman and Thirwell 1994). At lower levels 
of development alternative modes of saving such as curb markets, or non-money assets 
such as gold or other non-financial assets may be more efficient. Asking whether 
financial saving was more efficient bought no firm conclusion: ‘financial saving may 
remain in the financial sector for speculation purposes and not lead to more productive 
investment’ (ibid.).
A further criticism is that the FLH ignores the impact of short run capital flows and the 
spectre of speculation (Arestis 2006). The FLH, at least in its earlier incarnations, tended 
to assume a closed economy and did not consider the impact of a higher interest rate on 
foreign capital inflows, which in many countries has proved destabilising (Arestis 2006, 
Bhaduri 2004). Foreign capital inflows can also lead to stock market expansion, which 
‘erodes policy autonomy, and, in the case of a fixed exchange rate policy, it forces 
monetary authorities to maintain high interest rates to sustain investor confidence and 
greed’ (Arestis 2006, p.  360). Financial liberalisation may also lead to ‘high risk 
speculative transactions in the economy and to the increased vulnerability to financial 
crises’ (Ibid., p.359).
4.3. A post-Keynesian Alternative
New Keynesian and FLH approaches continue to maintain that it is savings that drives 
the accumulation process, so economic policy should be concerned primarily with 
maximising the availability of prior savings and ensuring its efficient distribution. The 
firm appears as the agent in informational principle agent problems, where the market 
failure is located in the capacity of the banking sector to properly assess the credit-
worthiness of borrowers, as a rent seeking member of the urban enclave or as an isolated 
and small rural firm. Firms are a passive partner in their relationship with the financial 
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sector. In the absence of serious market failure and in the presence of fully liberalised 
financial markets the Modigliani-Miller proposition that the financial structure of the firm 
has no impact on the value or operating decisions is assumed to hold (Modigliani and M. 
Miller 1958). 
The most fundamental critique of the FLH is to be found in the Keynesian and Kaleckian 
conception of the monetary production economy. The FLH rests on the principle that 
investment is dependent on ‘prior-saving’, hence the emphasis on attracting savings to the 
banking system. Schumpeter had long taken issue with the notion that banks simply 
advanced accumulated savings to finance starved firms, and believed that such a view 
would be consigned to history:
‘[for a] typical economist, writing around 1900… credit is quite 
independent of the existence or non-existence of banks and can be 
understood without any reference to them. . . . The public is . . . the true 
lender. Bankers are nothing but its agents, middlemen who do the actual 
lending on behalf of the public and whose existence is a mere matter of 
division of labor. . . . They add nothing to the existing mass of liquid 
means, though they make it to do more work.’ 
(Schumpeter 1954, p.1113)  
For Schumpeter in an economy at full capacity banks advanced credit to entrepreneurs 
who were then able to afford and recombine resources to create innovate products or 
processes that reconfigured the structure of the economy (Schumpeter 1954).
In Keynesian and Kaleckian models it is investment that leads to saving. Kalecki, 
manipulating national accounts identities, demonstrates that assuming that households 
don’t save, wages finance consumption and firm savings are equal to profits. Using the 
Keynesian savings identity: 
(1) S = I + (G-T) + (X-M)
And, distinguishing capitalist (SC) and workers saving (SW), capitalists’ saving is as 
follows:
(2) SC = I + (G-T) + (X-M) - SW
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Profits must equal capitalist saving and consumption (CC) so,
(3) P = SC + CC = I + (G-T) + (X-M) + CC - SW 
Capitalists can only determine their levels of consumption and investment, not profits. 
Therefore, capitalists’ consumption and investment define profits. It is the decision of 
firms to invest that leads to the accumulation of savings.
Moreover, the distribution of profits among firms will influence the levels of investment 
by firms and sectors (to the degree that sector characteristics or distribution of firms 
within a sector determines the level of profits). Firms that command high profits and so 
can accumulate savings have access to a higher level of both savings and borrowed funds, 
assuming as will be discussed below that the possession of collateral influences access to 
credit. 
4.3.1. Banks
The decision of capitalists to consume some portion of profits (and workers save, if the 
assumption is dropped) means firms must turn to bank credit to finance at least some 
portion of investment. Banks are therefore in a position to put a halt to any expansion in 
demand (Sawyer 2006). The ‘amount of credit and money follows the demand for credit’, 
and any economic expansion can be aborted by banks refusing to either provide loans, or 
raising the price of loans (Sawyer  2006, p. 172)29. 
The degree to which banks actually create money is a contentious one. Among post-
Keynesians there are a number of different approaches, ranging from those who 
understand the supply of money to be infinitely elastic with respect to the Central Bank 
discount rate (Moore 1988), and those who see the banks and other factors as setting a 
limit on the supply of credit (Arestis and Howells 1996). Empirical studies suggest that 
the degree of endogeneity is closely related to the level of development of the banking 
sector (see below) and a country’s financial institutions.
29.  Kalecki, therefore, is consistent with theories of endogenous money in arguing that it is loans that 
determine deposits (Sawyer 2006).
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The ability to finance and fund investments and the direction of causality between 
savings and investment is determined by the level of development of the finance sector. 
Two prominent descriptions of the development of the finance and banking sector are 
provided by Lance Taylor and Victoria Chick. Lance Taylor developed his own ‘stages’ 
account of the development of finance in developing countries. For Taylor Stage 1 
corresponds to an economic structure dominated by bank lending. Private businesses and 
households borrow from banks, but not from abroad. There are no equity or bond markets 
to speak of, so private and commercial bank bond holdings are zero. The government’s 
total borrowing is from the central bank, whose only other asset is foreign reserves. The 
money supply is the sole liability of the banking system, and the only monetary 
instrument is the requirement that commercial banks hold reserves against deposits. The 
only other bank asset is outstanding credit or loans (Ocampo et al 2009). Stage 2 is the 
development of government or central bank bonds. Stage 3 is the ability of private actors 
to access external (hard currency) finance. Stage 4 finance features the development of 
stock markets. 
Victoria Chick proposed a ‘stages of banking approach’ (Chick 1992). In the first stage 
geographically isolated banks operate as ‘conduits’ between savers and investors. 
Deposits are savings, whose supply stems ‘from an increased supply of high powered 
money not wanted to be held in cash or from a change in the public’s cash/ deposit 
preferences as confidence in the banks grew’. An extension of lending ‘would entail a 
substantial loss of reserves even to the system as a whole’ (Chick 1992). In the second 
stage banks have won the public’s confidence and branching and consolidated clearing 
arrangements mean fewer deposits are lost after loan expansion and deposits are now a 
convenient means of payment. Using deposits for all transactions means they now 
represent ‘all income whether destined for consumption or saving’. Stage 2 also holds the 
potential for the savings/ investment causality to be reversed, as banks can lend beyond 
the level of savings in the economy. At this point loans create deposits. In Stage 3 
interbank lending mechanisms are further developed. Stage 4 sees the central bank accept 
full responsibility for the stability of the banking system, and by operating as the lender 
of last resort embolden banks further. Stage 5 sees banks develop liability management.
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Dow and Ghosh (2008) apply Chick’s stages approach to former Soviet bloc countries. 
Critiquing banking reforms in sixteen countries they argue that reformers ahistoricism 
and their inability to take into account the ‘peculiarities of the soviet system’ hampered 
the successful working of the system. One major problem was the difficulties many 
countries had in building and maintaining confidence in the banking system. Without 
such confidence it is difficult to reach Stage 4, or even Stage 3. Dow et al. suggest that 
there are a further four phases prior to Chick’s Stage 1. Phase 1 is the period under central 
planning, in which there is a separation of corporate and retail banking. Phase 2 is the 
beginning of transition, characterised by hyperinflation and a complete loss of confidence 
in banks. The ‘monetary overhang’ generated under central planning is ‘translated into 
hyperinflation’, wiping out the purchasing power of bank deposits and eroding the 
public’s trust in the banking sector’. Households turn to foreign currency and other assets 
to hold savings, and hold cash money for transactions. The demand for cash money 
increases following the expansion of the retail trade sector and wholesale markets. 
Supplies of cash money created by the Central Bank circulate outside of the banking 
sector. Non-cash money accumulates in the banking sector ‘and a complete collapse of 
trust in banks meant that achieving immediate convertibility between cash money and 
non-cash money could only come at the cost of a an undesirably high rate of inflation’. 
As a result of difficulties attracting cash bank credits shrink affecting the liquidity of the 
system and a payments crisis in the enterprise sector. As a result enterprises start to use 
monetary surrogates.
Phases 3 and 4 are essentially the stages banks should pass through to in order to 
establish a modern banking system. In Phase 3 ‘a sound national currency must be 
established, usually through currency reform and the maintenance of moderate inflation. 
Modernisation of the payments system should follow suit, starting from the corporate 
banking system’. The purpose is to increase confidence in bank liabilities as a safe and 
liquid asset and to attract households’ cash holdings. Phase 4 sees the maintenance of 
national currency and the extension of payments systems reforms to the retail banking 
sector. There will be an increase in deposit based transactions and banks’ ability to create 
credit. Phase 5 corresponds with Chick’s Phase 2, and ‘[b]ank liabilities will be accepted 
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as fully-fledged money by both the corporate sector and the household sector. Banks will 
now be able to create credit endogenously’.
4.3.2. Funding and Financing
Both accounts of the ‘stages’ of financial development suggest that the understanding the 
relationship between firm financing and investment in a developing country requires a 
close analysis of the institutional development of the finance and banking sector. They 
also have implications for the ability off firms to ‘fund’ investments, a concept first 
discussed by Keynes (1937):
‘The entrepreneur when he decides to invest has to be satisfied on two 
points: firstly, that he can obtain sufficient short term finance during the 
period of producing the investment; and secondly, that he can eventually 
fund his short-term obligations by a long-term issue on satisfactory 
conditions.’
(Keynes 1937, p. 217) 
Banks finance investments by advancing credit to firms. Firms then seek to fund their 
liquidity requirements in asset markets. Savings is a crucial requirement for the latter, 
rather than the former (Studart 1995). Credit expansion is then a function of the demand 
for finance, the willingness of banks to lend, and any exogenous constraints (by the 
central bank or government) on bank lending, and savings is primarily dependent on the 
level of income. All this assumes that the banking sector has reached Stage 2. There can 
only be a ‘financial constraint’ if, for some reason, banks refuse to advance firms credit 
(Davidson, 1986, p. 101). Nevertheless, bank financed investment and growth can lead to 
increased financial fragility and instability (Studart 1995), particularly as firms holding 
short term debt in need of refinancing will be dependent on future conditions of credit. 
Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis and distinction between hedged, speculative and 
ponzi firms provides useful insights into the financial positions of firms (Minsky 1992).
Although limited savings need not constrain expansion its availability still plays a vital 
role in funding investments, and so managing borrowers’ and lenders’ risk and tempering 
unwelcome tendencies to financial instability. Financial markets thus play a crucial role 
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as the loci of funding, and providing information for firms issuing securities, underwriters 
and those wishing to purchase securities (Studart 1995). In less developed financial 
systems with smaller and thinner asset markets firms become reliant on bank loans for 
their liquidity needs, however, loans themselves are more likely to be short term, as banks 
are reluctant to take on the risks of long term investments (Studart 1995). Such a situation 
can lead to financial instability, as firms become excessively leveraged and vulnerable to 
interest rate fluctuations, as well as shocks to other sources of income.  
4.3.3. Capital Market Inflation and Overcapitalisation
Stock markets provide firms with the opportunity to both access long term finance and 
the opportunity to fund existing investments. This enables firms to reduce their reliance 
on bank debt for both finance and funding, and, in principle, facilitate larger investments 
at lower risk. However, the concept of ‘funding’ investments implies firms’ interaction 
with asset markets is directly related to real economy operations. Firms ‘only issue 
capital up to the point where the return from their commercial and industrial activities 
would exceed the cost of financing that capital’(Toporowski 2008). However, in practice 
firms issue capital beyond this point and invest the excess capital in liquid rather than 
fixed assets. Toporowski (2008) defines this ‘excess capital’ as the excess of a company’s 
liabilities over its productive capital, i.e., the plant, equipment, materials, and stocks of 
unsold products and semi-fabricates that a firm holds’. ‘If the return from these assets is 
less than is necessary to pay the cost of the excess capital, the margin between them is a 
‘cost of liquidity” (ibid.) There are a number of benefits of such a strategy. Liquid assets 
provide firms with extra collateral, or firms can ‘buy and sell companies in balance sheet 
restructuring that may be profitable as long as capital markets are inflating’ (ibid.). 
Capital market inflation, induced by increases in domestic credit or foreign inflows, can 
provide such firms with potential profits that may even be greater than the costs of 
liquidity. 
Drawing on the experience of Eastern European transition economies Toporowski argues 
that once financial markets become sufficiently liquid capitalists are able to realize 
capital gains by buying and reselling assets in inflating markets. In most developing 
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countries markets are limited to real estate and once developed (as an outcome of the 
privatisation process) the stock market:
‘Once financial markets are established then the obvious assets to 
use for this kind of speculation are financial assets. Real estate 
capital can be turned over more rapidly than industrial capital; 
financial assets can be turned over even more rapidly than real 
estate.’
(Toporowski 2009, p.237)
This process complicates the balance sheet firm, which, it has been argued thus far, seeks 
liquidity to manage its survival in its primary productive activities. Toporowski points to 
the decoupling of finance from production. Firms with access to assets are able to pursue 
profits in asset markets; in the process further inflating them. Amit Bhaduri (2004) 
develops a model to discuss capital inflows to developing countries, and shows that the 
impact on productive investment depends on whether foreign investors ‘purchase equities 
in the primary markets to finance the issue of new equities’ or secondary markets and 
instead of calling forth new investments ‘diverts investments more toward the acquisition 
and merger to create a ‘financial bubble”. Rather than simply facilitating the financing of 
much needed investments financial deepening can affect firm strategies and economic 
stability. The concept of managing excess capital in inflated capital markets essentially 
corresponds to the potential of speculation raised by Arestis (see above) and others.
4.4. The Balance Sheet Firm and Financial Development
There are three elements to the balance sheet firm approach: that the principle of 
increasing risk is likely to apply in LDCs; that small and large firms will have different 
approaches to liquidity management, as well as the sorts and size of investments they 
make; and that the ability to manage liquidity will influence the likelihood of survival and 
that in managing portfolios firms can critically influence financial and other asset markets 
and, also, it was suggested move beyond purely liquidity management to the search for 
profit.
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This section will explore some of the theoretical implications of these propositions and 
provide some empirical support.
4.4.1. Banks, entrepreneurial capital and the principle of increasing risk
The principle of increasing risk (PIR) and the distribution of entrepreneurial capital has 
substantial implications for both the FLH and Keynesian theories of financial 
development. The size composition of the firm sector becomes a determinant of the size 
of individual investments, and so potentially of the level of investment in the economy at 
large and also the likelihood of firm survival. The survival of firms is important, as in an 
economy in which firms are expected to grow ‘organically’ over time a proportion of the 
firm sector will be expected to grow over a substantial period. In a LDC banks tend to 
lend to firms that can provide collateral. The absence of secondary markets for assets 
pledged as collateral may provide a further limit to lending. 
Such a scenario suggests that it is commonplace for banks to limit loans to the extent of 
available collateral (however defined), and for banks to charge higher rates of interest to 
firms they regard to be riskier propositions. 
Empirical studies of the relationship between collateral and lending, and the range of 
interest rates facing firms are mostly testing New Keynesian concepts. In some respects 
the principle of increasing risk and the importance of collateral to bank lending is similar 
to the New Keynesian concept of credit rationing (Sawyer 1996). For example, the 
purpose of collateral was tested by Godlewski et al (2011), who ran a number of 
regressions testing the relationship between collateral and a risk premium, asking whether 
collateral is used by quality borrowers to signal their reliability (in which case there will 
be a negative relationship) or whether banks demand collateral from risky borrowers (a 
positive relationship). They concluded that the relationship is strongest in the presence of 
strong information asymmetries, and find some evidence that in developing countries 
collateral is used by firms to signal their reliability. More generally, their conclusions 
point to the importance of both the availability of collateral and varying interest payments 
as a determinant of the size of bank loans.
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Others have examined the incidence of ‘asset based lending’ (ABL), in which banks only 
lend against physical collateral; and others have analysed the interest rates available to 
firms of different sizes. Tran Dinh Khoi Nguyen, Neelakantan Ramachandran for 
example, discuss the predominance of ABL, in which banks prefer to make loans backed 
with ‘tangible’ collateral (Tran Dinh khoi Nguyen and Ramachandran 2006). Queen and 
Roll (1987) argue that SMEs are likely to have a higher level of business risk, relative to 
large firms’. Firms with a high proportion of ‘tangible’ collateral are assumed to have 
better access to credit, as in moments of ‘financial distress’ they will be better able to 
liquidate their collateral. Wattanapruttipaisan (2003) pointed out that even in developed 
countries SME loans are regarded as a credit risk, and banks tend to insist on collateral. 
In one survey in the United States, for example, 92% of SME loans were secured, and 
53% of total loans (Berger and Udell 1995). In France 76% of loans are secured, and in 
Germany 88.5% (Davydenko and Franks 2005).   According to Miller (2001) and IFC 
(2000) many SMEs in LDCs lack collateral and so access to loans. Using a large data set 
Chakraborty and Mallick (2012) estimate the actual ‘credit gap’ for US firms, the 
difference between the desired and estimated levels of debt for credit constrained small 
businesses, to be an average of 20% for all firms, and 46% for manufacturing firms.
A number of studies have looked at the problem of SME financing in developing 
countries. Hill (2002), for example, examined problems with SME financing in ASEAN 
countries, and found that the vast majority of SMEs (between 70% and 90%) relied on 
own savings and short term informal borrowing for investment financing. The IFC (2000) 
found that in Ghana, Sri Lanka and Tanzania smaller firms had less access to bank loans 
than larger firms. Similarly, APEC (2003) showed that in Indonesia despite a period of 
rapid expansion in financial services for firms in the ‘formal’ sector only 12% of firms 
had access to bank loans.
4.4.2. Liquidity management in Small and Large firms
Liquidity management is closely related to the funding of investments as discussed 
above, and refers to firms’ efforts to ensure they are able to meet upcoming cash 
obligations, particularly current costs and financial commitments. Liquidity management 
enables a firm to cope with unforeseen cash demands, and also to fund investments 
Chapter 4: Financial Development and the Balance Sheet Firm 92
financed with short term bank lending. The inability to do the latter increases the firm’s 
vulnerability and may discourage investments in the first place. It was argued in Chapter 
3 that small firms are reliant on their ‘primary activity’ or ‘income account’. As they have 
limited access to bank credit, face higher borrowing costs and also lack sufficiently liquid 
assets their liquidity is determined by the success of their business line, and by the 
availability of retained earnings. This partly affects the high mortality rates among small 
firms, particularly in developing countries30.
Large firms, on the other hand, tend to develop alternative liquidity management 
strategies. Essentially, as discussed above, firms need to ‘fund’ their investments, 
particularly long term investments. Firms tend to wish to limit bank borrowing (Studart 
1995b), and instead ensure a functional income account, and otherwise hold a portfolio of 
assets that provide both a steady income stream, and are sufficiently liquid to ensure they 
can be sold to meet short term commitments if the need arises. 
The FLH ignores this state of affairs entirely. A liberalised and functioning finance and 
banking system is expected to provide firms with the financing required on the desired 
terms:
‘[A] perfectly competitive capital market will supply the 
economy with all its needs of financing, be it short term or long 
term; the time structure of the rate of interest will accommodate 
the intertemporal preferences and the risk aversion of the savers.’ 
(Studart 1995, p. 271)
An alternative post-Keynesian account argues that as bank financing tends to be short 
term then firms need alternative means to ‘fund’ their investments. In developed 
economies the stock market, bond market and other markets for liquid financial assets 
provide this service. In LDCs firms must either rely on cash flow from their real economy 
activities, short term bank loans or the sale of liquid assets. Of course, firms might also 
30. See Wattanapruttipaisan (2003) for a discussion of mortality rates and SME financing in ASEAN 
countries.
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opt for relatively risk free and small scale investments, that require little prior financing 
and that will generate a rapid return. 
Chapter 3 discussed the potential marriage of Kalecki and Steindl’s distinction between 
large and small firms and Minsky’s balance sheet approach. Large firms, it was argued, 
develop a portfolio of assets that can both provide cash flow and liquidity. They are thus 
able to meet their commitments following investments and also in difficult periods. Table 
2 suggests four categories of firm: small, large, conglomerate and SOE, and in the 
columns possible sources of funding and liquidity.
Table 2: Firms and Financial Institutions 
Conglomerates are firms that operate in two or more distinct sectors, and so can draw on 
different sources of cashflow from their operations in the real economy31. ‘Large’ firms 
are firms classified as being of large size based on criteria such as capitalisation or 
‘Small’ firm
‘Large’ firm
Conglomerate
SOE
Banks
PIR applies; 
limited collateral; 
Access depends 
on collateral and 
relationship
Access depends 
on collateral and 
relationship
Access depends 
on collateral and 
relationship; 
possible access to 
dedicated 
investment bank.
Stock Market
-
Possible source of 
finance and 
funding
Possible source of 
finance and 
funding
Privatisation; 
Bonds
-
Possible source of 
finance and 
funding
Possible source of 
finance and 
funding
Government  
sanctioned issue
Government
Possible 
Government 
programmes
Source of ‘rents’
Source of rents; 
legislative 
flexibility
Subsidies; rents; 
loans; grants; 
determines 
autonomy.
Other
Informal 
finance; 
owners’ 
wealth and 
portfolio.
Portfolio of 
liquid and 
income 
generating 
assets.
Establishes 
subsidiaries
; 
establishes 
banks or 
other 
finance 
institutions
Depends on 
government 
relationship
; 
31. The Oxford Dictionary of Economics defines a conglomerate as ‘a business conducting activities in 
different industries with very little in common’ (Black 2009).
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employees32, but that operate in only one sector. In the absence of asset markets large 
firms are reliant on retained earnings, bank credit and their income account for liquidity, 
and for funding investments. Both Kalecki and Steindl suggested that large firms are also 
able to charge a mark up, something denied ‘marginal firms’, and so generate monopoly 
profits and retained earnings. Studies of large firms in a number of countries suggest that 
rents are a source of profits for many firms, lending some support to this assertion. 
Studart, for example, demonstrated that in the absence of domestic capital markets to 
fund investments Brazilian firms, benefitting from protected domestic markets, generated 
liquidity by increasing mark-ups on prices in protected sectors (Studart 1995b). 
The literature on the corporate history of South East Asia provides some useful insights 
into the origins and strategies of large firms, and particularly diversified conglomerates. It 
demonstrates that the growth of many Southeast Asian conglomerates is underpinned by 
the state that either explicitly granted firms with access to relatively risk free rents, or, 
more implicitly, opted against regulating rent seeking behaviour33.
The literature is divided as to whether such firms and their behaviour was a pragmatic 
response to the absence of formal asset markets that would provide funding opportunities 
to large firms operating in relatively unstable economic environments or a 
straightforward rent seeking. Yoshihara (1988) provides the classic argument that large 
conglomerates who not only pursue monopoly rents, but do so in deliberately low 
technology sectors requiring low levels of investment, give rise to ‘Ersatz Capitalism’, an 
economic model that limits productive investment, technological development and 
growth. Jamie Mackie (2002) and Akira Suehiro (2003), on the other hand, argue that 
whilst there are problems with the practises of large, politically connected conglomerates, 
their behaviour is primarily a response to the conditions and institutional environment in 
which they operated. In other words, in the absence of effective competition and modern 
32. A common classifier of firm size is number of employees; however, as ownership of collateral is an 
important determinant of access to capital some measure of capital assets is also significant. For the purposes 
of this discussion it is only necessary that large firms are not significantly limited in access to credit because 
of a shortage of collateral and that they operate in fewer sectors than conglomerates.
33. See, for example, Doner (1992), Gomez (2002), Studwell (2007), Yoshihara (1988), Suhiro (1996), 
Hutchcroft (1994) and Hewison (1997),
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institutions the diversified conglomerate form designed to maximise cash flow and build 
a portfolio of assets is an effective strategy. In Indonesia, for example, 
‘[M]ost Indonesian conglomerates are highly diversified. This makes 
good sense in an uncertain economic or political environment, as a 
means of spreading risks, but it has hindered serious industrial 
commitment, and long term investment strategy. Liem Sioe Liong… 
controls a vast and heterogenous business empire, a rambling collection 
of enterprises. Cash flow and control of assets seem to be his primary 
aims, not corporate strategy or market dominance, and this is true of the 
other Indonesian conglomerate heads’.
(Mackie 2002, p.181)
Brown (2006), on the other hand, in a seminal analysis of the ‘corporate economy’ in 
Southeast Asia argued that many corporations (the majority of those he studied) used 
‘size and diversified growth as a proxy for the fundamental risk of high debt 
burdens’ (Brown 2006, p.334). Larger firms tended to have a larger debt burden. They 
diversified because they were highly leveraged. Diverse sources of cashflow lowered the 
risk of having to renege of repayments. 
Other studies demonstrate changing strategies as business environments and, particularly 
financial institutions, develop. Wailerdsak (2008), in a survey of corporate structures and 
strategies in Thailand argues that firms that did respond to a changing environment 
tended to have fared better in the Asian crisis. Similarly, studies of individual 
corporations point to changing strategies as financial institutions develop (Sato 1994 and 
2002). Even so, responses to financial development were not always benign. The most 
brazen, but not uncommon, strategy to secure cash flow was to establish or purchase a 
controlling share in lending institutions (Suehiro 1989). A number of firms, for example, 
exploited lax regulation and government contacts to establish banks whose primary 
purpose was to provide liquidity to firms within the group. Brown (2006), highlighted the 
importance of banks to corporate strategies in Indonesia:
‘…[C]orporate empires often had a family bank. Bank Central Asia 
(BCA), the largest private commercial bank in Indonesia, formed the 
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core bank in the Salim Group. It was a major recipient of state revenues, 
foreign aid and foreign direct and portfolio investments, and had access 
to offshore banks as well as to diverse and innovative sources of finance 
such as derivatives. This capital abundance intensified corporate 
economic concentration… A further feature of concentration is the high 
percentage of loans to single individuals, or select groups of 
conglomerates.’ 
(Brown 2006, p.11)
He goes on to discuss in detail the tendency of conglomerate owned banks to lend 
primarily to subsidiaries.
Stockmarkets were also a means to further build the diversified conglomerate. Once 
stockmarkets became firmly established, and in some cases inflated with foreign capital 
inflows many conglomerates built large stock and real estate portfolios, that were 
designed to generate speculative profits rather than a diversified source of cashflow 
(Habir 1999). Brown (2006) discusses the impact of inflows of portfolio capital into 
Southeast Asian markets in the 1980s and 1990s:
‘The large concentrated positions of portfolio capital in targeting 
specific sectors of the economy (property, finance and currency 
markets), their herding and manipulative activities, not only increase 
speculation but assist in creating large diversified corporations in 
Southeast Asia, which are reluctant to specialise because diversification 
provided revenues, reduced risks and concealed problems of quality in 
subsidiaries and connected firms.’ 
(Brown 2006, p. 149)
In summary, the corporate history of Southeast Asia suggests that one source of growth 
for firms in less developed countries is politically determined rents, and that such firms 
manage risk through diversification into relatively risk-free activities that provide cash 
flow to meet commitments and retained earnings for investment. Financial development, 
or more specifically, liberalisation of banking systems and capital markets, can provide 
the means to fund investments and better manage liquidity. However, it can also provide a 
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means to generate cash flow and profit from the manipulation of a portfolio account, 
particularly in periods of capital market inflation.
4.5. Vision and Propositions
The discussion thus far in this chapter and in Chapter 4 suggests a clear ‘vision’ and a 
series of propositions or event regularities that can be explored in an empirical study of a 
developing country. This section will elaborate a series of hypothetical scenarios that may 
play out as an economy and its financial system develop. It will first outline an economy 
populated solely by small firms, suggesting that investments will depend on savings rates, 
the availability of collateral and prospects of survival. It will then suggest that in the 
presence of large firms asset markets might prove destabilising as firms choose to seek 
returns via their portfolio account. It will then explore the implications of state owned 
enterprises; one solution to the absence of entrepreneurial capital and less than optimal 
levels of private investment. It will finally set out a series of propositions that will be 
explored in the remainder of this thesis. 
4.5.1. Private Sector Growth
One way to think through the implications of the balance sheet firm for understanding 
financial development is to develop a simple model in which firm types and financial 
institutions are gradually introduced. Beginning with a stationary state in which 
investment in each period is financed entirely by savings from the previous period, and in 
which it is assumed that either workers do not save, or that workers’ savings is entirely 
passed on to firms, and all savings is used by firms. Using this simple framework it is 
possible to see the implications for a country’s development prospects of the composition 
of the firm sector. 
In such a hypothetical example of an economy populated entirely by ‘small 
proprietorships’, indeed much the same as that envisaged by McKinnon, Jan Kregel 
demonstrates that an economy may grow slowly (Kregel 1989). In a closed economy in 
which small firms are financed by their single owner’s equity, all profits are invested and 
workers do not save the rate of growth will depend on the ‘distribution of income as 
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determined by a Kaleckian degree of monopoly within the limits of subsistence’. On the 
other hand if workers save then firms will need to borrow to finance investment in excess 
of net profits. ‘But bank lending to small firms will be limited... by the value of the 
owner’s assets available as collateral’. If workers’ savings exceed the value of assets 
owned by firms accepted by banks as collateral then there would still be a deficiency of 
demand. The larger the average size of firms then the more likely the economy will grow 
over time. The evolution of the debt-equity ratio will ‘depend on the relative size of 
profits and workers’ savings in national income’ (Kregel 1989). If savings exceed profits 
then the debt-equity ratio will tend toward unity. However, it is likely lending will cease 
long before this point is reached as lenders risk becomes too high, and as the interest rate 
correspondingly rises above the internal rate of return of investments, both increasing the 
reluctance of entrepreneurs to borrow and also increasing the incomes of lenders, and so 
increasing the savings rate further.
Although larger firms, in possession of greater collateral may be able to access credit in 
the absence of funding opportunities they will also limit the size of their investments 
relative to own capital so as to ensure their liquidity. The implication of the balance sheet 
firm is that the availability of funding opportunities has a bearing on the size and type of 
investment. In the absence of financial markets larger firms may choose to diversify 
sources of cash flow and limit the size and riskiness of investments, in the process 
limiting borrower’s risk. Diversified cash flow also has the potential to provide a more 
stable source of financing for investments.
The need to fund investments, or in the absence of funding opportunities to limit financial 
commitments associated with fixed capital investments stems from the desire to remain 
sufficiently liquid and avoid insolvency. In perfect markets bankruptcy should have few 
wider economic implications, as assets can be resold costlessly in secondary markets. 
However, in developing countries such markets are imperfect. Moreover, although 
bankruptcy may have little wider economic implications, it will at the level of the firm, 
and so managers and owners will seek to avoid it. Theories of the firm that stress the 
accumulation of capabilities and intangible assets also suggest that there are economic 
losses associated with bankruptcy. If learning is a function of firm survival, and the size 
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and complexity of investments then the type of firm that makes an investment and the 
chances of that firm’s survival have a direct bearing on economic development.
The introduction of financial markets gives firms the opportunity to fund investments, 
and so, limit both borrower’s and lender’s risk. Financial markets then have the 
possibility of increasing the ‘functionality’ of financing systems and limiting financial 
instability (Studart 1995b). However, such an outcome also relies on the strategies of 
firms vis a vis markets. The balance sheet firm suggests that firm strategy can vary 
according to the buoyancy of markets. During periods of capital market inflation firms 
may choose to become ‘over capitalised’ and hold a greater portion of current assets - 
particularly cash and short term financial assets. This, in turn provides opportunities for 
speculation and accessing further loans, which may serve either to provide the firm with a 
portfolio of revenue generating liquid assets and so provide extra levels of stability or 
contribute further to capital market inflation and, in the event of a market downturn, 
increase the firm’s financial instability. 
Over time an economy may develop an enterprise sector with distinct categories of firms 
with regard to the finance and banking sector. Small firms, running an income account, 
with limited access to credit or finance markets will generally make smaller, less capital 
intensive investments. Mortality rates will generally be higher. Larger firms, able to 
generate greater revenues, will be able to make larger investments depending on profit 
margins and so available retained earnings. However, to ensure sufficient cash flow to 
manage commitments and an uncertain business environment they will also refrain from 
capital intensive investments and diversify their investment portfolio. The South East 
Asia experience suggests that such firms will likely seek to invest in areas with minimal 
competition. 
The introduction of institutions that enable firms to ‘fund’ investments may facilitate 
more capital intensive investments, particularly by larger firms. The opportunity to 
exchange short term debt for equity will reduce commitments and decrease both 
borrower’s and lender’s risk. Those same institutions will also provide firms with the 
opportunity to better manage a portfolio account of liquid assets. 
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One way for developing countries to overcome the absence of large entrepreneurial 
capital is to directly finance large firm investments. The behaviour of firms will be 
determined by institutional rules set by the state. However, the state will have to decide 
the degree to which it manages firm liquidity by supporting firm efforts to fund 
investments. If the state chooses to allow firms’ autonomy in their financial operations 
then they must have some means of determining the true intentions of SOEs with regard 
to diversification and interaction with financial markets. The following section discusses 
the possible implications of the balance sheet firm for state owned enterprises.
4.5.2. State owned enterprises
Economies undergoing institutional change from command economy to more typically 
capitalist structures present further complications. Most former members of the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance or Comecon adopted radical reforms, creating new 
institutions almost overnight. This thesis, however, will look in detail at the experience of 
Vietnam. Vietnam did not see the need to tear down all existing institutions, and construct 
what many saw as overtly capitalist institutions. Reform was a more drawn out affair. A 
commonly used phrase to describe the process is ‘feeling for the stones to cross the 
river’34. The stated aim was to build an economy that was a mix of market and socialist 
institutions and attributes.
In a pure command economy all sectors are part of one administered whole, in which 
prices are primarily an accounting tool. The banking system is a mono-banking system, 
in which the state bank carries out all banking functions: currency creation, allocation of 
credit, creation and management of deposits, the management of foreign currency and so 
on. Firms are in essence factories. They are single productive units that do not possess or 
manage balance sheets. Using Minsky’s schema they are plant, with the state taking the 
role of entrepreneur. However, unlike Minksy’s entrepreneur the state is not primarily 
concerned either with revenues or costs (which are anyway difficult to measure), or with 
the value of assets and liabilities on the firm’s balance sheet, as they also do not possess a 
market price, are not tradable and do not affect the firm’s solvency, or liquidity (again an 
34. The phrase is originally attributed to Deng Xiaoping. 
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unimportant concept). Transactions between firms are recorded in the banking system. 
Interaction with the outside world is typically in the form of barter. If there are private 
firms, they are typically small traders, possessing little capital.
Households are expected only to consume according to the plan. The state provides 
essential services such as housing, education and health care. As a result wages are low, 
and workers are often paid in kind. Households tend not to save, although some do hold 
accounts in the state bank, and nor do they require loans.
The process of ‘reform’ requires the sectors achieve a degree of separation, goods and 
asset markets must develop and channels for the flows of profits, wages, interest and 
transfers must come into being.
At the firm level there are two (or maybe three) distinct processes at work. The first, and 
most straightforward, is the establishment of new private enterprises. Such firms come 
into being in the post command economy period, and are not the direct result of some 
form of organisational transformation. Assuming there is no capitalist class and that 
equity markets are, if existing, small newly established private firms are likely to be have 
the following characteristics:
•  They are single activity firms.
•  They are almost entirely debt financed.
•  Owners are likely to also be managers. 
The second process is the transformation of state owned enterprises. As suggested above 
in the planning period SOEs are essentially factories, and do not possess their own 
balance sheets. Managers are concerned entirely with production, and are not required to 
consider issues such as strategy or finance. In becoming a functioning economic unit in a 
market orientated economy the firm takes command of its own balance sheet, and also of 
what it produces rather than simply how. However, in the absence of any substantive 
reorganisation of the firm sector SOEs remain single activity firms.
If SOEs are privatised then they effectively join the ranks of newly private firms. If not, 
and some form of state ownership is maintained then the state must make a number of 
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decisions. The first is the distribution of profits. Profits can be distributed to investment 
as retained earnings, to shareholders as dividends and to government as either dividends 
or taxation, which amount to the same thing. Firms are financed via revenues, bank loans 
and transfers. Given the importance of SOEs to the success of the economic plan, policy 
loans are likely to depend less on firms viability as an economic entity, and more on the 
importance of the objective to the government.
First, it is possible to imagine a scenario identical to private sector led development. The 
government chooses to finance small, single activity firms that act either autonomously 
or according to some form of development plan. Either way firms would confront the 
principle of increasing risk, and the inability to protect themselves in the event of shocks 
to their primary (only) markets. Extra government expenditure takes the form of higher 
transfers to the firm sector, funded by taxation and/ or credit creation by state owned 
banks. The government must decide whether it limits itself solely to financing start up 
firms, or it also makes some form of commitment to the long term survival of such firms. 
The latter strategy would involve a commitment to support distressed firms and also to 
fund long term investments.
The latter commitment is particularly important if the government is pursuing some form 
of development strategy, as typically the justification for government intervention is large 
scale investment that might otherwise not be undertaken (Lin et al. 2001). This presents a 
separate set of issues associated with the government’s stance on monopoly profits and 
also with strategies to ensure long run liquidity. As argued in Chapter 3 large scale private 
firms can limit their exposure to borrower’s risk through the accumulation of retained 
earnings, which they source through mark-up pricing. In other words, such firms both 
achieve and maintain their large size through their ability to generate supernormal profits. 
Moreover, such firms are able to manage the vagaries of fluctuations in revenues in 
primary business lines by building a diversified portfolio of liquid real and financial 
assets, that both grant revenue streams and can be sold if necessary in asset markets.
A further consideration is the source of such profits. In some ways large firms in 
developing countries are the ‘marginal’ firms of Chapter 3. They tend to operate in 
markets with demand determined prices, and lack the capabilities to develop more 
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profitable activities. As such building monopoly positions without state support is 
difficult. Moreover, exposure to unpredictable prices increases the risk of insolvency. 
The second major attribute of the large balance sheet firm is the propensity to build a 
portfolio of assets to manage liquidity. This presents the government with a number of 
difficulties. First, firms are charged with the efficient and productive use of state funds to 
achieve a defined objective. As such investing in areas outside of the plan is likely to 
receive some resistance. From the perspective of a government looking to manage scarce 
resources, such investments look at best like the frivolous use of state funds, and, at 
worse, attempted theft. However, from the perspective of the firm, investments outside of 
core activities serve a crucial purpose, as a source of diversity, and as a means to build a 
liquid portfolio to better manage crisis. If the government insists firms devote the 
majority of their resources to their primary activity, then the government must in turn 
take some of the responsibility for the firm’s liquidity. If not, then the government must 
be able to distinguish between speculative and legitimate projects.
4.6. Propositions
The literature discussed in this chapter, coupled with the discussion of the balance sheet 
firm of Chapter 3 suggests that any analysis of the relationship between financial 
development and economic development should incorporate a close study of the firm 
sector and the sources of both finance and funding for different categories of firm. The 
remainder of this thesis will undertake such a study in Vietnam, an economy that has 
undergone recent financial development and in which the state plays a considerable role. 
The discussion in this chapter can generate a number of propositions that can be explored 
empirically:
A. That small firms with limited collateral and reliant on their income 
account will both struggle to attract finance, and have restricted 
means to manage liquidity and ‘fund’ investments.
B. That large firms will have more liberal access to finance, but in the 
absence of the opportunity to fund investments will engage in 
typically small scale investments and/ or seek to diversify their 
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sources of cash flow, and possibly develop a precautionary portfolio 
of liquid assets.
C. Following from proposition (B) large firms might choose to diversify 
into a number of unrelated sectors that require limited capital 
investment, and if asset markets are available may build a portfolio of 
liquid assets. 
D. In the absence of financial markets firms will limit use to bank loans, 
as they will struggle to fund their loans, and will choose the 
‘conglomerate’ form. Once financial markets are established firms 
will finance investments with bank loans and retained earnings and 
fund them with capital issues.
E. In the event of capital market inflation large firms may hold ‘excess 
capital’ and seek capital gains in capital markets.
F. State owned enterprises will be dependent on government for 
liquidity management; and/ or they will operate as large firms or 
conglomerates.
4.7. Methodology
A variety of approaches will be used to explore these propositions in Vietnam. 
Fundamental to the argument is that the development of financial institutions provides 
new instruments to firms to both finance and fund investments. Moreover, new financial 
instruments will stimulate new flows of funds within the economy, as will more 
liberalised reform of the economy. To this end Chapter 6 will develop a flow of funds 
analysis of the Vietnamese economy. It will seek to demonstrate the evolution of flows, 
and how institutional development has  affected the change. It will look closely at 
aggregate flows as well as specific instruments such as bank deposits, bonds and stocks. 
The next stage will be to look at the relationship between financial development and the 
firm sector in light of the discussion in this and the previous chapter. A number of 
techniques will be used:
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• Existing firm studies in Vietnam will be consulted in order to seek insights into 
the changing relationship between the enterprise sector and the finance sector. 
• An analysis of the World Bank enterprise survey for 2005 and 2009 in Vietnam 
will shed some light on the financial behaviour of smaller firms in Vietnam. 
• A series of case studies of some of Vietnam’s largest firms will provide evidence 
of changing strategies, and in particular strategies unique to the state owned 
sector.
• To investigate the role of the stockmarket on firm financing and funding 
behaviour firm balance sheets will be analysed. Listed firms are required to 
publish quarterly balance sheets, which are publicly available. However, few 
firms have been listed for longer than five years, and most are equitised state 
owned enterprises. Nevertheless, it is still possible to see if the general sequence 
as proposed by Davidson, Studart and others generally holds. Specifically, firms 
finance investments with retained earnings and bank loans, and later fund them 
with stock market issues, which would in turn be used to pay down accumulated 
debt. Such analysis will also enable analysis of whether state firms operate 
differently to private firms, and whether firms forego banks loans, or issue shares 
purely for liquidity reasons.
4.8. Conclusion
The Financial Liberalisation Hypothesis suggests that policies to liberalise the finance 
system in developing economies will serve to improve access to finance for firms that in 
underdeveloped financial systems and systems characterised by financial repression 
struggle to secure capital for investment. Empirical studies of the key tenets of the FLH 
suggest that the relationship between financial liberalisation and economic growth is 
more complicated and nuanced than its proponents suggests. The causal relationship 
between financial development and economic growth is questioned in a number of 
studies, as is the relationship between interest rates and savings. Other critiques 
emphasise the importance of institutional factors that fall outside of empirical studies of 
the impact of financial development, as well as the destabilising impact of foreign capital 
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flows. Post-Keynesian approaches to financial development and the role of the finance 
sector present more fundamental challenges to the FLH. Specifically, post-Keynesian 
approaches invert the relationship between savings and investment, and emphasise the 
role of the finance system as a source of funding as well as financing for firms. Victoria 
Chick and Lance Taylor propose accounts of economic development that emphasise a 
series of stages in which key institutions come to influence the economy. This chapter 
suggested that the ideas developed in Chapter 3 contribute further to post-Keynesian 
approaches to economic development. It argued that the balance sheet firm implies that in 
the absence of institutions facilitating liquidity management and the funding of 
investments firm behaviour might differ according to the level of financial development. 
Moreover, adapting the insights of Kalecki and Steindl different types of firms might 
interact with the finance and banking sector in different ways, suggesting that the 
composition of the enterprise sector will have a bearing on the impact of financial 
development. The discussion was also extended to economies in which governments 
sought to compensate for the absence of entrepreneurial capital by supporting enterprise 
development. As and if state sponsored firms were granted autonomy, funding and 
liquidity management needs would present challenges to both government and the 
financial system. These ideas will be explored further in the remainder of this thesis in a 
study of Vietnam.    
5.
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Chapter 5: Institutional Reform in Vietnam
5.1. Introduction
In this and the following two chapters, the ideas developed in Chapters 3 and 4 are 
explored in the context of Vietnam. Vietnam is an interesting country of study for a 
number of reasons. In a period of continuous reform, known as Doi Moi, Vietnam has 
grown from one of the world’s poorest countries to middle income status (USD 1,000 per 
capita per annum). As a former command economy reforms in Vietnam have concerned 
not only the development of the private sector, but also the state sector, enabling analysis 
of the state owned enterprise as a possible solution to the absence of private 
entrepreneurial capital in a less developed country. Banking reforms have also 
encompassed both the dismantling of a mono-banking system and then the liberalisation 
of the banking sector in line with WTO commitments.  In this Vietnam is unusual as it 
has been slow to adopt the tenets of the Washington consensus. This allows consideration 
of both the impact of liberalisation of enterprise and banking sectors and policies to retain 
control of the developmental process through restrictions of both the enterprise and 
financial sector.
5.2. Vietnam - Background
Vietnam has made remarkable progress since the beginning of the 1990s. GDP growth 
rates have averaged 7.6 percent. Slowdowns can be directly attributed to the Asian crisis 
and the more recent global financial crisis. In that time all the significant economic 
indicators show considerable development. Vietnam’s economic interaction with the 
outside world grew dramatically, aided in part by a string of trade agreements. Trade 
(imports plus exports) grew from 23 percent of GDP in 1986, to 97 percent in 1998, to 
171 percent in 200835. From a position of near famine in the mid-1980s Vietnam became 
a net exporter of agricultural output by the mid -1990s, and is now one of the leading 
exporters of rice, rubber, seafood, coffee, garments and footwear. Vietnam is also an 
35. The global financial crisis forced a reduction to 131 percent of GDP in 2009.
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attractive destination for foreign investment. In 2009 registered FDI capital stood at over 
USD 29 billion36.
The Vietnamese economy is also undergoing rapid structural change. Distinguishing 
between a manufacturing sector and an agricultural sector we can see that since the 
mid-1990s manufacturing output increased as a proportion of total output at the expense 
of agriculture (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Contribution to GDP by Sector (%)
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Source: GSO.gov.vn37 
The manufacturing sector is employing increasing numbers of people every year and the 
proportion of the labour force working in agriculture is falling. People are moving from 
the countryside to work in urban areas or semi-urban areas. Although more detailed data 
are hard to come by there is enough to paint a rough picture of a changing agricultural 
landscape. According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) 
since 2001 land devoted to crops has dropped from over 4.3 million ha to 4.13 million ha. 
In 2007, land devoted to rice cultivation fell by 125,000 ha. By 2020 another 600,000 ha 
36. Again, economic difficulties across the world has affected the rate of growth in FDI since 2009.
37. http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=468&idmid=3&ItemID=12980, accessed 28th June 2012.
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of land will be converted to nonagricultural uses and a further 300,000 of paddy planted 
with more lucrative crops (MARD 2008). 
A significant proportion of the growth in manufacturing is attributed to the growth in 
foreign direct investment. The World Bank estimates that 189.6 trillion VND, or 58 
percent of total investment by the business sector (including State Owned Enterprises) in 
2007 was foreign direct investment, portfolio investment or foreign lending (World Bank 
2009). At the same time 53.3 percent of manufacturing sector revenues was from exports. 
Much of that from foreign firms based in Vietnam.
Foreign and private firms have also become increasingly significant in terms of total 
output. Figure 2 shows that the foreign invested sector has also come to dominate 
exports.
Figure 2: Exports of Foreign and Domestic Sector (Mill USD)
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The rapid changes in the Vietnamese economy have occurred during a period of ongoing 
reform termed ‘Doi Moi’ (renovation). Reform has touched every aspect of the economy. 
38. http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=471&idmid=3&ItemID=13129, accessed 28th June 2012
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The following sections will outline the main contours of reform, specifically with regard 
to enterprise reform, banking and finance and foreign investment. 
5.3. Doi Moi.
Few suggest that the objective of Government policy in the 1980s and early 1990s was to 
create an orthodox market economy consistent with the ‘Washington Consensus’. 
However, it is unclear to what extent anyone had much of an idea where they were going. 
Although the outcomes of reform tended to suggest a movement toward a conventional 
market economy, they were also a movement away from something that wasn’t working. 
As Dang Phong, one of Vietnam’s more prominent economists, has argued:
‘An interesting feature of the Vietnamese reform is that its leaders 
aimed to repair the old model; they certainly did not intend to 
move towards a market economy. But each attempt at repair took 
them a step further away from that which was to be repaired. 
Only when one foot was already on the new shore could it be 
seen that there was nothing dangerous, in fact many things were 
better, and the new model could be affirmed.’
(Dang Phong 2004, p. 76)
In many ways the last thirty five years of Vietnamese history has been a protracted search 
for a ‘model’ that both worked and ensured the ‘leaders’, or the Communist Party, 
remained in power. Following the occupation of the South of Vietnam in 1975 the North 
Vietnamese government sought to build the institutions of a command economy across 
the country. However, policy makers soon met with resistance and difficulty. Waging war 
with Cambodia and then China, and coping with the most destructive monsoon in over 
eighty years certainly didn’t help matters. Vietnam also suffered from its decision to join 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) in 1978. During the American 
war Vietnam had received aid from the Soviet Union amounting to approximately one 
billion dollars a year (Dang Phong 2004). The Vietnamese government used the money to 
buy supplies for the war effort, inputs into production and essentials for the population. 
Prior to full accession to Comecon in 1978 Vietnam was entitled to generous discounts on 
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the price of key items. They could, for example, purchase petrol at a fraction of the price 
paid by Comecon members. Joining Comecon and so paying the full price drastically 
reduced the quantity of items purchased with Soviet aid. The effect was to handicap 
attempts to impose the institutions of a command economy, limit the ability of the state to 
provide inputs to firms and purchase outputs, and, in the process, put firms themselves 
under severe pressure. By 1979-80 the majority of enterprises across the country were 
running at fifty or even thirty percent of planned capacity:
‘Every type of good was scarce in the market. This was a period 
in which coal was often used to run automobiles and tyres had to 
be retreaded. The state shops had insufficient amounts to sell in 
relation to the ration coupons for cadres and soldiers. In many 
months coupons for meat could only buy tofu or Mongolian 
mutton fat’. 
(Dang Phong 2004, p. 56)
Workers were paid in kind and traded their wages on the street. A black market thrived. 
By 1980 ‘free market’ prices were three times those of 1976; by 1985 three thousand 
times and by 1986 nineteen thousand times (Pham and Le 2003). Proponents of some 
form of combination of plan and market began to find they were listened to. Vietnam also 
saw a resurgence of a phenomenon known as ‘fence breaking’ (pha rao)39, in which the 
strictures of the plan were tested. Rice was sold at market rather than official prices, 
unofficial trading took place between industrial units, households signed contracts with 
SOEs and ‘one price systems’ - in which state prices and market prices became one and 
the same - were established across the country. Fence breaking appears to have been a 
considered response to the more unworkable aspects of the command system40. The 
general outcome was the relaxation of the more intractable planning regulations, the 
39. The tradition of fence breaking apparently goes back to the early 1960s. See (Dang Phong 2004).
40. There is some debate as to the significance of fence breaking, the complicity of high ranking officials and 
the degree to which reforms were ‘bottom-up’ or ‘top down’. See (Fforde and Vylder 1996) and (Dang Phong 
2004).
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improved productivity of many firms and, for individuals and families, more reliable 
access to food and other goods. Fence breaking also led to and was accompanied by new 
legislation that worked to dismantle the more cumbersome and economically damaging 
aspects of the planning system. The general approach to reform was sanctified in the VI 
Party Congress in 1986, now regarded as the official launch date of Doi Moi. At the 
Congress it was proposed that Vietnam should become a ‘multi-sector economy’, 
involving state, foreign and private business and a ‘commodity economy’ (a euphemism 
for market economy (Dang Phong 2004); the focus on heavy industry should be 
abandoned and replaced with the production of food goods, export goods and consumer 
goods and Vietnam should adopt a more open policy to the outside world. In effect the 
Plan was abolished and Vietnamese SOEs were able to recruit workers, set wages, 
purchase their own inputs, sell their own output and borrow capital for  investment. They 
also had access to foreign exchange and direct access to foreign markets was permitted. 
Nevertheless, the Government maintained significant control over the ‘commanding 
heights’, and identified industries it wished to maintain some control over.
In dismantling a pure command economy, and enabling firms and individuals to sell and 
purchase goods and services at market prices the Government began the process of 
building a ‘market economy with socialist characteristics’. In 1979 a resolution was 
passed that effectively granted individuals and collectives the right to establish and 
operate businesses. The state monopoly of foreign trade was gradually relaxed from 1980 
onwards. In 1981 the ‘three plan system’, which gave SOEs the legal right to trade at 
market prices outside of the plan, was established41. From 1981 official prices were 
gradually bought into line with prices revealed in the unofficial free market and after 
1989 SOEs paid world market price for inputs from other state owned units. The official 
price system was dismantled, and rouble and dollar rates were fixed at market rates. In 
March 1989 subsidies to state enterprises were abolished, interest rates were brought 
above the rate of inflation and the savings rate raised to thirteen percent a month. To 
increase its attractiveness to foreign investors, open potential markets for domestic 
enterprises and to discipline domestic firms and interest groups the GoV sought 
41. Plan A was that of the centre, Plan B an agreement between enterprises and local authorities and Plan C 
the right of enterprises to sell excess output in the open market (Dang Phong 2004).
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membership of major trade organisations and agreements. In 1992 Vietnam signed a trade 
agreement with the European Union. In 1996 Vietnam joined the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers with other 
ASEAN countries. In 1998 Vietnam joined APEC, and in 1999 signed a most favoured 
nation (MFN) agreement with Japan. In 2000 after several years of negotiation Vietnam 
signed a bilateral trade agreement with the United States (USBTA) and in January 2007 
twelve years after the original working party was established Vietnam finally acceded to 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The USBTA and prospective accession to the 
WTO called forth new enterprise, investment and competition laws (discussed further 
below).
5.4. Enterprise Reform under Doi Moi
In Vietnam enterprise reform refers to the restructuring of the state owned enterprise 
sector and the granting of rights to private enterprise. Both aspects of reform have proved 
contentious as the relative position and contributions of both sectors has for so long been 
of political as well as economic significance. The issue is complicated by the sometimes 
ambiguous status of the private sector, the apparently illegal role of private capital in state 
enterprises in the 1980s and 1990s, and foreign investment in Vietnamese firms.
5.4.1. State Owned Enterprise Reform
The planning period was not particularly successful. Most SOEs were forced to go 
outside of the plan for inputs and customers, yet still retained ‘social’ responsibilities42. 
By the beginning of the 1990s most firms were poorly equipped. A 1992 survey found 
that there was a direct relationship between the date of an enterprises’ establishment and 
the vintage of its equipment (Beresford and Dang Phong 2000). Many firms continued to 
use machinery originally purchased in the 1960s and 1970s. One textile mill used second 
42. Many firms were expected to provide a range of services to employees and local communities, and were 
discouraged from firing workers. Well into the 2000s firms employed, mostly elderly, workers who had no 
hope of adapting to modern production methods.
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hand equipment originally used in 1930s England. Melanie Beresford recounts a 
conversation in the mid-1990s:
‘About a decade ago, many of the SOEs were described to me by 
a retired senior Communist as ‘deformed’ – a textile mill, for 
example, may have spinning and weaving plants, but be ‘missing 
a leg’, namely, the dyeing plant. Others had been cobbled 
together from a range of different (Soviet, Chinese, East 
European) sources and could not operate as an integrated plant. 
Further, in explaining why the state was unwilling to privatise, 
dissolve or break up the SOEs, he argued that ‘they are our 
children and we cannot eat our children.”
(Beresford 2008, p. 226)
SOEs also suffered from their subordination to state planning. Although the strict 
planning system had broken down by the late 1980s, firms remained constrained in other 
ways. Investment was channelled to the establishment of new SOEs, rather than 
supporting existing ones, which were expected to succeed on their own (Beresford 2008). 
As late as 1992 firms were still returning their depreciation fund to the state, and 
submitting applications for new funds (ibid.). Over half of SOE’s fixed assets were 
depreciated by more than 50 percent and a quarter had fixed assets depreciated by less 
than 30 percent. Only fifteen percent of output was estimated to be suitable for export, 
although seventy percent was apparently good enough for domestic consumption 
(Beresford 2008). The remaining fifteen percent, absorbing approximately ten percent of 
working capital, could not even be sold on the domestic market (Phan Van Tiem and 
Thanh 1996). The reform programme was a response to the profound undercapitalisation 
of state owned companies and an acknowledgement that what capital there was was 
spread too thin (Beresford 2008). There were three aspects to SOE reform. Firms were 
liquidated, restructured through a programme of merger, or equitised (a form of 
privatisation in which a proportion of state assets was sold to enterprise managers and 
workers). Equitisation would serve to reallocate state capital from ‘sectors and branches 
of the state sector which are not important to the national economy, do not necessarily 
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need state capital, or require an element of share ownership to be held by the state’ (Phan 
Van Tiem and Thanh 1996). Equitisation was also designed to break the hold of line 
ministries on SOEs43. The reform process proceeded in fits and bursts. Between 1991 and 
1994 the total number of SOEs fell from over 12,000 to 6,000. Of these around half were 
liquidated, two thousand combined with other state firms and the rest sold off. Between 
2001 and 2005 another three thousand firms were restructured, and two thousand 
equitised (World Bank 2009).
Another plank of the reform programme was the formation of General Corporations 
(GCs) in 1994. They were an attempt to consolidate firms in the same or related 
industries. Firms were brought together under the command of a Head Quarters, which 
essentially became the head of a holding company. They also had a social objective. 
General Corporations were expected to turn around failing companies that still employed 
a significant numbers of working age people. They were also an attempt by the GoV to 
retain control over the economy’s ‘commanding heights’ and drive the industrialisation 
process forward. State owned enterprises were increasingly asked to operate on the same 
terms as private and foreign owned firms. Although firms were not expected to abide by 
the same legislation until 2010 successive ‘enterprise laws’ (culminating in the 2005 
Unified Enterprise Law) and SOE laws dismantled the barriers between them. The 
objective was to force SOEs to respond to market pressures and was also a response to 
donor pressure and trade agreement commitments. State owned enterprise reform and 
restructuring did result in increases in productivity, although this was associated more 
with reductions of the labour force and consolidation. In 1990 and 1991 for example, 
approximately 750,000 people lost their jobs. In 2000 and 2001 many more were made 
redundant following a further round of redundancies. The ability of SOEs to derive 
productivity gains from more progressive sources has proved more difficult. Explanations 
as to why have largely focussed on the investment decisions of SOEs, and the efficiency 
of those decisions. Since the 1980s SOEs have appeared to shun their ‘core business’, 
preferring instead to pursue side lines in other areas, particularly, and most 
43. As a response to the shortages of the 1970s and early 1980s line ministries and provincial authorities 
relied on SOEs as a source of revenue.
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controversially real estate, and more recently financial activities. Beresford saw the 
strategy as a consequence of the poor quality of firms’ primary assets:
‘Since rent-free access to high-value urban land has been one of 
the few marketable assets that SOEs could use as a source of 
revenue, there was much participation by industrial SOEs in the 
real estate and hotel boom of the early 1990s.’
(Beresford 2008, p. 231) 
Beresford (2008) and Phan Van Tiem and Thanh (1996) argued that as most SOEs had 
limited access to capital many abandoned their main business lines. Instead opting for 
‘trading activities, tourism and transport services’. Many even resorted to selling off fixed 
capital for cash in order to meet short term requirements. Even so:
‘Some of those SOEs with relatively large capital bases have 
shifted their investment into restaurants, hotels and joint ventures. 
Yet at present, the government is unable to regulate such shifts in 
investment and business operations by SOEs.’ 
(Phan Van Tiem and Nguyen Van Thanh 1996, p. 25)
Given the ease of entry into these areas SOEs faced increasing levels of competition from 
non-state enterprises, many of which were actually SOEs ‘penetrated’ by private capital:
‘Surveys have shown that many state owned retail commercial 
centres, transport companies, and tourism enterprises are state-
owned in name only with private persons operating the 
businesses, having rented the premises, equipment, facilities, and 
even the legal status of the SOEs.’ 
(Phan Van Tiem and Thanh 1996, p. 28) 
Other profitable lines were trading activities, where firms were able to benefit from short 
term credit. Chi Do Pham and Duc Viet Le (2003) suggest that SOEs had little choice as 
their primary activities were always bound to be uncompetitive. By the late 1990s, they 
argue, firms found themselves producing goods for which global and domestic demand 
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was saturated, leading to difficulties exporting, stock piling of inventories and deflation. 
More recent surveys have demonstrated similar patterns. Cheshier and Penrose (2007), 
for example, found that SOEs felt duty bound to maintain their core business, but were 
increasingly seeking to diversify into other apparently non-productive investments. 
Managers cited the profitability of alternative activities, difficulties mastering advanced 
technologies and breaking into new markets as the main reasons (Cheshier and Penrose 
2007). Such strategies have attracted much hand wringing by senior government and 
party officials as well as the media. A string of articles have called attention to firms’ 
speculative practices, asking whether the interests of Vietnam are being well served.
5.4.2. Private Sector Reform
As one might expect the GoV’s attitude to the private sector has always attracted 
controversy. There are, for example, many anecdotal accounts of local and sometimes 
central opposition to the private sector. Private enterprise has long been a source of 
revenue for local authorities, and many, particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
imposed informal fees and other forms of taxation. Private firms have also suffered from 
weaker property rights than state owned and foreign firms (Rand et al. 2008). 
Nevertheless, even during the late 1980s, in a period particularly inhospitable to private 
enterprise, the ‘non state sector’ produced nearly 40 percent of industrial output (Dang 
Phong 2004). Subsequent reforms have sought to dismantle barriers to private sector 
growth. Successive Enterprise Laws (discussed above) have given private entrepreneurs 
the right to establish and operate firms on the same terms as other forms of enterprise. 
Private firms can take the form of limited companies, joint-stock companies, partnership 
companies and private enterprises (Nguyen Dinh Tai 2006). Emphasis has been put on 
simplifying the procedures involved in establishing privately owned firms, and reducing 
restrictions on business activities of private firms. A number of studies have demonstrated 
that reforms designed to improve the business environment have been successful. In a 
recent survey of firms across Vietnam research project found that private firms now face 
‘lower entry costs, better access to land, smaller time costs, reduced informal charges, a 
more pro-active local government, better private sector development programmes, greater 
labour flexibility, and a better legal environment’ (McCulloch et. al. 2013, p.21). 
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Similarly, the World Bank, whilst emphasising the continued dominance of the state 
sector find that most obstacles to private sector development have been dismantled 
(World Bank 2011). Nevertheless, although the number of private enterprises operating in 
Vietnam has increased significantly, the majority remain small and struggle to grow:
‘Vietnamese private firms are able to establish operations and 
may relatively easily grow to employ several tens of people, but 
reaching the ranks of medium sized and large firms is difficult for 
those enterprises that are not successful exporters.’
(Hakkala and Kokko 2007, p. 32)
McCulloch et al. (2013) found that the improvements in the business environment and the 
removal of legal and most institutional obstacles to private sector development do not 
appear to have contributed to increased levels of private sector investment. 
Reforms have, then, tended to dismantle obstacles to private sector development, and at 
the same time seek to reform the state owned sector. However, as will be demonstrated 
further in the following chapter, despite the removal of many barriers to growth, private 
firms remain relatively small, and state owned enterprises, despite a process of 
equitisation and the removal of some if not all privileges continue to dominate much of 
the economy (World Bank 2011).  
5.5. Financial and Banking Reform
The difficulties of the 1980s highlighted the importance of the ability to raise and direct 
investment capital. As with enterprise reform it is something of a surprise how 
conventional banking and finance reform has been. Reforms essentially pursued three 
objectives. The first was to overcome the shortcomings of the planning system and 
bolster the country’s state owned sector. The second, was to provide investment for 
infrastructure. The third, particularly after the 1997 Asian crisis, was to satisfy the 
requirements of foreign investors, by better managing inflows of foreign capital, and 
responding to concerns about the number of nonperforming loans held by the state owned 
banking sector. The commitment appears to be toward the development of conventional 
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financial institutions. This section will outline the main banking and finance sector 
reforms and then discuss the relationship between firms and the banking and finance 
sectors. The first major reform was the creation of a two tier banking system in 1988. 
Tier 1 was the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), Tier 2 four State Owned Commercial Banks 
(SOCBs), themselves spinoffs from the SBV. Originally, the SOCBs had specific roles. 
The Investment and Development Bank (IDB) of Vietnam focussed on medium and long 
term financing of SOEs; the Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam (ICBV) offered 
commercial banking services; the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(VBARD) offered credit and services to farmers and the Vietcom Bank handled foreign 
exchange and trade finance. There was however no actual separation between the SBV 
and the SOCB as the SBV influenced the appointment of SOCB management (Ben Ang 
Siew Hock et al. 1997). However, more recently banks, although not abandoning their 
traditional responsibilities have begun to branch into new areas (World Bank 2009). 
As Figure 3 illustrates banking reforms in Vietnam were primarily aimed at bringing 
Vietnamese banking practices in line with developed country standards, gradually 
liberalising the banking system by allowing the entrance of private (joint-stock) and 
foreign banks, and relaxing constraints on SOCBs. A 2005 initiative called for the 
equitisation of SOCBs by 2010. The financial crises means that thus far only two have 
been equitised. In total there are four major and one minor SOCBs, 37 JCBs, six JVs and 
two development and policy banks.
Figure 3: Timeline of the Major Finance and Banking Reforms since 1990.
1990: Non-state Joint Stock banks, joint venture banks and representative offices of 
foreign banks were allowed to set up offices in Vietnam. 
1993: Interbank market for VND established.
1994: Interbank market for foreign exchange established.
1995: Minimum capital requirement of commercial banks established at 6.4 million 
USD in HCMC and 4.6 million in Hanoi
1996-2002: Deregulation of domestic interest rates on both VND and foreign currency 
deposits and loans.
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1997: Law on State Bank and Law on Credit Institutions
1999: Government commits to separating policy from commercial lending. 
2000: Banks allowed unsecured lending to SOEs, FIEs, Joint ventures between 
domestic and foreign firms.
2001: Banks allowed to use Land User Certificates (LUCs) as collateral. 
2000: HCMC stock exchange (HOSE) established
2000: Re-Capitalization of banks in response to NPLs following Asian crisis
2005: State Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs) restructured, and commitment to 
equitise by 2010.
2005: Banks have to improve their credit classification system to allow for the 
calculation of NPLs and loan provisioning closer to international standards. However, 
by the end of 2008 only two commercial banks had completed the process (Suiwah 
2009).  
2005: Investment Law: “investors shall be permitted to invest in all sectors and in all 
industries and businesses which are not prohibited by law,” and “the State shall provide 
equal treatment before law to all investors from all economic sectors and as between 
domestic investment and foreign investment.” 
2006: Law on Securities to facilitate the development of the securities market. The law 
covers the regulation of listing and trading securities; the State’s role in administering 
and inspecting the securities market; the public offer of securities; the disclosure and 
corporate governance of public companies; the organization of trading markets; 
depository, clearance and payment facilities; investment management and fund 
companies; information disclosure; inspections and dispute resolution. 
2007: Foreign banks allowed to enter the Vietnamese market according to an agreed 
timetable.
2007: State bank licensed eleven rural institutions to operate in urban areas. As a result 
credit growth reached 95 percent (Suiwah 2009).
2007: Ceilings placed on bank lending to finance share purchases, and an embargo on 
bank financing of banks’ security trading affiliates.
2008: SCIC established
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Source: Unless otherwise stated Leung (2009), Nguyen Xuan Ngja (2005) and Van 
Arkadie and Mallon (2003)
The banking system has struggled to mobilise funds from the Vietnamese population. 
According to the World Bank in 1995 the banks raised only one third of total funding 
requirements (World Bank 2009) SOCBs borrowed the remaining two thirds from the 
SBV and foreign banks (Nguyen Xuan Nghia 2005). Van Nhu Dang suggests that banks 
generally refused to make the effort to tap into the savings of the majority of the 
population. Small firms and households relied on the substantial informal finance sector:
‘In brief, what went wrong in the financial sector in Vietnam was 
that the banks, instead of being an intermediary fund from savers 
to its best users, only acted as a pawn-shop for private borrowers 
and as a credit distributor for SOEs.’ 
(Van Nhu Dang 2003, p. 55)
By 2008 the only ten percent of the population were estimated to have a bank account 
(Leung 2009). Nevertheless, Bank deposits as a share of GDP doubled between 1990 and 
2000 (from ten to twenty percent), and bank credits from 13 to 25 percent. There were 
also substantial changes in the proportion of loans to the private sector. By the mid-2000s 
the private sector received 60 percent of SOCB credit. More recently there has been an 
increase in the number of private banks, many associated with SOEs. In 2007 fifteen 
SOEs submitted banking applications. Three were granted in 2008 (Leung 2009).
Another recent and accelerating trend is foreign banks. There are, at the time of writing, 
three foreign banks operating in Vietnam: Standard Chartered, HSBC and ANZ. 
Vietnamese banks have also been taking on ‘strategic investors’. By 2008 five out of the 
ten largest JSBs had taken on a foreign strategic investor (Bank 2009). The unofficial 
financial system has always been important in Vietnamese economic life. Rather than 
diminish in the face of recent reform, it appears to be as significant as ever. Figure 4 
2008: Stabilization package, aimed at tightening bank liquidity and raising bank 
deposit rates.
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illustrates the amount of cash (VND and foreign currency) circulating outside of the 
banking system.
Figure 4: Cash in Circulation Outside the Banking System (%)
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Source: IFS 2011
Thirty eight billion dollars worth of gold and foreign exchange is currently estimated to 
reside in private houses, businesses and gold shops. This compares to USD 26 billion 
worth within the banking sector.
5.6. Stock Market Reforms
There are now, in effect, four stock markets in Vietnam. The Ho Chi Minh City Securities 
Trading Centre was established in July 2000 with two stocks and a market capitalisation 
of USD 31.5 million. It was upgraded to the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) in 
August 2007. The Hanoi Stock Trading Centre (HASTC) was opened in March 2005. A 
parallel, informal, market, the ‘Over the Counter’ or OTC market developed over the 
course of the decade. In 2009 in an attempt to bridge the gap between the OTC and the 
HOSE and HASTE a fourth, the UNCOM, more tightly controlled than the OTC was 
established. There are currently nearly two thousand stocks listed on the OTC market. 
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Both the HOSE and the HASTC are supervised and managed by the State Securities 
Commission,   part of the Ministry of Finance. Companies can list in Hanoi if they have 
been profitable for one year and in Ho Chi Minh Minh for three years. The State Capital 
Investment Corporation (SCIC) represents the State as an investor where the state retains 
a majority interest in SOEs. Approximately twenty percent of equity stock is owned by 
foreigner investors. The Vietnamese Stock Exchange is scheduled to equitize and go 
public in 2010. There are approximately one hundred private security companies trading. 
Many are small, although a few are backed by foreign partners.
5.7. Foreign Investment
To raise capital, upgrade domestic enterprises and drive the industrialisation process 
Vietnam turned to foreign investment. To some degree Vietnam has always been been 
dependent on foreign capital and technology. By the late 1980s it had to find a way to 
replace the Soviet Union as the source of investible funds and technology. The key policy 
tools were trade agreements which also sought to make it easier for foreign firms to 
establish plant and operate in Vietnam: 
‘WTO accession in early 2007 is the latest significant step in the 
process of legal and economic reform. In debate in Vietnam on 
potential WTO impacts, discussion quickly moves from tariff 
commitments to finance and insurance, telecommunications, 
wholesale and retail trade, and energy, where foreign firm 
operation in Vietnam rather than cross border trade is in focus. 
We keep this in mind as we move on to review existing modelling 
of Vietnam’s trade agreements.’
(Abbott et al. 2009. p. 347) 
The 1987 Law on Foreign Investment (revised in 1990, 1992, 1996 and 2000) first 
codified the rights of foreign firms settling in Vietnam. Changes in the law have tended to 
increase the rights of the foreign investor and close the policy gap between domestic and 
foreign investors. According to the Vietnamese Central Institute for Economic 
Management (CIEM) changes in the law are a response to an increasing appreciation of 
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the importance of FDI to the Vietnamese economy, increased competition for FDI in the 
region and international commitments (Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. 2006). Key 
developments included making it easier for FIEs to develop greenfield projects, the 
removal of foreign currency restrictions, relaxing constraints and fees relate to 
repatriation of profits and increasing the areas in which foreigners can invest including 
the proportion of equity in Vietnamese companies. Recalling Vietnam’s objective to 
create a ‘multi sector’ economy the IX Party Congress in 2001 classified the Foreign 
Invested Sector as ‘one of the six sectors of the economy’ (Nguyen Thi Tue Anh et al. 
2006). This marked a change in official thinking. For much of the 1990s the objective 
was for FDI to bring capital, technology and managerial skills to the domestic sector 
through the medium of the joint venture. The 2001 proclamation acknowledged that the 
operation of foreign firms within Vietnamese borders was an end in itself. Throughout the 
2000s the GoV has officially sought to attract high technology firms and large multi-
nationals, with little active though given to the transfer of technology or other positive 
spillovers (Penrose et al. 2010).
Vietnam was an important destination for FDI through the 1990s. Masina (2002) argues 
that FDI inflows were ‘disproportionately high considering the limited dimensions of the 
national economy’. In 1996 for example, foreign investments in Vietnam were higher 
than India, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. As a percentage of GDP inflows were 
higher than the regional average (Masina 2002). Beresford (2008) points to the 
significance of the East Asia bubble in the 1990s to levels and types of investment in 
Vietnam. Across the region companies were investing in real estate and other speculative 
projects. Vietnam was no exception. Real estate investments comprised 40 percent of 
total investments in 1995, 42 percent in 1996 and 7.6 percent in 1997. Investments in 
industry also declined (Masina 2002). Moreover, FDI in Vietnam was predominantly 
regional in origin. Its decline in the late 1990s was due largely to reduced outflows from 
regional investors, and not necessarily a function of Vietnamese policy. Despite fears 
following the Asian Crisis accession to the WTO and other trade agreements seems to 
have attracted further inflows of direct and indirect foreign investment. Before the global 
financial crisis and Vietnam’s own problems in 2007/2008 foreign direct investment was 
over USD 29 billion. However, again a high proportion is in real estate and other 
Chapter 5: Institutional Reform in Vietnam  125
speculative projects. For example, in 2008 three quarters of total registered FDI 
comprised of eight large projects, six of which were large property investments (Harvard 
2008).
5.8. Conclusion
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s a series of far reaching reforms referred to as Doi 
Moi have brought profound and far reaching change to the Vietnamese economy. The 
pace of reform accelerated once Vietnam acceded to the World Trade Organisation in 
2007. Reforms of relevance to this thesis concern the liberalisation of the banking sector, 
the development of stock markets in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and the reform of the 
state owned and private enterprise sectors. The mono-banking system, the basis of the 
command economy, was dismantled. In its place increasingly autonomous state owned 
banks now operate side by side with private joint stock banks and foreign owned banks. 
State owned enterprises deemed to be unsustainable were liquidated or merged with 
others, and firms in similar sectors were brought under the umbrella of ‘General 
Corporations’. A series of ‘enterprise laws’ gradually ensured that most state owned 
enterprises were subject to the same regulatory system as private enterprise. Although the 
state retained an ownership share in many firms most were gradually granted increased 
autonomy, albeit with some constraints. Restrictions on private enterprise were also 
lifted, and reforms set about encouraging the development of the private sector. 
Accession to the WTO also coincided with relaxations on foreign capital flows, and the 
development of stock markets in Hanoi and HCMC. After 2007 the Vietnamese economy, 
whilst still dominated by the state sector, saw the emergence of an increasingly dynamic 
private sector, a more autonomous state owned sector, a liberalised finance sector and, as 
the following chapter will demonstrate, substantial inflows of foreign capital. All of these 
factors combined, it will be argued, marked the beginning of a new chapter in Vietnam’s 
economic development and presented firms with the opportunity to adapt their financial 
strategies.     
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Chapter 6: Vietnam - Flow of Funds
6.1. Introduction
This chapter will present a flow of funds analysis of Vietnam, a fast developing economy 
undergoing a period of financial development, in which the state has intervened heavily 
in the enterprise sector. The objective of the chapter is to explore the ideas developed in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Specifically: the implications of state ownership as a means to 
overcome the absence of private entrepreneurs; the funding and financing of state 
enterprise in a period of financial liberalisation; and the impact of financial development 
on the private sector. 
The chapter will be organised as follows. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 will present a flow of 
funds analysis of Vietnam, arguing that a combination of domestic reforms (as outlined in 
Chapter 5) and foreign capital inflows have created three distinct periods, each with a 
different set of financial flows. Sections 6.3.1 to 6.3.3 look more closely at the banking 
and financial sector. Section 6.3.4, making use of Government Statistics Office (GSO) 
enterprise survey looks more closely at the firm sector, showing how different firms 
responded to financial development. Section 6.4, using a World Bank Survey and other 
studies will look more closely at smaller, private firms. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2. Flow of Funds
Flow of Funds (FoFs) accounting depicts the flow of financial instruments between 
sectors, which in turn enables analysis of how sector deficits are financed and how 
surpluses are used. The top part of flow of funds matrices typically  represent income and 
expenditure flows. The bottom part of the matrix shows balance sheet flows. The 
columns represent the key economic sectors: Households, Productive Firms, Commercial 
Banks, the Government and the Central bank. Both rows and columns must sum to zero. 
The zero-sum rule represents the budget constraint for each sector, describing how ‘the 
balance between flows of expenditure, factor income and transfers generate counterpart 
changes in stocks of assets and liabilities’ (Godley and Lavoie 2007). Everything comes 
from somewhere and everything goes somewhere. A negative sign indicates a flow of 
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funds from the sector, and a positive a flow to the sector. Uses of flows (a negative sign) 
represent the purchase of a consumption good or financial asset. Sources of funds 
represent receipt of a money flow from the sale of a good or asset. 
Flow of funds analysis has been used in the study of developing countries since at least 
the 1950s, however, more recently its use has been limited. In the 1990s a number of 
economists exploring the implications for post-Keynesian ideas in developing countries 
adopted FoFs models. For instance John Dawson and Stephen Everhart looked at the 
impact of twin deficits in Kazakhstan (Dawson and Everhart 2000), Stephen Peachey 
used FoFs analysis to look at the early years of economic transition in Romania (Peachey 
2000); Anna Kerekes and John Holsen looked at fiscal imbalances in Hungary and Russia 
respectively (Kerekes 2000) (Holson 2000); and Lin and Schramm looked at China (Lin 
and Schramm 2006).
Flow of funds analysis, whilst extremely useful, has some limitations. It is difficult to 
determine causal relations between data. Flow of Funds is developed from national 
accounts identities, which are true by definition. As a result any interpretation of FoFs is 
dependent on the theory employed. In most countries, and particularly developing 
countries there are data limitations. Ideally actual values at the time of the transaction 
should be recorded. Often, however, transactions are derived from changes in balance 
sheet values and the prices of assets are rarely recorded at actual market value. Data are 
suspect and incomplete. Financial data, in particular, poses a number of problems. Firms 
are reluctant to reveal too much about the state of business, and banks often have 
problematic reporting procedures. Smuggling, off balance sheet activities and ‘informal’ 
markets mean that many transactions are unmonitored and unreported. All of these 
problems plague Vietnam. Nevertheless, the data are of sufficient quality to provide in, 
albeit broad brush strokes, the key trends of the last decade or so.
A further problem, that also applies to Vietnam, is that many countries, particularly 
developing countries, do not break down data into required sectors or units. For example, 
the enterprise sector includes all enterprises, regardless of ownership, size or sector. 
Similarly, financial instruments might be grouped together. Nevertheless, despite these 
limitations FoFs analysis can still shed light on the workings of developing countries:
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‘In developing economies, where markets are more fragmented, 
and securities markets are invariably thin and illiquid, prices 
provide much less useful policy information. More information of 
quantities, particularly on the flow of funds, would be very 
valuable for policy makers. Thus, the flow of funds could play an 
important role in developing countries to aid the study of 
financial sector development and resource mobilization issues so 
as to identify the effects of financial sector policies for promoting 
poverty and reducing economic growth’.
(Green et al. 2002, p.1)
This thesis in particular, is more interested in the broad trends of the developmental 
process in Vietnam.
The methodology adopted in this chapter is closely based on the work of John Dawson 
who was a champion of flow of funds analysis in developing countries. In an analysis of 
the impact of the Asian crisis on Thailand Dawson demonstrated that it is possible to 
develop a basic flow of funds using the IMF’s International Finance Statistics (IFS)44 and 
Government Financial Statistics (GFS). Unfortunately, Vietnam no longer adheres to the 
IMF’s requested format for gathering and presenting National Accounts data45. As a result 
government statistics are taken from various IMF Article IV publications and statistical 
appendices. In these the IMF estimates its preferred figures, and these are used to 
construct government accounts. The approach is to build a series of worksheets, each 
representing one sector over the time period in question46. Because of the aggregation of 
the data it is only possible to assemble data for the Government, the Central Bank, 
Deposit Banks, the Rest of the World (RoW) and the Private Sector. The private sector 
44. The most recent data (June 2012) can be downloaded from http://esds80.mcc.ac.uk/wds_ifs/TableViewer/
tableView.aspx?ReportId=41222.
45. Personal correspondence with IMF representative in Vietnam.
46. The worksheets can be found in Appendix ?
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includes households, firms and any other units not represented elsewhere. This is 
obviously problematic, particularly for this study.
To attempt to overcome the problem this chapter adopts a number of strategies. The IMF 
Article IV for Vietnam includes data for bank lending by bank ownership type. It also 
breaks down lending by sector. The IMF published Article IVs for Vietnam in 2006, 2008 
and 2012. This data will be used in Section 3 of this chapter. Recently a number of banks 
have published annual reports and financial statements on their websites. Many of these 
give further details of sources of deposits as well as loan portfolios. Where appropriate 
such data will be used to shed more light on lending practises.
The General Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam publishes a range of statistics. 
Unfortunately, it does not list financial data. However, it does publish data on investments 
by sector and ownership type. Investment differs from gross fixed capital formation, and 
cannot be used as a direct substitute. Also under the auspices of GSO Vietnam undertakes 
an annual enterprise survey, that collects data for ownership of assets and liabilities. The 
survey breaks down ownership further, by size (in terms of assets, revenues and 
employment) and by ownership type. The Non-State sector is further broken down into a 
number of sub-categories.
The World Bank has published the data from two enterprise surveys in Vietnam, one in 
2006 and one in 2009. The survey covers predominantly small and medium sized 
enterprises, and provides further insight into the financing and funding behaviour of 
firms.
6.3. Vietnamese Flow of Funds
This section will present flow of funds analysis based on the technique adopted by John 
Dawson in his analysis of the impact of the Asian crisis on the Thai economy (Dawson 
2004)47. Figure 5 illustrates gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in Vietnam, gross 
domestic savings and the savings of the foreign sector (defined, after Dawson, as the 
Vietnamese current account deficit with sign reversed). Unfortunately, it is impossible to 
47. See Appendix 6 for worksheets used to derive Figures 5 to 15.
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begin earlier than 1996. Nevertheless, it is possible to find data for all variables between 
1996 and 2011.
Over this period annual gross fixed capital formation, as a percentage of GDP, rises at a 
relatively constant rate, increasing by approximately ten percentage points. The split 
between domestic and foreign funding, however, oscillates over the same period. Figure 5 
suggests three distinct periods that correspond to internal reform and external events. 
Until 1999 total investment exceeds domestic savings, leading to a deficit with the rest of 
the world (RoW). Following the Asian crisis the annual rate of capital accumulation 
steadies at about 25 percent of GDP; the fall in foreign saving is countered by a rise in 
domestic savings. Over the next few years, as Vietnam embarks on another round of 
reforms, foreign savings show positive growth, as does the rate of capital accumulation. 
Accession to the WTO in 2007 brought forth a large inflow of foreign funds in the form 
of both direct and indirect investment, which corresponds to a fall in domestic savings 
and a rise in investment.
Figure 5: Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Savings (% of GDP)
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
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Figure 6 represents fixed capital formation and savings for three broad sectors: 
Government, the rest of the world and the private sector, which is a residual and includes 
both households and firms. The Government and private sector also include the net 
lending position. As the rest of the world does not actively carry out investments only the 
net lending position is represented. Figures 6, 7 and 8 illustrate the three periods in 
greater detail. 
Figure 6: Government FCF and Net Lending (% of GDP)
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS), IMF Article IV and IMF Statistical 
Appendix48, GSO National Accounts Statistics49
In the late 1990s Gross Fixed Capital Formation was dominated by the private sector. 
Government investment remained at approximately five percent of GDP, with little 
change in the government deficit. Private sector investment, on the other hand, grew 
faster than savings suggesting a private sector deficit with the RoW. The decline in 
foreign investment, attributable to the impact on the Asian crisis on the South East Asian 
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48. IMF Article IV 2012, 2010, 2008, 2006. IMF Statistical Appendix for Vietnam 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 
2003, 2006, 2007. Accessed at http://www.imf.org/external/country/vnm/index.htm.
49. http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=468&idmid=3, accessed June 22nd 2012.
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region appears to have prompted an increase in government investment, with a steady 
expansion of the deficit as a result. The net lending positions of the other two sectors 
suggest the deficit was funded first by the private sector, which achieved a surplus 
following a reduction in imports by foreign firms, and then the RoW, as FDI recovered.
The crisis following WTO accession triggered an increase in government investment, 
which, along with foreign savings, financed private sector capital accumulation. All three 
sectors are now approaching a zero net lending position, with the private sector 
apparently in surplus, the result of a decline in investment rather than an increase 
domestic savings, corresponding to a concomitant fall in foreign funding.  
Figure 7: Private Sector FCF, Saving and Net Lending (% of GDP)
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS), IMF Article IV and IMF Statistical 
Appendix, GSO National Accounts Statistics. Own calculations.
Rest of the world net lending, the inverse of the current account deficit, closely follows 
flows of foreign direct and indirect investment (Figure 8), which in turn reflect the 
response of foreign, particularly regional investors to first the Asian crisis, then Vietnam’s 
accession to WTO and most recently concerns over the Vietnamese economy, and the 
impact of the global financial crisis. 
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Figure 8: RoW Net Lending (% of GDP)
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS)
Figure 9 illustrates the dramatic increase in the inflow of portfolio capital in the lead up 
to and following Vietnam’s accession to WTO. Investors sought value in the Hanoi and 
HCMC stock markets after the Government increased the proportion of domestic equity 
foreign investors could hold, and the drive to equitise state owned enterprises saw an 
increase in the number of firms listed on both stock exchanges between 2005 - 2007.
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Figure 9: Contribution of Foreign Direct and Indirect Investment (% of GDP)
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS)
Figure 10 illustrates the sources and uses for each sector’s net balances. The columns 
correspond to five broad sectors: the Monetary Authorities (the State Bank of Vietnam), 
Deposit Banks (State owned Commercial Banks and Joint Stock Banks), the Government 
sector (Central and Provincial Government), the Private sector (all firms and households) 
and the Rest of the World (RoW). In theory the rows should all sum zero. The dotted 
lines, which represent a sector’s liability, should equal the total value of the total use of 
each instrument. Although this is not always the case it is possible to discern general 
trends.
As indicated above there appear to be three distinct periods represented in Vietnam’s flow 
of funds: 1995 - 1998/9; 2000 - 2005/6; 2006 - 2011. These three periods help to organise 
the data in Figure 10. In Period 1 (1995 - 1998/9) the
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Figure 10: Sector Uses and Sources
Central Bank
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Deposit Banks
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private sector is in deficit to the rest of the world. The government is in balance, with 
minimal increases in debt to either the private or foreign sectors. Foreign savings enters 
Vietnam as reserves held in the banking sector and State Bank and as direct investment in 
the private sector. Foreign reserves appear to have been used to run down the 
government’s debt with the State Bank and the banking sector. The remainder is extended 
as credit to the private sector via the banking system. Nevertheless, the growth in private 
sector credit remains below five percent of GDP until 1998.
In the second period (2000 - 2005/6) Vietnam runs a (slight) balance of payments surplus 
with the rest of the world as firms reduce imports. Increased reserves lead to an increase 
in the quantity of broad money and quasi money. Foreign direct investment falls as 
government investment and government lending to the private sector increases. There is 
also a steady increase in private credit, despite the reduction in foreign lending. This 
stems directly from the banking sector, and continues despite the continued private sector 
surplus. The government deficit is now primarily funded from foreign debt. The Asian 
crisis also triggers rapid and deep reforms of the banking system and the enterprise 
sector. The impact of these reforms will be discussed below.
The third period begins with anticipation of Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in January 2007. The private sector’s net lending position reverses 
relative to that of the rest of the world. A fall in the relative rate of growth of domestic 
saving corresponds with an increase in foreign funded investment. Vietnam also 
experiences dramatic increases in portfolio investment, which, unsterilized, corresponds 
to an increase in the money supply. However, an increase in bank credit also accounts for 
a large proportion of private credit. Figure 10 indicates that the increase in credit does not 
fully translate to an increase in real investment. As will be discussed below, a sizeable 
proportion of credit expansion funded investments in the stock markets, and much real 
sector investment was in the real estate market.
The boom, triggered by foreign inflows, and leading to extensive capital market, real 
estate and price inflation created a general economic crisis for Vietnam in 2008 - 2011. 
The period corresponds to a decline in private credit and foreign inflows as FDI grows 
wary, and foreign export markets decline. The government, in response to falling 
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investment and general distress sought to stimulate the economy, generating domestic 
debt. 
6.3.1. Finance and Banking
Underlying the flow of funds analysis is institutional change in the banking and finance 
system, that correspond to a process of financial deepening as measured in terms of the 
growth of deposits and the increasing use of other financial instruments.
Figure 11: Deposit Bank Credit and Money (% of GDP) 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Staff Reports for Article IV Consultations for 
Vietnam, 1999 to 2012.
Despite the growth in a number of financial markets, Vietnam remains a predominantly 
bank based system, with deposits and loans as a proportion of GDP doubling between 
2002 and 2008. Even so, only between ten and thirty percent of the population make use 
of the banking system, with the majority of bank users living in urban areas (Leung 
2009). The remainder of the sector has shown signs of development, but remains 
relatively small. Insurance and pension funds have remained stable as a proportion of 
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GDP. The bond market has grown, but as will be discussed below, there are limited 
secondary markets. Like the stock market it grew substantially in 2007, partially as a 
result of changing regulation and increased confidence in Vietnam as a response to its 
accession to WTO.
Figure 12: State Owned Commercial Bank Loans and JSB Loans (% of GDP)
Source: International Monetary Fund, Staff Reports for Article IV Consultations for 
Vietnam, 1999 to 2012.
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Figure 13: Total Bank Loans to SOEs and Non-State Sector (% of GDP)
 Source: International Monetary Fund, Staff Reports for Article IV Consultations for 
Vietnam, 1999 to 2012.
The crisis appears to have hit the SOE sector the hardest. This was due to a cap on credit 
growth, particularly to the SOE sector, that is regarded to be the primary culprit for 
speculative investments between 2007 and 2009. A number of SOEs have also been 
restructured, with the state holding less than fifty percent,  suggesting a further reason for 
the decrease in credit growth.
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Figure 14: SOCB Loans to SOEs and Non-State Sector (% of GDP)
Source: International Monetary Fund, Staff Reports for Article IV Consultations for 
Vietnam, 1999 to 2012. Note: Data for non-state and SOE loans 2008-2011 not available.
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Figure 15: JSB Loans to SOEs and Non-State Sector (% of GDP)
Source: International Monetary Fund, Staff Reports for Article IV Consultations for 
Vietnam, 1999 to 2012. Note: Data for non-state and SOE loans 2008-2011 not available.
Figures 12 to 15 show flows of bank credit from the banking sector to the private sector. 
IMF statistics allow a distinction between the state owned banking system and the ‘other’ 
banking system, which is comprised mostly of joint-stock banks. They also record flows 
of credit to the state owned system and ‘other sectors’, which includes households and 
private enterprises. The data are consistent with the three periods discussed above. Bank 
credit expansion as a percentage of GDP was stable throughout the 1990s. Between 2000 
and 2006 flows of bank credit grew by three and a half times, and by two and a half times 
again between 2006 and 2007. State Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs) have remained 
the dominant lenders in the banking system, with loans to ‘other sectors’ showing the 
highest and most consistent rates of growth. They have also dominated lending to SOEs. 
Joint Stock Bank lending has also grown, again with the majority of loans to households 
and private enterprise, who are also the primary recipients of loans during the 2006/7 
bubble.
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The SBV has played an active role in determining the parameters of credit expansion in 
Vietnam. The main channel by which state policy has impacted on credit and deposit 
expansion are moral suasion, reserve requirements, amending regulations for foreign 
currency deposits and lending requirements. The growth in lending in 1999 was triggered 
by a administered reductions in lending rates, inspired by Government concern for export 
orientated and agricultural firms following the Asian crisis. Again in an effort to sustain 
production and employment the SBV expanded short term credit to SOEs, and reduced 
bank reserve requirements from ten to seven percent of short term deposits (IMF 1999). 
According to the IMF the reduction in deposit rates saw a portfolio shift toward foreign 
currency deposits (IMF 2000). In 2004, this time worried about the expansion of credit 
growth the government raised reserve requirements with some success (IMF 2004). At 
the same time an increase in official reserves led to an increase in bank liquidity (IMF 
2006). Worried by the growth in bank credit in 2007-2009 the Government imposed 
limits on bank lending, particularly to large SOEs. However, it is also likely that credit 
growth slowed because firms cut back on investment in light of a fall in domestic and 
foreign demand. 
The main drivers of credit growth after 2005 appear to have been SOCBs and non-state 
firms and households. Other bank lending is intimately linked to non-state borrowers, as, 
to a lesser extent is SOCB lending. Again lending regulations appear to have had some 
influence on lending patterns. After 1998 SOEs no longer required collateral to borrow 
from SOCBs. However, non-state firms had to provide security to receive loans up until 
2002. From 2002 banks could provide credit to all enterprises on the condition they had 
been profitable for two years or the enterprise had a feasible project and was financially 
sound. Nevertheless, banks were still unable to lend to start-ups. Although SOCBs were 
encouraged to expand lending the loss of state capital remains a capital offence, 
providing a further brake on bank lending.
A particular problem for the authorities was the impact of the Asian crisis on the banking 
sector and on firms. Although the crisis was not as destabilising as in other countries a 
number of firms were dependent on exports and joint ventures with foreign owned firms. 
SOEs also had social responsibilities, which affected their efficiency and liquidity. They 
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were, for example, expected to maximise employment, as well as take responsibility for 
employee health care and training. Many firms were as a result unable to meet their 
obligations to banks in the late 1990s, leading to a dramatic rise in non performing loans 
(NPLs), which demanded Government intervention. This partly explained the 
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to borrow without collateral. Of the banks joint stock banks appear to have been hit 
hardest by the increase in non-performing loans. In 1999 two banks collapsed. Most were 
dangerously undercapitalised, and it was estimated that between 30 and 40 percent of 
loans in JSBs were non performing (IMF 1999).
Most JSBs were established by one of the major SOCBs, and as Figure 15 illustrates the 
majority of their lending was to non-state firms, which tended to be smaller. A number of 
others developed from ‘credit cooperatives’, which were established in rural areas to 
support agricultural SOEs and farmers. However, these, like other JSBs were 
undercapitalised and lacked expertise and technology (Leung 2009). Many JSBs found 
themselves lending to firms to support what was essentially speculative behaviour. The 
2007 spike in lending to SOEs was partially funded by JSBs (Leung 2009).
Figure 16 illustrates the exposure of JSBs to real estate loans in 2008. The JSB sector has 
proved problematic for the authorities, particularly rural credit institutions and state 
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conglomerates. In 2007, as in the late 1990s, credit institutions were granted banking 
licenses to operate in urban areas, where they met the demand for credit from households 
and firms anxious to participate in the stock market and real estate boom (Leung et al. 
2010). Similarly, large SOEs sought to establish banks leading to fears that Vietnam 
would experience a bout of irresponsible lending (Cheshier and Pincus 2010). Many 
SOEs also purchased equity in existing JSBs, prompting the authorities to limit equity to 
holdings to thirty percent per enterprise.
Figure 16: Real Estate Share of Total Loans 2008
Source: Presentation by Fulbright School, HCMC in Hoi An July 9th 2011
Vietnam has four large state owned commercial banks. Tables 4, 5 and 6 depict the 
lending habits of these banks. The data was collected from bank annual reports and 
financial reports. As ever in Vietnam such an exercise illustrates the difficulties with data 
sources. Total loans in 2007 and 2008, for example, exceed total loans by SOCBs in IMF 
Article IV. Nevertheless, they provide some insight into the development of SOCBs and 
their role as lenders and financial intermediaries throughout the 2000s.
Table 3: Bank of Investment and Development50
Lending to 
Enterprises
Total State
Non-State
Foreign
Individual
other
2004
100.0%
65.0%
32.0%
3.0%
0.0%
0.0%
2005
100.0%
52.0%
45.0%
3.0%
0.0%
0.0%
2006
88.5%
49.3%
61.0%
3.9%
11.5%
1.5%
2007
83.3%
47.0%
50.1%
2.9%
15.8%
1.4%
2008
54.0%
37.5%
53.3%
9.2%
65.7%
19.4%
2009
48.0%
45.4%
48.7%
5.9%
82.7%
25.9%
50. BIDV annual reports for 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, all accessed at http://bidv.com.vn/
default.aspx?lang=vi-VN, June 2011
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Table 4: Vietcombank51
Table 5: Vietinbank52
Each bank is traditionally responsible for particular sectors of the economy deemed 
important by the state. Agribank, is responsible for agriculture and rural areas; the Bank 
for Investment and Development (BIDV) is responsible for basic infrastructure, 
Vietinbank for industry and Vietcombank for trade. As such the four banks were central 
to the Government’s development policy, responsible for policy lending and for taking 
care of the financial needs of key sectors of the economy. However, over the last decade 
each of the four banks has adopted more conventional banking operations. Tables 4, 5 
and 6 also indicate the changing loan portfolios of banks. The proportion of loans to the 
state sector is declining, and banks are lending more to ‘individuals’. However, it is likely 
that many customers are equitised SOEs, and have been reclassified by the banks as 
limited liability or ‘non state’ companies. Of the four, Agribank remains closest to its 
roots, lending over half of its total portfolio to farmers and smallholders. Agribank data 
Lending to 
Enterprises
Total State
Non-State
Foreign
Individual
Other
2003
100.0%
46.0%
54.0%
0.0%
0.0%
-
2004
100.0%
42.0%
58.0%
0.0%
0.0%
-
2005
86.4%
37.7%
47.1%
1.6%
13.6%
-
2006
82.3%
30.7%
49.3%
2.3%
17.7%
-
2007
74.0%
46.5%
25.5%
2.1%
26.0%
-
2008
76.9%
35.6%
39.2%
2.1%
23.1%
-
Lending to 
Enterprises
Total State
Non-State
Foreign
Individual
Other
2004
88.5%
54.8%
11.0%
22.7%
11.4%
0.1%
2005
86.1%
41.7%
37.4%
7.1%
7.0%
6.9%
2006
77.3%
38.9%
24.6%
13.8%
8.5%
14.2%
2007
77.6%
48.3%
26.5%
2.8%
9.5%
13.0%
2008
72.7%
46.9%
17.2%
8.5%
9.6%
17.7%
2009
67.7%
39.7%
19.9%
8.1%
9.7%
22.6%
51. Vietcombank annual reports for 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010. All accessed at http://
www.vietcombank.com.vn/en/About%20VCB.htm, June 2011
52. Vietinbank annual reports for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, accessed at http://
investor.vietinbank.vn/FinancialReports.aspx, June 2011
Chapter 6: Vietnam - Flow of Funds 146
are only available for 2008 and 200953. According to 2009 figures over ninety percent of 
lending is to households and individuals. Of these around fifty percent are reported as 
rural farmers. The remainder is to SOEs and private enterprise also concentrated in rural 
areas of Vietnam. The banks’ annual reports also suggest a change in lending policy. The 
2009 annual report for Vietcombank, for example, claims it was ‘originally established as 
a specialized bank servicing external economic activities, Vietcombank today has grown 
into a universal bank with presence in all major cities and provinces throughout the 
country, as well as branches in Hong Kong and Singapore.’ The change in focus of the 
banks is also illustrated by the claims in a number of reports that the banks are meeting 
government targets for lending to small and medium sized enterprise. The four SOCBs 
also directly fund large state infrastructure projects, or purchase bonds from 
municipalities, State Owned Enterprises or Economic Groups. In this way banks provide 
the means for the government to fund infrastructure development and industrial 
investments. These transfers are included in the IMF accounts, although not in official 
GoV reports.
6.3.2. Financial Sector
The stock market as a destination for financial investment took off in 2006/2007. A 
number of factors contributed to the bubble. Accession to WTO brought with it portfolio 
flows, which in contributing to rising equity prices proved attractive to domestic 
investors. The Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) Stock Market Price Index rose by 144.5 
percent in 2006 alone, and by another 51 percent in early 2007. A major contribution was 
tax incentives to firms willing to list on the stock market by the end of 2006. Limits on 
foreign ownership were also raised from thirty to forty nine percent in 2005. Most of the 
new listings took place during the last two months of 2006 as companies tried to benefit 
from tax incentives that were to expire by year end. Total stock market capitalisation 
went from USD 0.6 billion (one percent of GDP) in 2005 to a peak of US$ 23 billion (34 
percent of GDP) by March 2007. Daily stock trading volumes increased from an average 
of US$10 million in January 2006 to about USD 70 million in late February and early 
53. Accessed at http://www.agribank.com.vn/91/848/thu-vien/bao-cao-tai-chinh.aspx, June 2011
Chapter 6: Vietnam - Flow of Funds 147
March 2007 (IMF 2007). The sheer volume of interest is evidenced by the nearly four 
billion USD of mostly foreign money held by investment firms in search of profitable 
outlets in 2006 and 2007 (IMF 2007). A further attraction was the anticipation of future 
equitisation of large state owned enterprises and state owned commercial banks. Figure 8 
illustrates the impact of foreign funds on the stock market inflation of 2006/7.
Figure 17: Value of Shares Traded (% of GDP)
Source: World Development Indicators
The official stock market was not the only destination for funds. Until late in the decade 
the informal market for listed shares was believed to be larger than the formal stock 
market. A large proportion of the credit expansion found its way to the informal market, 
which included a large unlicensed stock market conducted in coffee shops, and with the 
use of web based bulletin boards. An estimated one thousand stocks were traded between 
over half a million investors. The majority of stocks on all four markets are equitised 
State Owned Enterprises. Smaller JSBs were the main source of credit sued to purchase 
equities. According to the IMF some banks were lending up to forty percent of their loan 
portfolios using stocks as collateral (IMF 2007). In response the SBV raised the risk 
weighting of loans secured by securities from 100 percent to 150 percent, and moved to 
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
35% 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
!"#$%&'()*+*&,&-&./0&
Chapter 6: Vietnam - Flow of Funds 148
limit investment by directing banks to reduce this type of lending to no more than three 
percent of their total loan balances by the end of 2007. The SBV’s Decision 03/2007 
issued on January 19 contained new regulations on bank capital adequacy, liquidity 
ratios, and lending and investment limits, which restricted the scope for new bank lending 
for the purchase of stocks. In particular: (i) credit institutions were not allowed to extend 
credit to their securities company affiliates nor grant unsecured loans financing 
investment or trade in securities; and (ii) the risk weight of securities-related loans was 
raised from 100 to 150 percent. Credit institutions were given one year to fully conform 
with the new restrictions (IMF 2007).
The Vietnamese bond market has, legally, been in existence since 1992. However, as 
Table 5 indicates nearly two decades later it remains small, and the secondary market 
almost non-existent. In that time only 63 firms have issued a total of 152 bonds, and of 
these large state owned conglomerates and banks dominate. Electricity Vietnam (EVN), 
Vinashin, Petrovietnam (PVN) and the Bank of Investment and Development (BIDV) 
issued 28 percent of bonds but mobilized 48 percent of total funds. Table 5 shows that 
even of these top five two large economic groups, EVN and Vinashin, dominate.
Table 6: Corporate Bonds 
Source: Adapted from Vuong and Tran (2010)
Figure 18 indicates that outside of these firms real estate has proved a significant 
destination for raised funds. Although it cannot be demonstrated conclusively, concerns 
over SOE investments suggest that other issues may also have gone to fund similar 
projects. Activities listed in Figure 18 are based on the reported primary activities of 
firms, not the actual use of funds.
Issuer
EVN
Vinashin
BIDV
VIC
PVN
Sub Total
Total
State Ownership
1
1
1
0
1
Listed
0
0
0
1
0
Total
15
14
7
5
1
42
152
Value (Mil USD)
734.86
660.60
472.60
284.64
219.07
2,371.77
4,927.49
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Figure 18: Corporate Bonds by Industry
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Of those purchasing bonds the majority are large banks and, more recently, insurance 
companies and pension funds. The identity of those involved in most exchanges suggests 
that deals are arranged before bonds are issued.
The weakness of the market can ultimately be attributed to the level of Vietnamese 
development, and to coordination difficulties among those responsible. Although the 
development of the stock market and the bond market thus far suggest the bond market 
might be deep enough, Vietnam has struggled to build the required infrastructure to 
manage a private debt market. Only recently has the government addressed the problem 
with the proposed Public Debt Law, however, in practise its success would depend on 
cooperation among a number of agencies, including the Ministry of Finance, the State 
Security Commission, the Tax Department and the State Bank (Leung 2009).
6.3.3. Real Estate Investment 
The growth in real estate was accompanied by a rapid expansion of the number of firms 
whose primary activity was real estate. Figure 20 shows the number of firms recorded in 
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annual enterprise surveys between 2000 and 2008. Figure 19 illustrates the growth in real 
estate investment as a proportion of GDP.
Figure 19: Real Estate Investment (% of GDP)
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54. Data available at: http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=471&idmid=3&ItemID=13128
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Figure 20: Growth in Real Estate Enterprises
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Whilst many investors claimed they were meeting increased demand for ‘office space’ 
and urban residential areas the real estate sector in Vietnam was undoubtedly the target of 
much speculation (Harvard Program Vietnam 2008).
6.3.4. The Enterprise Sector
Early reforms had sought to reduce the reliance of state enterprises on the state (Dang 
Phong, 2004) and separate SOE financing from state budget expenditures. Ideally all 
enterprises would borrow capital for investments (Le Dang Doanh 1996). Bereford 
suggests the GoV was too successful, and SOEs suffered from limited access to capital:
‘The other major source of finance for SOEs came from credit, 
which, however, provided a progressively lower proportion of 
their investment. Given generally low profitability, they tended to 
borrow for working capital rather than for longer-term 
investments in fixed assets. The structure of interest rates 
favoured short-term borrowing over long term, partly as a result 
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of risk management by banks and partly because interest rate 
policy was designed to enable SOEs to survive in the market 
environment. The latter was not, however, designed in a way that 
enabled technologically backward firms to upgrade their 
equipment to globally competitive standards’
(Beresford  2004, p. 56)
Beresford goes so far as to argue that, ‘because of donor pressure’, SOEs were unable to 
access the credit they required, causing them to cede ground to the private sector and 
foreign firms (Beresford 2008). Instead, again a result of a donor led strategy, state 
investment funds were increasingly channelled to infrastructure projects. As a result the 
SOE sector was reliant on the banking sector and foreign capital. In 1993 SOEs received 
55 percent of state investment. By 2000 it had fallen to 14 percent. It is no surprise then, 
that SOEs began to increasingly rely on self-finance for investments. In terms of SOCB 
lending, the proportion of credit allocated to SOEs fell from 90 percent in the early 
1990s, to 50 percent in 1997 and 40 percent in 2001 (Beresford 2004).
The relationship between the state sector and the banking and government sector can also 
be estimated. Wolff (1999) calculates the ‘financial relations’ between SOE, banks and 
the national budget between 1987 and 1994. He demonstrates that after 1990 the SOE 
sector transferred more to the budget and banks than it received. The net transfer in 1994 
was -9.2% of GDP. Table 7 illustrates the net transfer from the Government budget to the 
SOE sector between 2000 and 2008. Onlending is typically used to finance large 
infrastructure projects, and SOEs tend to be the major recipients (IMF 2007). As the table 
indicates only after 2007 and the increased credit growth did the SOE sector as a whole 
receive more than it contributed. 
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Table 7: Net Transfers of SOE Sector to Banks and Budget
Source: Taxes are reported in the enterprise survey for each year (GSO 2010, Part 06). 
Onlending is government sanctioned lending through the Development Assistance Fund 
(DAF) and, after 2005, the Vietnam Development Bank (VDB). The DAF was primarily 
financed from household savings (via the Postal Savings Postal Company) and Overseas 
Development Aid (ODA). Onlending and bank credit data are sourced from IMF 
statistical appendices and Article IV. Own calculations.
Figure 21 provides savings rates for the Government, enterprise and household sectors 
between 2001 and 2007. The figure illustrates the difficulties inherent in assembling 
accurate savings data. The private savings rate used in Figure 7 above is a residual after 
government and RoW savings is subtracted. Unfortunately, accurate estimates of 
government savings is difficult to establish, largely because until recently the state budget 
was an official secret, and many expenditures were not published. Government saving in 
Figure 21 is the sum of government capital expenditure and the government deficit and is 
the same figure used by the IMF. Like the IMF off balance sheet expenditures are 
included for some years, so the savings rate differs from estimates using official 
government figures available from the GSO website55. 
The GSO enterprise census provides data for pre-tax profits for the total firm sector, and 
also by firm ownership and industrial sector. Total profits represent firm savings, and can, 
in principle be subtracted from private sector savings to arrive at household savings. 
Figure 21 shows pre-tax profits, and also an estimate for after tax profits, assuming a tax 
rate of 25% of profits. Two estimates for household savings are also given. The first, 
Tax
Onlending
Balance
Bank 
Credit
Net 
Transfer
2000
7.0%
2.2%
4.7%
3.5%
-1.2%
2001
10.9%
2.2%
8.7%
2.0%
-6.6%
2002
10.7%
2.4%
8.4%
1.8%
-6.5%
2003
8.7%
2.9%
5.8%
2.6%
-3.2%
2004
7.9%
2.4%
5.5%
5.2%
-0.2%
2005
8.1%
2.7%
5.4%
4.6%
-0.8%
2006
7.4%
2.1%
5.3%
3.8%
-1.4%
2007
7.2%
2.1%
5.1%
10.1%
5.0%
2008
5.4%
1.8%
3.6%
5.4%
1.8%
55. Data available at: http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=468&idmid=3&ItemID=12981
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falling from 20 percent in 2001 to 8% in 2008 is the residual once after-tax profits are 
subtracted from total private savings. Whilst it is plausible that household savings did fall 
between 2005 and 2007, particularly as real incomes rose slower than inflation and 
household consumption remained relatively constant at around 65 percent of GDP the 
alternative measure derived from biannual household living standards surveys (LSS) up 
until 2010 suggest household savings only fell after 2008. 
The rather high residual savings rate in 2001 and 2002 is probably partly explained by the 
fact that many small private enterprises were not registered as such, and so were not 
surveyed and did not report profits. Similarly, the increase in profits after 2005 will partly 
be explained increased enterprise registration. Although household savings may well 
have fallen as a proportion of GDP between 2008 and 2010, it is probably safe to assume 
it was closer to the LSS estimate between 2004 and 2008 than the residual estimate, 
suggesting it was somewhere between 12% and 15% of GDP.
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Figure 21: Firm and Household Savings (% of GDP)
Source: Government Saving: IMF Article IV (Various years) and Statistical Appendix 
(Various Years) and GSO National Accounts. Firm Saving: GSO Enterprise Survey (GSO 
2010, Part 06). GSO Firm Saving - tax: Subtracted 25% of profits, standard corporation 
tax. Household Saving (residual): Private Sector Saving - Government Saving - 
Corporate Saving (post-tax). Household Saving (LSS): Biannual Living Standard Surveys 
2002-2010: Average income x population - Average expenditure x population. All own 
calculations.
To further explore the investment and saving behaviour of the enterprise sector it is 
necessary to derive a figure for investments from the GSO enterprise census. The 
Government Statistics Office provides a measure of investment that includes Government 
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developmental programmes. As Table 8 shows it is approximately five to six percent 
points of GDP greater than GFCF. However, it has its advantages as GSO breaks the 
same figure down by firm ownership and by sector. 
Table 8: Measures of Investment as a Percentage of GDP
Source: GSO investment figures from http://www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?
tabid=432&idmid=3, accessed July 2012, GSO Enterprise Survey 2010 Part 06, IFS 
annual financial statistics for Vietnam56
What is clear is that the figure used will have an impact on any calculation of the savings 
gap faced by the private sector. The first has the advantage of being verified by the IMF. 
However, it is a residual, and nowhere broken down into, at the very least, household and 
corporate constituents. The second depicts a similar trend, and, as a proportion of GDP is 
of a similar magnitude. It is also broken down by the Government Statistics Office into 
‘investment by ownership’, and ‘by sector’. A third measure is derived from from the 
GSO enterprise census, for which results are available for years 2000 - 2009. 
Unfortunately, the enterprise survey does not have a figure for investment, or gross fixed 
capital formation. Instead it lists fixed capital and long term investments as a stock for 
both sectors and ownership classes. Taking changes in long term investment provides a 
flow, which can be a proxy for investment. However, it is a valuation of long term assets 
at a given point in the year, and includes financial investments. Although, the quality of 
the census is improving annually, there are known to be a number of issues with the 
quality of the data.  
The GSO enterprise sector also provides data for firm profits, and taxes and fees paid to 
government. Both together are pretax profits. According to Kalecki’s equation in a closed 
GFCF - 
Flow of 
funds
GSO 
Investment
Ent Census 
Ch Assets
1996
21.8
%
25.8
%
1997
22.1
%
28.3
%
1998
23.4
%
26.8
%
1999
21.0
%
26.1
%
2000
20.0
%
24.6
%
2001
20.6
%
24.9
%
13.5
%
2002
21.7
%
25.8
%
14.2
%
2003
22.0
%
25.5
%
15.2
%
2004
22.9
%
28.1
%
13.8
%
2005
21.7
%
27.0
%
24.8
%
2006
26.2
%
31.0
%
49.0
%
2007
32.8
%
36.2
%
37.0
%
2008
29.4
%
31.2
%
48.9
%
2009
25.4
%
56. Accessed at http://esds80.mcc.ac.uk/wds_ifs/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=48867
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economy with a balanced budget and no workers’ saving the total will be equal to total 
investment, and will be split between capitalist consumption and spending. Table 9 shows 
total profits as a percentage of GDP and as a ratio to total fixed assets. 
Table 9: Profits as a Proportion of GDP and Profits / Change in assets
Source: (GSO 2010, Part 06)
Total profits are consistently around 40 percent of GDP, until 2008, which can be 
attributed to the fall out from the 2007/ 2008 crisis. The reduction in the increase of 
profits as a proportion of total change in assets (approximately total new investment) can 
be attributed to the formation and entry of new, particularly small firms, into the 
economy. As will be demonstrated below profit rates for larger, state firms tend to remain 
relatively high.
Figure 22 shows profits and investments for the total enterprise sector, and is derived 
from annual census reports. It has not been possible to access raw enterprise census data 
as it is not published. A number of books (GSO 2008, 2009, 2010, 2010b) provide 
aggregated data for ownership classes and sectors. 
Profits are pre-tax profits, as they are published. After tax profits, as above, can be 
estimated to be in the region of 25 percent less. It is difficult to ascertain the impact of 
taxation, as a significant portion of government tax revenues will constitute demand for 
the firm sector. 
PreTax 
Profits
Profits/ 
ChAssets
2000
40.5%
2001
40.3%
 2.99 
2002
37.8%
 2.67 
2003
38.4%
 2.53 
2004
41.4%
 2.99 
2005
41.9%
 1.69 
2006
41.2%
 0.84 
2007
38.9%
 1.05 
2008
30.2%
 0.62 
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Source: GSO 2010, Part 06
Figure 22 is consistent with other data sources; 2005 - 2008 shows a large increase in 
investment that does not correspond to an increase in profits. Both profits and investment 
follow a similar trend between 2001 and 2004, which is approximately consistent with 
Figure 5. Figure 21, above, suggests that the surplus in Figure 7 can possibly be attributed 
to a greater share of household savings in private savings. This in turn is probably due to 
the relatively small size of the enterprise sector and that many enterprises were not 
registered until after 2004.  
Figure 22: Profits and Investment of Total Enterprise Sector (% of GDP)
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Source: GSO 2010, Part 06
Profits as a percentage of GDP for the state sector are consistent at approximately five 
percent of GDP. The state sector ran a deficit between 2001 and 2003, between 2004 and 
2007, and again in 2008. The likely source of the excess financing was the acceleration in 
the equitisation process in the run up to WTO accession, which was partly financed by 
foreign capital inflows into the stock market. 
Figure 23: Profits and Investment of State Sector (% of GDP)
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Source: GSO 2010, Part 06
The non-state sector has been in deficit throughout the decade. After 2006 the savings 
gap widened considerably. Figure 25 enables us to break down the non-state sector 
further. The first observation is that the breakdown by ownership is consistent with the 
flow of funds data. Until 2005/6 all sectors with the exception of joint ventures ran only 
slight deficits. During this period the savings gap was funded by household savings, via 
the banking system or more informal channels. Most firms relied on retained earnings to 
finance investments. Recalling Figure 11 credit growth as a proportion of GDP grew at a 
relatively low level until 2005.
The reforms of 2006/7 appear to have a profound effect on all sectors’ levels of 
investment and savings gap. It is worth remembering that investments are all long term 
investments, not just increases in fixed assets. The private sector has the smallest 
increase. Both forms of joint stock company demonstrate an increase in 
Figure 24: Profits and Investment of Non-State Sector (% of GDP)
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Figure 25: Savings Gap by Firm Ownership (% of GDP) (Source: GSO, Part 06)
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financing, as does the foreign sector. However, only joint ventures run a surplus. Few 
sectors show a marked increase in profits, suggesting that increased investments do not 
translate to profits in other sectors, and that the trade balance is the primary leakage. The 
private sector, which is composed primarily of small firms, invested the least as a 
proportion of GDP, despite having by far the largest population.
After 2006/7 there is a large savings gap in most sectors consistent with the changes in 
financial institutions and foreign flows. Bank credit, equity investments, foreign inflows - 
direct and indirect - constitute the largest sources of financing.
Table 10 shows the average size of total fixed and long term assets of firms by by 
ownership between 2000 and 2008.  Although all firm sizes show some increase in size 
(partly attributable to inflation) state and joint stock companies show the largest increase. 
The increase in size of the state sector is due to a number of factors. Smaller, loss making 
firms were liquidated or sold off. Larger firms were recapitalised primarily as a result of 
equitisation. Joint stock companies with less that 50 percent state capital demonstrate the 
most dramatic growth in average size. This is also a result of equitisation and improved 
access to capital. Many firms were large state owned companies that were recategorised 
following the reduction of the state share to under fifty percent.   
Table 10: Average size of ownership types (Bil VND)
Source: GSO 2010, Part 06
Average
State
Non-state enterprises
Private
Private Ltd
JS with State Cap
JS without State cap
100% foreign capital
JV
2000
9.7
39.9
1.0
0.3
1.5
9.7
7.4
52.6
153.5
2001
9.2
49.1
1.2
0.4
1.5
15.7
4.3
43.3
148.1
2002
8.8
57.6
1.3
0.5
1.6
17.8
3.6
43.8
136.9
2003
9.0
68.5
1.6
0.6
1.8
18.4
4.6
44.9
163.9
2004
8.1
78.3
1.8
0.6
1.9
26.0
3.7
48.0
152.7
2005
8.4
119.1
1.9
0.7
1.9
22.9
4.0
49.5
151.9
2006
10.9
214.3
2.4
0.8
2.1
34.1
5.8
59.2
158.8
2007
11.9
249.4
4.0
0.9
2.6
61.0
11.9
60.2
157.3
2008
12.5
336.7
4.9
1.2
3.1
84.5
13.0
73.1
175.7
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Table 11 uses liability data from the GSO enterprise survey. Liabilities include more than 
bank debt, and so don’t correlate with financial data used above. Between 2006 and 2007 
both joint stock sectors, as expected, experienced increase in equity as a proportion of 
total capital. Private and collective firms conversely experience an increase in liabilities, 
which may indicate increased access to bank credit. The state sector also experiences an 
increase in equity, also consistent with equitisation.
Table 11: Liabilities/ Total Capital
Source: (GSO 2008, pp. 208-212) and (GSO 2010b, pp. 304-306)
The following graphs tell the same story graphically. The greatest changes in the debt 
equity ratio over the five year period are, in the ‘private’ firm, and the ‘joint stock with 
state capital’ firm. The former apparently benefits from an increased access to credit, 
which probably corresponds to developments in the banking sector. The latter, is the 
likely outcome of the equitisation process. Otherwise, the debt to equity ratio remains 
approximately constant.
Total
State 
State Central
State Local
Non State
Collective
Private
Private Ltd
JS w State capital
JS w/o State Capital
Foreign
100% foreign
JV
2005
0.70 
0.77 
0.80 
0.54 
0.64 
0.57 
0.42 
0.59 
0.83 
0.69 
0.57 
0.67 
0.43 
2006
0.69 
0.76 
0.79 
0.53 
0.64 
0.59 
0.43 
0.58 
0.81 
0.69 
0.57 
0.66 
0.43 
2007
0.69 
0.77 
0.80 
0.55 
0.63 
0.64 
0.46 
0.56 
0.75 
0.67 
0.60 
0.68 
0.44 
2008
0.68 
0.74 
0.76 
0.56 
0.64 
0.52 
0.53 
0.57 
0.74 
0.67 
0.60 
0.67 
0.46 
2009
0.68 
0.76 
0.78 
0.50 
0.66 
0.60 
0.52 
0.59 
0.79 
0.68 
0.59 
0.64 
0.45 
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Figure 26: Liability to Equity Ratio
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Source: (GSO 2008, pp. 208-212) and (GSO 2010b, pp. 304-306)
Figure 27 shows changes in equity in absolute terms over the five year period. It must be 
remembered the increases also represent equity in new firms, rather than changes in the 
behaviour of existing firms. Nevertheless, state firms, private limited liability companies 
and joint stock companies without state capital show the greatest rise. This both 
represents the equitisation process and increasing ease with which to establish enterprises 
and seek capital.   
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Figure 27: Total Equity by Sector (Bil VND)
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Source: (GSO 2008, pp. 208-212) and (GSO 2010b, pp. 304-306)
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Figure 28: Total Liabilities by Sector (Bil VND)
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Source: (GSO 2008, pp. 208-212) and (GSO 2010b, pp. 304-306)
The final graph shows the increase in total liabilities. Again the state shows the greatest 
absolute increase, as firms that are required to remain majority state owned have less 
access to equity and must rely on debt finance.
Table 12 provides a rough measure of the ability of firms to cover their liabilities with 
current assets (assets that can be liquidated within one year). State firms are have a 
significantly lower ratio, particularly when compared to the smaller categories of firm 
(private and collective firms). 
Chapter 6: Vietnam - Flow of Funds 167
Table 12: Current Assets/ Total Liabilities
Source: (GSO 2008, pp. 208-212) and (GSO 2010b, pp. 304-306)
Table 13: Share of Total Revenues
Source: GSO 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010
Total
State 
State Central
State Local
Non State
Collective
Private
Private Ltd
JS w State capital
JS w/o State Capital
Foreign
100% foreign
JV
2005
 0.93 
 0.86 
 0.85 
 1.00 
 1.13 
 1.17 
 1.59 
 1.15 
 0.97 
 1.10 
 0.86 
 0.80 
 0.97 
2006
 0.83 
 0.71 
 0.69 
 0.96 
 1.08 
 1.14 
 1.58 
 1.16 
 0.93 
 1.01 
 0.85 
 0.77 
 1.04 
2007
 0.90 
 0.77 
 0.75 
 1.02 
 1.07 
 1.06 
 1.46 
 1.21 
 0.98 
 0.96 
 0.91 
 0.83 
 1.14 
2008
 0.86 
 0.74 
 0.72 
 0.96 
 1.01 
 1.20 
 1.25 
 1.14 
 0.96 
 0.91 
 0.87 
 0.81 
 1.06 
2009
 0.87 
 0.67 
 0.65 
 1.00 
 1.06 
 1.11 
 1.39 
 1.18 
 0.92 
 0.99 
 0.82 
 0.77 
 1.00 
State
Collective
Private
Private LL
JS w state cap
JS wo state cap
100% Foreign
JV
Total
2000
54.9%
1.2%
8.8%
13.1%
1.3%
0.8%
7.3%
12.7%
100.0%
2001
51.5%
1.1%
9.4%
14.8%
2.4%
1.6%
7.8%
11.5%
100.0%
2002
51.4%
0.9%
7.6%
16.9%
2.5%
2.0%
8.1%
10.6%
100.0%
2003
46.9%
0.9%
7.2%
18.7%
3.0%
3.0%
9.1%
11.2%
100.0%
2004
41.5%
0.7%
7.8%
20.5%
3.6%
4.2%
10.8%
11.0%
100.0%
2005
38.7%
0.8%
7.8%
20.1%
4.8%
5.3%
10.9%
11.7%
100.0%
2006
36.2%
0.7%
8.0%
21.0%
5.1%
6.8%
12.3%
9.8%
100.0%
2007
31.6%
0.7%
7.3%
22.9%
5.8%
10.4%
12.4%
8.8%
100.0%
2008
25.4%
0.8%
7.3%
26.8%
6.3%
14.7%
11.3%
7.3%
100.0%
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Table 14: Average Profit Margins by Ownership Type 
Source: GSO 2010, Part 06
Table 13 shows the falling share of the state sector in total revenues. Other than the 
collective sector and private sector all other ownership categories have increased their 
share. Table 14 shows profit margins (profits as proportion of annual revenues). Profit 
margins give an indication of the sector’s ability to finance investments from retained 
earnings and its share of total investments (recalling the Kaleckian equation). Despite the 
increase in revenue share of the private limited liability sector and JS without state capital 
sector compared to the state sector profit margins are relatively low. 
State
Non-State
Private
Private LL
JS w state cap
JS wo state cap
100% Foreign
JV
2000
4.0%
1.0%
1.1%
0.2%
5.4%
2.9%
-0.3%
21.2%
2001
4.2%
1.3%
0.9%
0.7%
6.2%
1.9%
-0.4%
22.1%
2002
4.2%
1.5%
1.1%
0.7%
6.6%
2.5%
2.7%
22.0%
2003
4.2%
1.5%
1.0%
0.9%
5.1%
2.4%
2.9%
24.1%
2004
5.3%
1.2%
1.0%
0.6%
4.6%
1.7%
3.7%
26.8%
2005
5.4%
1.2%
0.8%
0.4%
3.9%
2.3%
2.6%
20.4%
2006
6.1%
1.7%
0.8%
0.7%
4.8%
3.5%
2.4%
29.0%
2007
6.8%
2.8%
0.9%
1.4%
6.8%
4.9%
4.5%
25.3%
2008
5.2%
1.2%
0.6%
0.2%
5.4%
1.6%
2.9%
22.5%
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Table 15: Some Indicators for Non-State Firms by Size (Employees)57
No. Firms
2004
2005
2006
2007
% Firms by 
Size
2004
2005
2006
2007
Net New 
Firms
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ave capital 
(Bil VND)
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ave Profit 
(Bil VND)
2004
2005
2006
No. Employees
Total
84,003 
105,167 
123,392 
147,316 
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
Total
 21,164 
 18,225 
 23,924 
Total
5.90
6.64
7.99
12.38
Total
0.10
0.10
0.16
0-5
17,884 
23,034 
16,656 
34,658 
0-5
21%
22%
13%
24%
0-5
24.3%
-35.0%
75.2%
0-5
0.95
1.34
1.70
2.01
0-5
0.00
0.00
0.02
5-9
26,285 
34,394 
57,722 
50,668 
5-9
31%
33%
47%
34%
5-9
38.3%
128.0
%
-29.5%
5-9
1.93
2.14
2.36
3.76
5-9
-0.03
0.00
0.00
10-49
30,849 
37,228 
37,503 
48,533 
10-49
37%
35%
30%
33%
10-49
30.1%
1.5%
46.1%
10-49
4.06
4.56
5.40
7.80
10-49
0.04
0.04
0.05
50-199
7,079 
8,254 
8,977 
10,549 
50-199
8%
8%
7%
7%
50-199
5.6%
4.0%
6.6%
50-199
15.65
17.19
21.73
31.57
50-199
0.35
0.25
0.52
200-299
743 
882 
1,017 
1,178 
200-299
1%
1%
1%
1%
200-299
0.7%
0.7%
0.7%
200-299
45.43
46.04
53.70
86.32
200-299
1.14
0.82
1.36
300-499
628 
716 
742 
870 
300-499
1%
1%
1%
1%
300-499
0.4%
0.1%
0.5%
300-499
76.82
86.07
68.23
158.09
300-499
1.90
1.78
2.53
500-999
369 
450 
526 
558 
500-999
0%
0%
0%
0%
500-999
0.4%
0.4%
0.1%
500-999
163.54
153.16
222.64
254.19
500-999
4.04
4.40
7.23
1000-4999
161 
203 
238 
290 
1000-4999
0%
0%
0%
0%
1000-4999
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
1000-4999
300.30
538.11
836.97
1385.78
1000-4999
10.17
13.79
23.26
5000+
5 
6 
11 
12 
5000+
0%
0%
0%
0%
5000+
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
5000+
263.0
0
347.6
7
290.6
4
5732.
01
5000+
3.60
17.00
27.82
57. ‘Net New Firms Total’ is the total number of firms. The remaining figures are the percentage year on year 
change in the number of firms of different sizes. 
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2007
Profit/ 
Capital
2004
2005
2006
2007
Revenue/ 
Employee
2004
2005
2006
2007
Profit/ 
Employee
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ch Capital
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ch Profit
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ch Profit/ 
Ch Capital
2004
2005
2006
0.32
Total
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.03
Total
0.26
0.29
0.34
0.43
Total
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
Total
0.13
0.20
0.55
Total
-
0.62
0.98
Total
-
2.05
0.02
0-5
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0-5
0.54
0.58
0.89
0.82
0-5
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0-5
0.40
0.27
0.18
0-5
-
5.47
-0.16
0-5
-
19.29
0.02
5-9
-0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
5-9
0.51
0.51
0.59
0.65
5-9
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
5-9
0.11
0.10
0.60
5-9
-
-1.76
4.95
5-9
-
-18.76
0.11
10-49
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
10-49
0.35
0.39
0.45
0.57
10-49
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
10-49
0.12
0.18
0.44
10-49
0.11
0.15
1.28
10-49
-0.07
-0.19
1.02
50-199
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.03
50-199
0.24
0.26
0.30
0.41
50-199
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
50-199
0.10
0.26
0.45
50-199
-0.28
1.05
0.99
50-199
-3.80
2.99
3.12
200-299
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.04
200-299
0.17
0.22
0.23
0.32
200-299
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
200-299
0.01
0.17
0.61
200-299
-0.28
0.66
1.30
200-299
-21.93
2.98
6.61
300-499
0.02
0.02
0.04
0.04
300-499
0.18
0.20
0.25
0.32
300-499
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
300-499
0.12
-0.21
1.32
300-499
-0.06
0.42
1.61
300-499
-1.51
-3.01
11.16
500-999
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.04
500-999
0.15
0.17
0.19
0.24
500-999
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
500-999
-0.06
0.45
0.14
500-999
0.09
0.64
0.54
500-999
-2.43
0.42
40.14
1000-4999
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
1000-4999
0.14
0.18
0.23
0.28
1000-4999
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
1000-4999
0.79
0.56
0.66
1000-4999
0.36
0.69
0.73
1000-4999
-0.55
0.24
164.1
6
5000+
0.01
0.05
0.10
0.03
5000+
0.02
0.05
0.05
0.10
5000+
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
5000+
0.32
-0.16
18.72
5000+
3.72
0.64
4.90
5000+
10.56
-4.88
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2007
Ave Rev
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ch in Rev
2004
2005
2006
2007
ICOR (Ch 
Rev/ Ch 
Capital)
2004
2005
2006
2007
ICOR (Ch. 
Profits/ Ch 
Capital)
2004
2005
2006
2007
Profit/ Inv
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ch Capital
2004
0.78
Total
6.67
7.18
8.26
10.40
Total
0.08
0.15
0.26
Total
1.64
1.35
2.11
Total
-
0.33
0.56
Total
0.05
0.07
0.06
Total
-1.86
0-5
0.58
0.69
2.00
1.54
0-5
0.19
1.91
-0.23
0-5
2.15
0.14
-0.80
0-5
-
0.05
-1.16
0-5
0.01
-0.13
0.01
0-5
7.28
5-9
2.49
2.42
2.66
3.31
5-9
-0.03
0.10
0.24
5-9
-4.31
1.02
2.45
5-9
-
-0.06
0.12
5-9
-0.01
0.00
0.02
5-9
1.87
10-49
6.13
6.82
8.12
10.09
10-49
0.11
0.19
0.24
10-49
1.09
0.96
1.83
10-49
1.07
1.23
0.35
10-49
0.03
0.05
0.03
10-49
1.17
50-199
20.91
22.17
26.69
36.69
50-199
0.06
0.20
0.37
50-199
1.64
1.29
1.21
50-199
-0.36
0.25
0.46
50-199
0.07
0.09
0.08
50-199
1.14
200-299
39.26
51.65
54.46
75.27
200-299
0.32
0.05
0.38
200-299
0.04
3.05
1.59
200-299
-0.05
0.25
0.47
200-299
0.10
0.10
0.08
200-299
0.23
300-499
67.06
75.03
92.66
119.58
300-499
0.12
0.23
0.29
300-499
1.01
-0.88
4.53
300-499
-1.97
-0.50
0.82
300-499
0.10
-0.17
0.07
300-499
2.84
500-999
98.10
112.17
122.79
164.12
500-999
0.14
0.09
0.34
500-999
-0.44
4.79
0.42
500-999
-0.70
0.71
0.26
500-999
0.23
0.08
0.25
500-999
0.11
1000-4999
241.06
329.37
401.82
489.58
1000-4999
0.37
0.22
0.22
1000-4999
2.16
2.52
3.00
1000-4999
2.22
0.81
0.90
1000-4999
0.05
0.06
0.06
1000-4999
-0.74
5000+
174.4
0
372.8
3
359.0
0
693.7
7
5000+
1.14
-0.04
0.93
5000+
0.28
4.42
20.08
5000+
0.09
-0.26
3.82
5000+
0.13
0.28
0.03
5000+
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Source: GSO 2007 and 2008, own calculations
The data in Table 15 and Table 16 is derived from GSO 2008 and GSO 2007. 
Unfortunately, whilst enterprise statistics are provided for non-state and state firms by 
size of employees they are not broken down further, so it is impossible, for example, to 
know how many large non-state firms possess state capital. 
After 2004 there were approximately 20,000 new firms (net) per year. There is no data for 
the number of firms that ceased trading. The vast majority of firms employed fewer than 
50 people, with only around three percent employing more than 200 people. It is likely 
that many of these firms were equitised state firms. There also appears to have been some 
growth in firms from the 0-5 employee category to the 5-10 employee category between 
2006 and 2007. There appears to have been little growth in the number of large firms. 
The average capital per firm is small compared to state firms, although it increases over 
time even when taking inflation into account. Larger firms report greater profits in 
absolute terms, but when stated as a proportion of available capital (unfortunately, total 
long term capital was not available as a measure) or per employee there was no 
discernible difference. Revenues per employee and the ‘ICOR’ measures provide some 
2005
2006
2007
Ave Ch 
Capital
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ave Ch 
Capital/ Av 
Ch Profits
2004
2005
2006
2007
203,048 
287,574 
837,138 
Total
2
2
6
Total
4
6
13,760 
(2,526)
41,324 
0-5
1
0
1
0-5
0
-8
23,108 
62,237 
54,805 
5-9
1
1
1
5-9
-1
0
44,585 
32,488 
176,007 
10-49
1
1
4
10-49
10
6
3
31,116 
53,119 
138,026 
50-199
4
6
13
50-199
-14
6
13
6,858 
13,999 
47,072 
200-299
8
14
40
200-299
-27
21
31
13,386 
(11,004)
86,913 
300-499
19
-15
100
300-499
-305
-36
62
8,576 
48,186 
24,729 
500-999
19
92
44
500-999
210
143
81
60,888 
89,963 
202,676 
1000-4999
300
378
699
1000-4999
842
550
964
771 
1,111 
65,58
7 
5000+
129
101
5466
5000+
35
159
1115
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indication of efficiency. In terms of revenues per employee smaller firms appear to be the 
most efficient. However, the two ICOR measures suggest larger firms make better use of 
incremental increases in capital. In absolute terms larger firms also have larger increases 
in available capital year on year. The average change in capital/ average change in profits 
suggests that larger firms are better able to leverage increases in savings. Moreover, non-
state firms appear to extract greater leverage than state firms.
Table 16: Some Indicators for State Firms by Size (Employees)
No. Firms
2004
2005
2006
2007
No. Firms
2004
2005
2006
2007
Net New Firms
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ave capital
2004
2005
2006
No. Employees
Total
4,597 
4,086 
3,720 
3,494 
Total
100%
100%
100%
100%
Total
 (511)
 (366)
 (226)
Total
264.73
353.63
475.32
0-5
4 
10 
19 
10 
0-5
0%
0%
1%
0%
0-5
-1.2%
-2.5%
4.0%
0-5
2.00
5.00
5.53
5-9
29 
32 
27 
43 
5-9
1%
1%
1%
1%
5-9
-0.6%
1.4%
-7.1%
5-9
2.41
9.91
56.70
10-49
720 
679 
658 
631 
10-49
16%
17%
18%
18%
10-49
8.0%
5.7%
11.9%
10-49
19.01
18.96
28.64
50-199
1,688 
1,507 
1,362 
1,251 
50-199
37%
37%
37%
36%
50-199
35.4%
39.6%
49.1%
50-199
61.00
94.26
129.33
200-29
9
518 
447 
398 
405 
200-29
9
11%
11%
11%
12%
200-29
9
13.9%
13.4%
-3.1%
200-29
9
80.94
114.50
179.64
300-49
9
609 
535 
457 
438 
300-49
9
13%
13%
12%
13%
300-49
9
14.5%
21.3%
8.4%
300-49
9
122.14
158.16
227.64
500-99
9
575 
449 
399 
357 
500-99
9
13%
11%
11%
10%
500-99
9
24.7%
13.7%
18.6%
500-99
9
199.56
264.01
305.46
1000-499
9
421 
387 
359 
322 
1000-499
9
9%
9%
10%
9%
1000-499
9
6.7%
7.7%
16.4%
1000-499
9
426.01
536.62
724.91
5000+
33 
40 
41 
37 
5000+
1%
1%
1%
1%
5000+
-1.4%
-0.3%
1.8%
5000+
20903.0
9
20691.3
3
24729.9
8
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2007
Average Profit
2004
2005
2006
2007
Profit/ Capital
2004
2005
2006
2007
Revenue/ 
Employee
2004
2005
2006
2007
Profit/ Employee
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ch Capital
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ch Profit
2004
2005
2006
626.00
Total
8.33
11.36
16.74
21.83
Total
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.03
Total
0.32
0.42
0.52
0.64
Total
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.04
Total
0.34
0.34
0.32
Total
-
0.47
22.86
0-5
0.00
-0.10
-0.16
-0.04
0-5
0.00
-0.02
-0.03
0.00
0-5
2.15
0.19
0.80
0.37
0-5
0.00
-0.03
-0.06
-0.01
0-5
1.50
0.11
3.14
0-5
-
0.58
35.75
5-9
0.00
0.66
0.26
-0.07
5-9
0.00
0.07
0.00
0.00
5-9
0.18
0.39
5.92
0.27
5-9
0.00
0.09
0.04
-0.01
5-9
3.10
4.72
-0.37
5-9
-
-0.60
33.68
10-49
0.98
0.76
1.03
1.65
10-49
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.05
10-49
0.52
0.60
0.60
0.76
10-49
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.06
10-49
0.00
0.51
0.18
10-49
-0.22
0.36
148.06
50-199
0.51
2.75
4.79
6.70
50-199
0.01
0.03
0.04
0.05
50-199
0.67
0.85
1.21
0.89
50-199
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
50-199
0.55
0.37
0.14
50-199
4.35
0.74
347.83
200-29
9
1.89
2.96
3.88
20.14
200-29
9
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.06
200-29
9
0.36
0.50
0.69
1.83
200-29
9
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.08
200-29
9
0.41
0.57
0.94
200-29
9
0.56
0.31
249.94
300-49
9
3.08
3.92
3.15
9.61
300-49
9
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.04
300-49
9
0.37
0.47
0.61
0.84
300-49
9
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
300-49
9
0.29
0.44
0.10
300-49
9
0.27
-0.20
371.04
500-99
9
3.41
4.62
6.42
13.23
500-99
9
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.04
500-99
9
0.27
0.35
0.36
0.45
500-99
9
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.02
500-99
9
0.32
0.16
0.21
500-99
9
0.36
0.39
1113.57
1000-499
9
29.89
42.81
62.23
58.69
1000-499
9
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.05
1000-499
9
0.25
0.33
0.40
0.46
1000-499
9
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
1000-499
9
0.26
0.35
0.54
1000-499
9
0.43
0.45
33449.2
1
5000+
585.48
491.60
663.10
834.08
5000+
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.02
5000+
0.31
0.41
0.51
0.58
5000+
0.04
0.04
0.06
0.07
5000+
-0.01
0.20
0.35
5000+
-0.16
0.35
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2007
Ch Profit/ Ch 
Capital
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ave Rev
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ch in Rev
2004
2005
2006
2007
ICOR (Ch Rev/ 
Ch Capital)
2004
2005
2006
2007
ICOR (Ch. 
Profits Ch 
Capital)
2004
2005
2006
2007
0.30
Total
-
0.38
-0.04
Total
156.95
209.18
268.11
321.83
Total
0.33
0.28
0.20
Total
1.01
1.22
1.58
Total
-
0.73
1.04
-0.75
0-5
-
4.50
-1.24
0-5
6.00
-0.40
1.11
0.42
0-5
-1.07
-3.76
-0.62
0-5
-1.41
-0.03
-5.06
0-5
-
0.18
-4.20
-1.27
5-9
-
-1.13
2.43
5-9
0.31
1.78
41.33
0.93
5-9
4.74
22.20
-0.98
5-9
0.65
0.21
0.38
5-9
-
-7.81
0.29
0.59
10-49
79.63
-0.30
2.37
10-49
14.97
16.71
16.99
21.06
10-49
0.12
0.02
0.24
10-49
-0.02
29.70
0.74
10-49
0.01
1.42
0.30
0.40
50-199
6.97
1.00
1.75
50-199
73.89
94.13
135.88
98.12
50-199
0.27
0.44
-0.28
50-199
1.99
0.84
-0.52
50-199
0.13
0.50
0.36
4.19
200-29
9
0.36
-0.46
3.48
200-29
9
87.29
122.06
168.66
446.53
200-29
9
0.40
0.38
1.65
200-29
9
1.04
1.49
0.57
200-29
9
0.74
1.84
0.22
2.06
300-49
9
-0.07
-1.45
19.98
300-49
9
140.06
179.16
235.38
323.15
300-49
9
0.28
0.31
0.37
300-49
9
1.06
1.40
0.26
300-49
9
1.08
-2.22
0.05
1.06
500-99
9
0.10
1.48
3.94
500-99
9
183.14
247.82
252.39
313.81
500-99
9
0.35
0.02
0.24
500-99
9
0.91
8.52
0.88
500-99
9
0.91
0.40
0.20
-0.06
1000-499
9
0.67
0.29
-1.11
1000-499
9
497.46
641.18
760.70
870.28
1000-499
9
0.29
0.19
0.14
1000-499
9
0.90
1.88
3.72
1000-499
9
0.60
0.77
-9.41
0.26
5000+
14.83
0.79
-0.27
5000+
4263.85
4791.23
6134.34
7398.61
5000+
0.12
0.28
0.21
5000+
-0.08
0.70
1.71
5000+
0.06
0.56
1.37
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Source: GSO 2007, 2008, own calculations
There are far fewer state firms, and the number of firms falls every year as a result of the 
rationalisation of the state sector. A large proportion of state firms employ more than 200 
people. Table 17 illustrates the differences between state and non-state firms. A negative 
number indicates a greater value for the state sector. The Table demonstrates that state 
firms are, on average, much larger than non-state firms. However, they don’t appear to be 
more efficient. Although they generate more revenue per employee, the two ICOR 
measures suggest that the non-state
Profit/ Inv
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ch Capital
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ave Ch Capital
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ave Ch Capital/ 
Av Ch Profits
2004
2005
2006
2007
Total
0.20
0.19
0.18
Total
228,003 
323,257 
419,036 
Total
56
87
120
Total
183
395
0-5
-0.02
-0.05
0.00
0-5
42 
55 
124 
0-5
4
3
12
0-5
5
-17
5-9
0.09
0.01
-0.47
5-9
247 
1,214 
6 
5-9
8
45
0
5-9
-74
0
10-49
-0.63
0.11
0.43
10-49
(815)
5,967 
2,412 
10-49
-1
9
4
10-49
5
25
6
50-199
0.11
0.19
0.92
50-199
39,075 
34,104 
9,075 
50-199
26
25
7
50-199
6
34
18
200-29
9
0.14
0.08
0.12
200-29
9
9,257 
20,315 
69,374 
200-29
9
21
51
171
200-29
9
37
165
41
300-49
9
0.21
0.07
0.77
300-49
9
10,231 
19,415 
5,442 
300-49
9
19
42
12
300-49
9
70
-215
6
500-99
9
0.55
0.77
0.45
500-99
9
3,794 
3,341 
10,583 
500-99
9
8
8
30
500-99
9
24
21
28
1000-499
9
0.58
0.43
0.19
1000-499
9
28,322 
52,569 
98,328 
1000-499
9
73
146
305
1000-499
9
169
323
-5362
5000+
0.14
0.15
0.14
5000+
137,851 
186,276 
223,692 
5000+
3446
4543
6046
5000+
-21492
13023
23446
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Table 17: Difference Between Non-State and State Firms ((-) indicates greater value for 
state sector).
Ave capital
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ave capital
2004
2005
2006
2007
Revenue/ 
Employee
2004
2005
2006
2007
Ave Rev
2004
2005
2006
2007
ICOR (Ch 
Rev/ Ch 
Capital)
2004
2005
2006
2007
Total
-258.83
-346.99
-467.33
-613.62
Total
-8.23
-11.26
-16.58
-21.51
Total
-0.06
-0.13
-0.19
-0.21
Total
-150.28
-202.00
-259.85
-311.43
Total
0.63
0.13
0.53
0-5
-1.05
-3.66
-3.83
-20.85
0-5
0.00
0.10
0.18
0.06
0-5
-1.61
0.38
0.09
0.45
0-5
-5.42
1.09
0.90
1.12
0-5
3.56
0.17
4.26
5-9
-0.49
-7.76
-54.35
-31.99
5-9
-0.03
-0.66
-0.26
0.09
5-9
0.33
0.12
-5.34
0.38
5-9
2.18
0.64
-38.68
2.38
5-9
-4.97
0.81
2.08
10-49
-14.95
-14.40
-23.24
-25.89
10-49
-0.94
-0.72
-0.99
-1.54
10-49
-0.17
-0.21
-0.16
-0.19
10-49
-8.84
-9.88
-8.88
-10.97
10-49
1.11
-28.73
1.09
50-199
-45.35
-77.06
-107.60
-116.49
50-199
-0.17
-2.50
-4.28
-5.68
50-199
-0.43
-0.60
-0.91
-0.48
50-199
-52.98
-71.95
-109.18
-61.43
50-199
-0.35
0.45
1.73
200-299
-35.51
-68.46
-125.95
-261.51
200-299
-0.75
-2.15
-2.52
-17.02
200-299
-0.20
-0.29
-0.46
-1.51
200-299
-48.04
-70.41
-114.20
-371.26
200-299
-1.00
1.56
1.02
300-499
-45.32
-72.09
-159.41
-91.85
300-499
-1.18
-2.14
-0.62
-3.01
300-499
-0.19
-0.27
-0.36
-0.52
300-499
-73.00
-104.13
-142.72
-203.56
300-499
-0.04
-2.28
4.27
500-999
-36.02
-110.85
-82.82
-116.86
500-999
0.63
-0.22
0.81
-2.06
500-999
-0.12
-0.19
-0.18
-0.21
500-999
-85.04
-135.65
-129.60
-149.70
500-999
-1.36
-3.73
-0.46
1000-4999
-125.71
1.49
112.07
272.21
1000-4999
-19.72
-29.02
-38.97
-18.55
1000-4999
-0.11
-0.15
-0.17
-0.18
1000-4999
-256.40
-311.81
-358.88
-380.70
1000-4999
1.26
0.64
-0.72
5000+
-20640.09
-20343.66
-24439.34
-27717.20
5000+
-581.88
-474.60
-635.28
-669.92
5000+
-0.29
-0.36
-0.46
-0.48
5000+
-4089.45
-4418.39
-5775.34
-6704.84
5000+
0.36
3.72
18.37
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Source: GSO 2007, 2008, own calculations
6.4. The Private Sector
A number of surveys carried out by the Government Statistics Office, the World Bank, 
The Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and others suggest SMEs in Vietnam share a 
number of characteristics. First, although the number of SMEs is increasing rapidly many 
new firms are actually existing household enterprises and other small firms that hitherto 
had chosen not to formally register (Malesky and Taussig 2009). Consequently, Table 17 
may not actually accurately depict the number of new SMEs. Second, although actual 
figures are difficult to come by, the rate of attrition is thought to be high. Individual firms 
tend to remain small. Although total assets for the sector are rising as a proportion of 
GDP, per firm the number remains small. 
The majority of SMEs are in the retail or service sectors, and those in the manufacturing 
sector tend to be low skilled, with limited technological capabilities. Surveys of smaller 
private companies conclude that the majority of firms face difficulties accessing bank 
credit, and tend to rely, instead, on friends and family (Le Van Su, 2005). In the 
mid-1990s half of SMEs surveyed did not keep bank accounts, and three quarters did not 
use banks to settle payments, opting instead for informal credit markets. As a result in 
1995 there was four times more cash in circulation in Vietnam than in other ASEAN 
countries (Nguyen Xuan Nghia, 2005). A 2003 survey by the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) found 61 percent of start up funds were personal savings, and a further 
nine percent borrowed from friends and family (Tenev et. al. 2003). The same study 
confirmed SOEs tend to dominate borrowing from SOEs, and private firms borrow more 
from private Joint Stock Banks. Private firms are also likely to depend on a more varied 
ICOR (Ch. 
Profits Ch 
Capital)
2004
2005
2006
2007
Total
-0.40
-0.48
0-5
-0.13
3.04
5-9
7.75
-0.17
10-49
1.06
-0.19
0.05
50-199
-0.48
-0.25
0.10
200-299
-0.78
-1.59
0.24
300-499
-3.05
1.73
0.77
500-999
-1.61
0.30
0.06
1000-4999
1.62
0.03
10.32
5000+
0.02
-0.82
2.45
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source of funds than SOEs. Similarly, Nguyen et. al find that the majority of SMEs rely 
on informal credit sources (Nguyen et al. 2009). 
A recent study of bank lending by one unnamed Vietnamese Joint Stock Bank provides 
further insight into the lending habits of Vietnamese banks, and so the availability of 
credit to private enterprise. Hainz et al (2011) had access to the JSB's loan portfolio for 
June 2006 until March 2009. The data set consisted of 51,161 loans to 'commercial, real-
estate, consumer and 'other' borrowers’. Thirteen percent of total loans in the data set 
were for commercial purposes, predominantly to SMEs or single entrepreneurs - just over 
half were to consumers. The researchers found that the bank categorised borrowers 
according to risk. Loans offered without collateral were charged higher interest rates than 
those with collateral. Collateralised loans were also granted for longer periods and were 
more likely to be larger than 100 million VND (approximately USD 6,200). Consistent 
with Figure 13 the number of new loans peaked in 2007 and by 2009 was 41 percent of 
the 2007 (Quarter 4) level. The study found that borrowers with 'lower credit quality as 
observed by the bank are more likely to pledge collateral' and concluded that 'observed 
credit risk is the dominant factor in determining the use of collateral’ and that the higher 
credit risk observed by the bank the more collateral will be pledged. However they also 
found that wealthier borrowers pledged collateral to secure lower interest rates. The 
importance of collateral for commercial loans is illustrated in Table 18.
Table 18: Collateral and interest in a JSB
Source: Adapted from Hainz et al. (2011, p. 27)
Hainz et al. also discovered that larger loans have collateral with a higher absolute value 
but low value relative to the size of the loan. Moreover, the absolute and relative values 
Number of Loans
Proportion of Collateralised Loans
Average collateral to loan value ratio
Average interest rate (Collateralised loans)
Average interest rate (Un-collateralised loans)
Commercial Loans
5,226
26,5%
5.0
14.5%
20.8%
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of collateral increased during the economic crisis in Vietnam (in Quarter 3, 2008) before 
dropping again.
The study supports the general proposition that bank credit is a function of available 
collateral, and that the greater the amount of collateral the lower the costs of borrowing 
and the larger the absolute loan that can be secured.
6.4.1. World Bank Enterprise Surveys
The World Bank conducts enterprise surveys in 135 countries58. In Vietnam surveys were 
conducted in 2005 and 2009. In 2005 1150 firms were surveyed, and in 2009, 1553. 
There are substantial differences in the types of firms surveyed. The questionnaire was 
also different. A number of variables relevant to this study are not reported in the 2009 
questionnaire. For example, the 2009 survey does not record any details of firm balance 
sheets. Similarly, lines of credit and loans become one variable in 2009. Nevertheless, the 
data from the surveys can add to the analysis.
6.4.1.1. Relationship with Banking sector
The surveys can help shed some more light on the sources of finance and working capital 
for firms of different sizes and ownership types, and also on the importance of pledging 
collateral when securing a loan. The 2004 survey provides some balance sheet data, 
including the amount of ‘cash’ held at the end of the year. 
Table 19 displays the proportion of surveyed firms that hold a ‘checking’ or ‘savings 
account’. If anything we would expect a higher proportion of firms to have an account in 
2009. The differences between the figures points to the difficulties making useful 
comparisons between the two years. 
Table 19: Proportion of Firms with Bank Account
2005
Small >=5 and 
<=19
84%
Medium >= 20 
and <=99
90%
Large >=100
95%
58. See http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.
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Table 20 shows the proportion of small, medium and large firms that pledged collateral 
when securing a loan. 
Table 20: Surveyed Firms with Loans that Pledged Collateral 
In 2009 of the 39% of firms that reported not having a loan the majority (63.4%) did not 
need a loan. Of the remainder 5.9% found the collateral requirements too high. In 2005 
50% of firms that did not have a loan (379) did not need a loan. Of the remainder 11.3% 
found collateral requirements too strict. Of these 43 firms 12 were small, 21 medium and 
the remainder over 100 employees. Of the 58 with a loan request turned down the 
majority (23) lacked the 'accepted' collateral. These figures point to the importance of 
collateral in accessing credit from banks. Table 21 shows the ratio of collateral to loans in 
both years.
Table 21: Ratio of Collateral to Loans 
The results in Table 21 are difficult to interpret. The 2005 figures are the interviewees 
response to a direct question asking the value of collateral as a proportion of the loan. No 
such question is asked in the 2009 survey. However, interviewees are invited to provide 
an estimate of both the value of the last firm’s last loan and the value of the collateral (if 
any was pledged) to acquire the loan. In calculating the ratio it becomes clear that one or 
both values are not accurately reported as some values are extremely high. The values in 
Table 21 are the means of calculated values under or equal to ten. Nevertheless, although 
it is difficult to determine whether there has been a change between 2005 and 2009 the 
fact that the ratio is higher for smaller firms in both years (the ranking remains the same 
2009 80.1% 82.2% 84.3%
2005
2009
Small >=5 and 
<=19
93.3%
94.6%
Medium >= 20 
and <=99
93.6%
95.4%
Large >=100
85.2%
89.3%
Ratio of collateral to loan 2005 
Ratio of collateral to loan 2009
Small >=5 and 
<=19
1.76
2.88
Medium >= 20 
and <=99
1.66
2.15
Large >=100
1.41
1.92
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even if outliers are not excluded) suggests that smaller firms are asked to pledge a higher 
proportion of collateral to loan size than larger firms. 
An OLS regression with the ratio of collateral to loan as the dependent variable suggests 
that the size of the firm and being able to pledge land or fixed assets as collateral is a 
significant determinant of the size of collateral. State ownership proved not to have a 
significant impact. 
Figure 29: Type of Collateral as Determinant on Value of Collateral Pledged
Model Summary
Model
1
R
Did the loan require 
collateral or a 
deposit?
.226a
R Square
.051
Adjusted R Square
.046
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
80.08698
ANOVAb,c
Model
1
a. Predictors: (Constant), sizeover100, If yes, land and buildings were used as collateral, If yes, personal 
assests of the owner/manager (e.g. house)
b. Dependent Variable: What was the approximate value of the collateral required as a percentage of the 
loan?
c. Selecting only cases for which Did the loan require collateral or a deposit? =  Yes
Regression
Residual
Total
Sum of Squares
207367.415
3867596.450
4074963.864
df
3
603
606
Mean Square
69122.472
6413.924
F
10.777
Sig.
.000a
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Table 22 shows the type of collateral pledged by firms of different size in both 2005 and 
2009. Smaller firms pledge a higher proportion of the owner’s assets than larger firms, as 
might be expected. Larger firms are able to pledge plant and machinery and are less 
dependent on land. 
Coefficientsa,b
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: What was the approximate value of the collateral required as a percentage of the
b. Selecting only cases for which Did the loan require collateral or a deposit? =  Yes
(Constant)
If yes, land and buildings 
were used as collateral
If yes, personal assets of 
the owner/manager (e.g. 
house)
sizeover100
Unstandardized Coefficients
B
238.629
-21.963
-24.522
-17.771
Std. Error
18.748
6.640
8.696
6.776
Standardized 
Coefficients
Beta
-.133
-.114
-.108
t
12.728
-3.308
-2.820
-2.623
Sig.
.000
.001
.005
.009
Coefficientsa,b
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: cashcurrent100
b. Selecting only cases for which Did the loan require collateral or a deposit? =  Yes
(Constant)
sizeover100
soe
Unstandardized Coefficients
B
15.920
-6.397
-4.782
Std. Error
.861
1.214
1.668
Standardized 
Coefficients
Beta
-.212
-.115
t
18.484
-5.270
-2.867
Sig.
.000
.000
.004
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Table 22: Types of Collateral (2005)
Table 23: Types of Collateral (%) (2009)
Many firms pledged more than one category of collateral. Percentages represent the 
proportion of firms in each size category that pledged collateral. Table 24 and Table 25 
report the sources of working capital for firms of differing sizes in 2005 and 2009.
Table 24: Sources of Working Capital (%) (2005)
Land and Buildings
Immoveable plant, machinery 
Moveable machinery and equipment (incl.vehicles)
Other tangible assets (e.g. accounts receivable, inventory)
Personal assets of the owner/manager (e.g. house)
Other
Small >=5 and 
<=19
71.4%
33.3%
31.0%
0.0%
35.7%
0.0%
Medium >= 20 
and <=99
60.0%
50.2%
40.4%
11.5%
23.4%
4.3%
Large >=100
46.9%
69.6%
56.7%
16.8%
10.6%
5.6%
Land and Buildings
Machinery and equipment including movables
Accounts receivable and inventories
Personal assets of owner (house, etc.)
Other
S m a l l > = 5 
and <=19
59.7%
28.1%
2.9%
48.2%
2.9%
Medium >= 
20 and <=99
71.7%
41.7%
5.3%
42.1%
3.6%
Large >=100
79.5%
70.1%
20.5%
20.9%
7.3%
Internal funds or retained earnings used for working capital
Private commercial banks (loan, overdraft) used for working 
capital
Small >=5 
and <=19
36.59
1.21
Medium >= 
20 and <=99
31.21
3.57
Large >=100
22.19
2.48
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Table 25: Sources of Working Capital (%) (2009)
In both years own funds are a significant source of working capital for all firms, but more 
so for smaller firms. The category for 2009 conflates retained earnings and the internal 
funds of the firm with equity or funds of the owner. Combining both in 2005 provides a 
similar figure. Large firms are more likely to use state owned banks. Few firms use 
private banks in 2005. Unfortunately, it is impossible to say for 2009. Again, as might be 
expected a greater proportion of smaller firms go to informal sources for working capital. 
This thesis also asks whether smaller firms hold more cash than larger firms. Table 26 
suggests that on average smaller firms hold 15 percentage points more cash than larger 
firms as a proportion of current assets.    
Table 26: 2005 Ratio of Cash to Current Assets, Total Assets and ST Liabilities. 
(Averages of 2003 and 2004)
State Owned commercial banks used for working capital
Private investment funds used for working capital
Trade credit (supplier or customer credit) used for working 
capital
Equity or sales of shares used for working capital
Family, friends used for working capital
Corporate bonds used for working capital
9.7
1
3.22
35.57
10.7
0
15.43
1
5.91
29.18
7.74
0
32.05
1
9.44
23.22
2.71
0.14
Internal funds/Retained earnings
Borrowed from banks (private and state-owned)
Borrowed from non-bank financial institutions
Purchases on credit from suppliers and advances from customers
 Other (moneylenders, friends, relatives, etc.)
Small >=5 
and <=19
68.0
20
0
2
8
Medium >= 
20 and <=99
58
28
1
4
6
Large >=100
47
37
0
6
5
Cash/ current
Cash/ Total Assets
cashofstliabx100
Small >=5 
and <=19
26.64
11.94
244
Medium >= 20 and <=99
16.73
7.62
65.09
Large >=100
10.06
4.87
27.08
Large 
>=300
9.63
4.79
25.56
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Smaller firms do indeed hold more cash as a proportion of both current assets and total 
assets. Interestingly they also hold, on average, over twice as much in cash as the value of 
their short term liabilities, a value that also decreases as firms get bigger. An OLS 
regression (Figure 30) supports this observation, suggesting that larger firms and SOEs 
tend to hold less cash as a proportion of current assets. 
Figure 30: Cash as a Proportion of Current Assets (OLS)
Model
1
a. Predictors: (Constant), soe, sizeover100
R
Did the loan require 
collateral or a 
deposit? =  Yes 
(Selected)
.271a
R Square
.073
Adjusted R Square
.070
Std. Error of the 
Estimate
14.49321
ANOVAb,c
Model
1
a. Predictors: (Constant), soe, sizeover100
b. Dependent Variable: cashcurrent100
c. Selecting only cases for which Did the loan require collateral or a deposit? =  Yes
Regression
Residual
Total
Sum of Squares
10576.250
133803.784
144380.034
df
2
637
639
Mean Square
5288.125
210.053
F
25.175
Sig.
.000a
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This thesis also suggests that diversified firms are better able to manage liquidity and so 
less likely to hold cash as opposed to other liquid assets or rely on sales revenues to meet 
commitments. Table 27 presents two variables - ‘two activities’ and ‘two diff activities’. 
The first represents firms that report revenues of more than thirty percent in two 
activities. The second is firms that report two distinct SITC numbers. The Table suggests 
that although the average cash holding is lower than the sample average the difference is 
not great. This is not necessarily surprising as the data does not allow us to determine the 
Coefficientsa,b
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: cashcurrent100
b. Selecting only cases for which Did the loan require collateral or a deposit? =  Yes
(Constant)
sizeover100
soe
Unstandardized Coefficients
B
15.920
-6.397
-4.782
Std. Error
.861
1.214
1.668
Standardized 
Coefficients
Beta
-.212
-.115
t
18.484
-5.270
-2.867
Sig.
.000
.000
.004
Coefficientsa,b
Model
1
a. Dependent Variable: cashcurrent100
b. Selecting only cases for which Did the loan require collateral or a deposit? =  Yes
(Constant)
sizeover100
soe
Unstandardized Coefficients
B
15.920
-6.397
-4.782
Std. Error
.861
1.214
1.668
Standardized 
Coefficients
Beta
-.212
-.115
t
18.484
-5.270
-2.867
Sig.
.000
.000
.004
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structure of the company, and whether the different activities are carried out by different 
subsidiaries.    
Table 27: Cash as Proportion of Current Assets for Diversified Firms.
Table 28: Cash as a Proportion of Current Assets for Various Diversified Firms
The large diversified firm is a firm that reports operating in two distinct activities (as in 
Table 27), but which employs at least 300 workers. The cash/ current asset ratio is lower 
at 7.33 percent. The diversified firm is the average of firms operating in two distinct 
activities. That such firms operate in more than one activity does not however mean they 
take a conglomerate structure. The GC structure is, however, a formal conglomerate with 
the autonomy of subsidiary firms a function of the equity owned by the General 
Corporation. The 2005 survey records whether a firm that identifies itself as an SOE, a JS 
Company or One Member Limited Liability Company is a member of a GC. Table 29 
records the average cash holding of SOE and JS members of GCs by size and compares 
them to non-GC SOEs and JS companies.    
All
Two activities
Two diff activities
Small >=5 and 
<=19
Mean
26.64
22.12
22.48
Count
116
43
31
Medium >= 20 
and <=99
Mean
16.73
16.23
14.71
Count
427
209
144
Large 
>=100
Mean
10.06
9.89
9.83
Count
588
320
221
Large Div Firm
Div Firm
300+ workers (single activity)
Mean Cash/ Curr 
Assets
7.33
12.3
9.75
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Table 29: Impact of Being a Member of a GC on Cash Held as Proportion of Current 
Assets
Again smaller firms hold more cash (although only there is only one firm in the sample 
that is both a member of a GC and employs fewer than 20 people). However, although 
GCs appear to hold, on average, less cash than other firms there is little difference 
between GC member JS companies and non-GC JS companies, and similarly between 
non-GC SOEs and unattached SOEs. With regards to GC members in which the state has 
a minority stake this can be explained by the fact that such companies tend to operate 
autonomously, with little need for support from the GC59. As SOEs themselves appear to 
hold less cash than the population average it is perhaps also not surprising. Table 30 and 
Table 31 report sources of investment capital in 2005 and 2009. 
Table 30: Sources of Investment Capital (%) (2005)
GC Member
SOE non GC
SOE GC
JS non-GC
JS GC
All
Small >=5 and 
<=19
5.36
-
5.36
24.13
-
26.64
Medium >= 20 and <=99
8.41
16.26
4.76
11.97
11.06
16.73
Large >=100
7.90
5.98
5.76
10.67
10.04
10.06
Internal funds or retained earnings used for new investments
Private commercial banks used for new investments
State owned commercial banks used for new investments
International commercial banks used for new investments
Private investment funds used for new investments
Equity or sales of shares used for new investments
Family, friends used for new investments
Informal sources used for new investments
Corporate bonds used for new investments
Small >=5 
and <=19
36.19
1
4.89
0
3
45.4
6.93
1
0
Medium >= 
20 and 
<=99
33.14
4
17.35
1
1
30.88
7.81
1
0
Large 
>=100
26.91
2
32.17
2
0
22.22
2.54
0
0.12
59. See Chapter 7 for further discussion of GC subsidiaries
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Table 31: Sources of Investment Capital (%) (2009)
As expected smaller firms made greater use of internal funds and retained earnings, and 
relied less on banks. In 2005 smaller firms called on private equity. The survey reports 
that very few firms issued equity in 2008. Given that the 2009 survey included more 
listed firms than the 2005 survey this is difficult to explain, and may be related to the 
downturn in 2008. 
6.5. Conclusion
This Chapter has examined the composition of the firm sector and its investment, funding 
and financing behaviour over the course of the 1990s and 2000s in Vietnam. The 
objective was to determine the extent of enterprise sector savings deficits and the 
consequent sources of financing; how those sources changed as the institutional structure 
changed; and how firms differed in the financing, funding and liquidity management 
behaviour in response to changes in the financial sector, which, also corresponds to a 
period of financial deepening.
It found that firms of all ownership types tended to rely on retained earnings for 
investment. Until the mid-2000s investments were typically not greater than firm savings. 
This can partly be attributed to state intervention in the banking sector and the absence of 
effective capital markets, as well as legislation concerning the private sector. In the run 
up to accession to the WTO, and corresponding capital inflows, accelerated equitisation 
of the SOE sector and liberalisation of the banking sector there were changes in 
enterprise sector behaviour. Notably, firms had greater access to credit on more relaxed 
Internal funds or retained earnings
Owners' contribution or issued new equity shares
Borrowed from banks (private and state-owned)
Borrowed from non-banks financial institutions
Purchases on credit from suppliers and advances 
from customers
Other (moneylenders, friends, relatives, bonds)
Small >=5 and 
<=19
76
3
10
0
2
8
Medium >= 20 
and <=99
67
7
18
0
1
5
Large >=100
59
11
20
0
3
3
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terms as well as to equity markets. Joint-Stock companies tended to experience a greater 
increase in investments over profits. This can largely be attributed to nascent 
entrepreneurial capital, and equitisation of state owned enterprises. The small average 
size of private JSCs suggests that capital contributions from private investors were small. 
Kalecki’s equation suggests that investments will return to firms in proportion to profit 
margins. It might be expected given the objectives of the state that state owned enterprise 
investments would have lower profit margins, and so would in effect be financing private 
sector firms. This does not appear to be the case. SOEs and equitised SOEs continue to 
generate the highest profits and so have the greatest access to retained earnings for 
subsequent investments.
The evidence appears to confirm that banks lend a proportionate amount of pledged 
collateral. Bank financed investments will, therefore, be limited in size by the possession 
of suitable assets. For most category of enterprise liability/ equity ratios have remained 
constant over the time in which data are available, suggesting that firms are either not 
able or choose not to increase the incidence of bank based investments.
Studies of smaller firms find the majority do indeed finance investments from retained 
earnings, although larger firms are able to seek bank credit for working capital. This 
suggests in turn that smaller firms will need to hold greater cash balances. This is also 
born out. 
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7. Chapter 7: Case Studies of Vietnamese Firms
7.1. Introduction
Since the early 1990s Vietnam has seen the gradual reform of the institutions and 
legislation that concern the enterprise sector and the finance and banking sectors. State 
owned enterprises have been liquidated, merged and reorganised into General 
Corporations, and they have gained substantially more autonomy in their day to day 
operations. It has also become easier to establish and run a private business. At the same 
time the finance and banking system has experienced substantial change, and capital 
flows into Vietnam, triggered by the equitisation of SOEs and accession to the WTO, 
have ensured the financial landscape has changed significantly. Chapter 4 looked to 
marry the balance sheet firm and post-Keynesian approaches to financial development 
and the relationship between the real and financial sectors and made a series of 
propositions. Chapter 6 explored these propositions using flow of funds analysis and 
making use of available firm data. This chapter seeks to look more closely at the 
concomitant development of the firm and finance sector by using case studies of different 
types of firm in Vietnam. In Vietnam the vast majority of large firms are conglomerates in 
the form of General Corporations and their subsidiaries. Of these subsidiaries some 
concentrate on one main activity, whilst others are developing a more diversified 
structure. Other large firms in Vietnam have some degree of state ownership but have 
operated with relative autonomy from the state. A small number are and always have 
been private. 
This Chapter will make use of a survey conducted by the author of Vietnam’s largest 
firms. The behaviour of these firms in response to developments in the finance sector will 
be analysed. It will also present analysis of the uses of the proceeds from stock issues of 
sixty-four non-financial firms that listed on the Hanoi stock market in 2007 and 2008. 
Section 7.2 will present the findings of a survey of Vietnam’s largest firms supplemented 
with secondary sources and, where possible, balance sheet analysis. Section 7.3 will look 
more closely at the balance sheets of listed firms. Section 7.4 will conclude. 
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7.2. Vietnam’s Largest Firms
Chapter 6 pointed to the dominance of the SOE sector in the population of domestically 
owned large firms in Vietnam. To understand better the relationship between large firms 
in Vietnam and the finance and banking sector this Chapter will develop case studies of 
large firms in Vietnam. As the characteristics of the enterprise sector in Vietnam are 
largely the outcome of Vietnam’s recent economic history firms differ in a number of 
ways, most obviously in terms of ownership, and the degree to which their activities are 
determined by the government’s economic plans. This section will organise Vietnam’s 
largest non-financial firms into three categories: General Corporations (GCs), the 
subsidiaries of GCs and large private firms. This Section is based on questionnaires and 
interview notes in a survey designed and conducted by the author of the largest firms in 
Vietnam in 2007, the year of Vietnam’s accession to WTO. The interview notes will be 
supplemented with secondary sources and further interviews. 
7.2.1. Survey Methodology 
The data used in this Chapter was collected as part of a survey conducted by the Country 
Economist Unit of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Hanoi. The 
research data are held by UNDP in Hanoi and are available upon request. Methodological 
issues were published in UNDP 2007. Participants in the survey all gave their permission 
for the results of the survey to be published in the public domain. The data used in this 
chapter are derived from interview notes and survey results. The resulting discussion and 
argument developed in this chapter are the author’s original interpretation of otherwise 
publicly available data. However, although the data are publicly available to ensure the 
discussion in this chapter is in accord with SOAS Research Ethics Policy60 no names of 
interviewees will be used.
The original survey targeted the two hundred largest non-financial firms in Vietnam. 
Eighty-eight interviews were conducted. This chapter will make use of a combination of 
interviews conducted by the author and secondary sources including company websites. 
60. Accessed http://www.soas.ac.uk/researchoffice/ethics/file50158.pdf, October 13th 2012. 
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As will be explained below the firms will be categorised as General Corporations (GCs), 
the subsidiaries of General Corporations, firms adopting the ‘Parent-Child Structure’, 
quasi-private firms and private firms. 
In the sections below interviewees are quoted. Quotes are derived from notes taken in 
English during the interview, and cannot be taken as verbatim. However, they are a fair 
reflection of what was reported. Quotes are used to reinforce the argument of the chapter. 
Where they might reveal a sensitive issue for a particular firm they have not been used. 
Two hundred firms were selected from the 2006 Enterprise Survey produced by the 
Government Statistics Office (GSO), developed from enterprises registered with the tax 
office at the Ministry of Finance. The annual survey covers foreign and domestically 
owned enterprises employing more than ten people. For the purposes of the study firms 
with 100 percent foreign ownership were excluded. Joint ventures, or firms in which 
foreign firms held equity were included. 
The enterprise survey was and is problematic in a number of ways. First, the data are 
known to be unreliable. Many firms deliberately reported incorrect values for ‘turnover’ 
and other variables. The value of firm assets is also problematic, both because of well 
known problems valuing assets and also, again because of misreporting. A further issue is 
the tendency to include all independent accounting enterprises as individual units. For the 
most part data for General Corporations includes the GC headquarters and affiliates, but 
excludes joint stock companies. On the other hand some GCs include all the associated 
enterprises. This results in a degree of double counting, and also in inaccurate 
representation of GCs. The decision was made to include GCs in the survey as many 
were and are important actors in the Vietnamese economy. Large subsidiaries that were 
listed separately were also included. Once foreign enterprises were excluded firms were 
ranked according to turnover, assets and number of employees. This method was chosen 
to provide a more complete picture of the economy. Some firms, particularly financial 
companies, were highly ranked in terms of assets, but not in employment or turnover. 
Some labour intensive firms with many employees reported low turnover and assets. The 
firms that were ranked highly in only one of the lists and so excluded were garments or 
footwear (employment), financial services (assets) and petroleum trading companies 
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(turnover). Two hundred firms were chosen so as to include some of the larger private 
companies that would otherwise be excluded in a ‘Top 100’ or ‘Top 50’. A recent attempt 
to rank firms by capitalisation includes the majority of firms included in the original 
survey61.
The top 200 firms (including foreign firms) in the survey commanded a significant 
proportion of total assets, labour and turnover employed by their ownership type.  
Table 32: Top 200 share of labour, assets and turnover
Once forty-one 100% foreign owned firms were excluded thirty four state firms, five 
private and two joint ventures were included. The majority (120) were GC affiliates 
(Table 33).
Ownership 
Type
State
Private
Foreign
No. firms 
in 
Enterprise 
Survey
4,083
105,167
3,697
No. firms 
in Top 200
122
22
56
Top 200 
share of 
ownership 
type %
(Labour)
29.6
1.9
15.9
Top 200 
share of 
ownership 
type %
(Assets)
65.5
13.7
10.1
Top 200 
share of 
ownership 
type %
(Turnover)
41.9
4.8
24.3
61. http://www.emergingmarketsanalysis.com/web/Vietnam/index.htm
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Table 33: General Corporation Affiliates
Two questionnaires were then devised, one for firms and one for General Corporations 
(Appendices 4 and 5), and distributed. The questionnaire was intended to capture data 
and also to provide background information for the interview. The questionnaire included 
sections on labour and skills, finance, technology, and firm history. The Ministry of 
Planning of Investment, provincial People’s Committees and provincial Departments of 
Planning and Investment assisted in contacting firms, arranging interviews and obtaining 
completed questionnaires. Of 200 firms 104 returned questionnaires and eighty eight 
interviews were conducted with firms and general corporation head offices and five 
interviews with industry associations.  These included eighteen interviews with firms that 
did not return questionnaires.
General Corporation
Vietnam National Coal and Mineral Industries Group
Vietnam National Textile and Garment Group
Vietnam National Cement Corporation
Vietnam Rubber Group
Vietnam National Chemical Corporation
Vietnam National Shipping Lines
Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group
Vietnam Insurance Group
Vietnam Oil and Gas Group
Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Group
Hanoi Construction Corporation
Vietnam Airlines
Vietnam National Petroleum Corporation
Vietnam Paper Corporation
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation No. 5
Electricity of Vietnam
Hanoi Electronics Corporation
Song Da Construction Corporation
Vietnam Engine and Agricultural Machinery Corporation
Vietnam Industrial Construction Corporation
Vietnam Railways
Vietnam Steel Corporation
Other GCs (Head offices)
Total
Abbreviation
Vinacomin
Vinatex
VNCC
Geruco
Vinachem
Vinalines
Vinashin
Bao Viet
Petrovietnam
VNPT
HACC
Vietnam Airlines
Petrolimex
Vinapaco
Cienco 5
EVN
Hanel
Song Da
VEAM
Vinaincon
VNR
VSC
 
 
No. Firms
15
11
9
8
8
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
19
120
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The majority of firms returned the questionnaire before the interview date. Prior to 
interview firms were researched in the Vietnamese press, and where possible statements 
made in interview were cross-referenced. Given the relationships between subsidiaries 
and GCs it was also possible to investigate issues from different perspectives. The 
interviews themselves were semi-structured and conducted through a translator. 
Interviewees were senior managers, who were occasionally senior members of accounts 
and technical departments.
The results of the questionnaire and interviews used in this Chapter concern the sources 
of finance and liquidity for firms, and the relationships between the firms and the state. 
This Chapter draws primarily on firm histories and responses concerning financial 
matters. Financial information was drawn from questions concerning sources of finance 
(in which interviewees were asked to rank sources now, five years ago, and in five years, 
the ease of and requirements for accessing finance of different types (and how that had 
changed) and key financial ratios. In interview interviewees were asked to expand on 
their answers. They were also asked about how key investment decisions had been made 
and how they had been financed. In this way firms gave further insight into how financial 
issues had changed over time. Firms were also asked about relevant issues that had been 
reported in the press or elsewhere, and also matters unique to individual industries. 
Where possible industry reports and studies were also consulted. In some cases it was 
also possible to interview former employees to gain further insight62. For one firm the 
author was able to interview the manager of one of the company’s larger subsidiaries. A 
representative of HCMC People’s Committee in the 1980s was able to provide further 
insight into the origins of another. Various departments of Binh Duong People’s 
Committee were happy to answer questions about a firm in the province. A number of 
firms do make balance sheets available to the public, and where possible these have been 
consulted. Interviews took approximately two hours and were often supplemented with a 
tour of the firm and plant, where more questions could be asked, and insight gained. A 
number of firms responded to further questions by email following the interview.
62. These interviews were conducted separately.
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It is possible that the interviews were biased in some respects. The survey was conducted 
on behalf of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Vietnam and 
interviewees were told the results would be relayed to government via a final report. 
Interviewees may, therefore, have emphasised certain issues they would not have 
reported to representatives of a state organisation. It is also likely that firms were 
reluctant to share data or information that would have presented the firm in a bad light. In 
the months following the interview, one firm, for example, was reported to be 
dangerously indebted to Cuban banks. Interviewees gave no indication of this. On the 
other hand a number of interviewees were particularly candid when discussing the 
relationship with the State and financial reporting. It is unlikely they would have engaged 
in such discussions with independent or state sponsored researchers. 
7.2.2. The Firms
In this Chapter Vietnam’s largest firms are categorised first by ownership, and then 
whether and when they pursued a diversified conglomerate form. Of the firms surveyed 
twenty-two are state owned corporations, or ‘General Corporations’. This Chapter will 
focus on fourteen of the GCs that were interviewed. It will then turn to the twenty-nine 
subsidiaries of these corporations, distinguishing between those that remain single 
activity firms and those that have diversified adopting a ‘parent-child’ structure. Twenty-
two are state owned firms owned, or previously owned by state bodies such as ministries 
or people’s committees. A third category of firm is the ‘quasi-private’ SOE. These are 
firms that are or have been nominally state owned, but throughout their history have 
demonstrated substantial autonomy. Finally nine privately owned companies, of which 
three were established in the 1980s will be considered.
All the GCs and their subsidiaries are now equitised. The state holds a majority share in 
the GCs. Of the subsidiaries the parent GC owns a majority share in all but three. Of the 
remainder the state owns 100% of 14 firms and a majority share of twelve. Nine firms 
had adopted a ‘parent-child’ structure in which the firm held a share in a number of 
subsidiaries. In 2006 and 2007 as part of the equitsation process four GC subsidiaries 
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adopted the ‘parent-child’ (PC) model. Four state owned firms have also adopted a 
similar structure since the 1980s, as has one private company.
All firms employed over 1,000 people. Of the GCs, Vinacomin (Coal) employs over 
100,000 people in member companies; VNPT employs 87,000 people; EVN, 
Petrovietnam, Petolimex, Geruco, Vinashin, Vinalines employ over 20,000 people; 
Lilama over 12,000 people and the remaining GCs between six and ten thousand people. 
Three of the remaining firms employed over ten thousand workers; seven firms employed 
between six and ten thousand people; fifteen between two and six thousand, and the 
remainder between one and two thousand. 
This Chapter will discuss General Corporations, the subsidiaries of GCs, subsidiaries of 
GCs that have adopted a ‘parent-child- structure’,   
7.2.3. General Corporations
General Corporations (GCs) were established by the state to manage state owned 
enterprises in sectors regarded as economically ‘strategic’. In most cases existing firms in 
the same or similar industries were grouped together with each reporting to the GC 
headquarters, which held a share of the company. General findings will be discussed and 
two case studies, of Vinatex and Vinashin, will be presented. Interviews were with the 
GC headquarters as well as subsidiaries.
7.2.4. GC Financing 
As illustrated in Chapter 6 a number of GCs were able, with government support, to issue 
bonds to finance investments. Otherwise the eleven GCs that responded to questions on 
the sources of finance in the questionnaire and interview indicated that there had been 
very little change in sources of finance between 2002 and 2007. Of these all but two 
listed retained earnings and loans from SOCBs as the two primary sources of investment 
finance. Three also listed the Development Assistance Fund (DAF) as a significant source 
of finance. Two reported that SOCB loans had replaced retained earnings as the most 
important source of funds in the intervening five years. 
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Each GC was asked to score access to capital as a constraint on a scale of one to five 
(five being no constraint). Three (the smallest corporations) scored ‘two’; nine scored 
‘four’ or ‘five’. Fourteen GCs responded when asked if it was easier to secure loans. Of 
these two reported it was harder, one that there was no change and the rest that it was 
easier. In interview most of these firms reported that it was easier because there were 
more banks willing to lend, and that as large firms able to offer collateral banks were 
willing to lend to them. The two GCs that reported that it was now harder to secure loans 
said that more collateral was required. The rest reported that no more collateral was 
required than previously. Unfortunately, only five GCs were able to report the proportion 
of short term to long term loans. Of these only two reported less than 50%. Three 
reported 60%, 73% and 91%. 
The following are two more in depth case studies of two GCs, Vinatex and Vinashin.
7.2.4.1. Vinatex
Vinatex is responsible for the garments and textiles sector (G&T). It is charged with 
building the garments and textiles industry, managing state assets in the sector and 
implementing other aspects of government policy. The garments and textiles industry is 
particularly valued as an employer. Vinatex’s role in the G&T industry can be dated to 
2006, when Vinatex was restructured with the help of PricewaterhouseCoopers and 
transformed it into a ‘profit-oriented holding company’ (Martin, 2008). Vinatex will itself 
also be equitised. The plan is for the state to hold 65 percent of the company63. The 
majority of the capital in Vinatex member companies is, however, privately owned (IBM 
Belgium et al., 2009). 
Vinatex has seven ‘non-productive’ subsidiaries, including trading colleges, design firms 
and research institutes; ninety-nine joint stock companies, the majority in textile and 
garments production, but also several in waste water management and infrastructure 
63. http://vietnambusiness.asia/tag/vinatex/, accessed 13/ 07/ 2012. As of January 2013 it has not been 
equitised. 
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development for the G&T industry64. A number of Vinatex’s subsidiaries have their own 
subsidiaries, creating, in effect, a large pyramid structure. The relationship between layers 
is, primarily, determined according to ownership and to the Law on Enterprises. The role 
of Vinatex in a subsidiary joint-stock company, for example, will reflect Vinatex’s 
ownership share and voting rights on the board. This relationship has evolved with 
changes in the enterprise law and other relevant legislation.
According to the interviewee once companies had been equitised member firms become 
more autonomous. Vinatex devises an industry plan, but members are not obliged to 
follow it. However, firms are encouraged to remain in the G&T industry, as, the 
interviewee explained if they focussed only on profits and efficiency they might operate 
in different sectors, for example real estate.  
Vinatex ‘trading’ subsidiaries manage internal distribution systems within the group, 
however, there is no obligation for firms to sell inputs (fibres and fabrics) to other 
Vinatex members. Nevertheless, firms are encouraged to trade with other members who 
are facing financial difficulties. Vinatex has also opened showrooms and markets across 
the country for the use of members and other firms. They are also developing chains of 
Vinatex branded shops, to sell the group’s higher quality products. Vinatex hopes to have 
developed an entire supply chain within the group by 2015. Although, in its infancy, there 
are also moves to expand the distribution system internationally. According to the 
interviewee Vinatex also intervenes to ‘help members avoid competition [with each 
other], by providing warnings, information and suggestions for future plans and 
production activities. [Vinatex] also help firms to avoid overlapping investments.’
Vinatex receives a management fee from its members and does not subsidise them, 
although it is able to provide them with a credit guarantee if necessary. According to the 
interviewee a lack of funds was a large constraint on the Group’s, and so industry’s 
development. The target for 2011, for example was to increase the proportion of inputs 
into garments production to fifty percent, however, by early 2012 seventy percent of the 
value of inputs was imported. The company has also forged partnerships with producers 
64. http://www.vinatex.com.vn/Intro.aspx, accessed 10/6/2012
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in Cambodia and Myanmar in an attempt to expand its supply chain65. However, 
according to the interviewee the state does not have the funds to support the group, which 
instead sought funding from banks and joint ventures with foreign partners.
There are moves to develop the financial capacity of Vinatex. One subsidiary, Textile-
Garment Financial Co (TFC) (listed on the Hanoi Stock Exchange in June 2011), whose 
role is to provide credit to member companies ‘at market rates’ who could not access 
credit elsewhere, has become a financial trading company, whose role is to invest on 
behalf of Vinatex in the stock market, as well as to pursue other investment opportunities. 
The firm can also access credit from other financial institutions66.
7.2.4.2. Vinashin
Vinashin was born as an attempt to replicate the industrial policy of South Korea, and in 
some respects Japan. Shipbuilding was designed to provide employment, generate 
supporting industries, attract foreign investment and foreign expertise and enable 
Vietnam to embark on a rapid period of ‘catch-up’.
Vinashin’s membership consists of the country’s shipyards, ship repair yards and other 
shipbuilding related businesses. Many predated the establishment of the group in 1996. 
However, Vinashin and members of the Vinashin group have since established nearly four 
hundred new subsidiaries, many of which operate in sectors that have nothing to do with 
shipbuilding. Like Vinatex, Vinashin is charged with building a sector considered 
important to Vietnam’s economic development. Vinashin shipyards began building 
progressively larger ships for domestic and foreign clients from 2000, with the intention 
of being the fourth largest shipbuilder in the world by 2010. A dual objective, like all 
65. http://vietnambusiness.asia/Vietnam-vinatex-aims-to-raiselocalization-
rate-to-50-in-2011/ accessed 12/07/2011.
66.  One such investment is in a JSB, Navibank. However, since 2010, the Government has restricted the 
ability of State Groups to invest in banks and other financial institutions, limiting its share to eleven percent 
(http://english.vietnamnet.vn/biz/201009/Small-banks-havetrouble-with-recapitalization-937094/, accessed 
12/07/2011)
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GCs, is to increase the proportion of final content produced in Vietnam. Again, like 
Vinatex, they have struggled.
Vinashin coordinates production across the group, selecting shipyards and other 
subsidiaries to carry out tenders it has won. It also invests in new subsidiaries, most of 
which are designed to increase local content and design capabilities. Like Hyundai67 
before it Vinashin also benefited from an acquiescent state owned shipping company, 
instructed by the government to purchase ships produced by Vinashin, including those 
rejected by foreign clients.
Because shipbuilding is a capital intensive industry debt and debt management is central 
to the success of the enterprise. As individual shipyards cannot access loans sufficient to 
meet the costs of large projects, Vinashin jointly with the Vietnamese government 
releases international and domestic bonds. Funds are then distributed throughout the 
group by the subsidiary, ‘Vinashin Finance’.
Unfortunately, the recent experience of Vinashin suggests that shipbuilding was a poor 
policy choice. A state audit of Vinashin in 2010 revealed the company to be USD 4.5 
billion in debt. In December 2010 and then in May 2011 the company was unable to 
repay scheduled tranches of this debt contributing to the downgrading of Vietnam’s credit 
rating. A number of Vinashin subsidiaries have since been moved to other GCs in an 
attempt to streamline the company.
Major challenges for Vinashin are financing investment and managing cash flow. At the 
end of the 1990s Vietnamese shipyards were small and possessed out of date capital 
equipment and infrastructure. In order to meet the requirements of foreign buyers 
shipyards needed large capital injections, which neither the firms, Vinashin or the 
Government could properly afford without securing large loans. Producing ships typically 
involves the producer borrowing to finance the project, and receiving payment on final 
delivery. As explained by interviewees in Vinashin and a number of member shipyards 
this is a risky endeavour. According to one senior manager of Nam Trieu, a Vinashin 
shipyard:
67. Amsden (1992)
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 ‘[The client] pays thirty percent up front. Nam Trieu has to get 
the loan [for the remainder] by itself from commercial banks. At 
the moment shipbuilding does not bring much profit, but can help 
solve social issues like providing jobs to large numbers of 
workers. We have to import most of the components. Most of the 
profit comes from labour, but not much. This is why Vinashin’s 
policy is to increase local content… then we can talk about 
profits’.
Another manager at another Vinashin shipbuilding company said:
‘Before we sign a contract we prepare tentative production costs 
and submit them to Vinashin. Usually profits are [included] as 
two percent of this cost. When we sign the contract we usually 
build a series of ships. So maybe for the first few we make a loss, 
but we make profits on later ships as we become familiar with the 
technology and the production process… Profits are very low 
because we don’t have capital. We have to get bank loans and pay 
them back. Every year on average we have to pay in interest 
about 100 billion VND.’
The interviewee at Vinashin cited cash flow as the main difficulty:
 ‘Cash flow dictates. It is positive or negative, [depending] on the 
period. When it is negative we need to borrow or find another 
way to generate cash. One way is to equitise firms. Then we get 
cash from the stock market, but we lose control of the firm, and 
are not able to implement the plan in the future. This is why 
Vinashin [is quite slow] to equitise its member companies, and 
why Vinashin holds a dominant share [in its subsidiaries]. Stock 
market investors want a quick return, but Vinashin as a long term 
plan. We need other sources of finance: domestic and 
international bonds… [or] government on-lending…’
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A Norwegian financed study into Vinashin and the shipbuilding industry in Vietnam 
came to a similar conclusion, pointing to the large debt and following the onset of the 
global financial crisis the cancellation of seventeen percent of Vinashin’s order book 
(Gille and Bruce 2010). Indeed, the crisis and fall in orders is the principle reason for 
Vinashin’s ongoing woes. The same study argued that the government led drive to build 
the shipbuilding industry ‘posed a financial burden on the sector which may hamper the 
industry in the coming years if the market remains weak’. Vinashin’s financial difficulties 
were laid bare by first a KPMG audit in 2009 and then in 2011 a state sponsored audit, 
whose results have been widely reported:
Table 34: Vinashin Liabilities
Source: http://vef.vn/2010-10-30-vinashin-nhung-khoan-no-
khong-dia-chi and http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/11/29/
vietnam-baoviet-idUKSGE6AS00Y20101129 for 2010 figure.
Vinashin’s debt included a USD 750 million Government issued bond, and loans from the 
State Bank of Vietnam. Vinashin’s debts were also misreported by the company. Both 
charter capital and total liabilities, for example, were reported to be lower than they 
actually were. 
Vinashin is also charged with building the capabilities required for a world standard 
shipping industry. Gille and Bruce emphasise Vinashin’s weak managerial and 
technological capacity, as well as the low productivity of most of its shipyards when 
compared to rivals across the world68. Interviewees from Vinashin shipyards tended to 
agree that capabilities were a problem, but also stressed that each new project involved a 
new period of learning, and that firms were improving. Related are the technical 
challenges inherent in establishing new firms in associated areas of the industry. Attempts 
Long Term liabilities (Tril 
VND)
Current liabilities/ Current 
Assets
2007
70,700
2008
88,512
1.024
2009
96,635
1.040
2010
86,000
68. This is a familiar refrain. Vietnamese shipyards are compared unfavourably to Indian equivalents in 
(Harvard Vietnam Program 2008).
Chapter 7: Case Studies of Vietnamese Firms 206
have been made, including a steel plant and a design company. However, other than 
issues of quality Gille and Bruce point out that most foreign buyers specify the source of 
the inputs they require, most of which are established foreign owned companies. The 
nature of the supply chain appears to be a further obstacle to Vinashin’s attempt to build 
local content.
In order to secure alternative sources of cashflow Vinashin shipyards established 
subsidiaries, often in unrelated areas such as real estate, insurance, and tourism. Many 
suspect the explosion of subsidiaries to be attempts by shipyards to expropriate Vinashin 
loans allocated to shipbuilding projects. Indeed, the activities of Vinashin and Vinashin 
members were prominent in causing the government to attempt to restrain investments 
‘outside of core areas’ among state-owned conglomerates. Nevertheless, as suggested 
above, those same investments can also be interpreted as attempts to manage cash flow 
by indebted companies, in the face of an uncertain future.
7.2.5. Subsidiaries
‘Subsidiaries’ are firms that are wholly or partially owned by a state owned parent 
company: either a General Corporation or a firm reporting to a People’s Committee or 
Ministry. Through the equitisation process these firms have all been ‘transformed’ into 
either joint stock companies (JSCs) or limited liability companies (LLCs), and are all 
subject to the 2010 Enterprise Law. One hundred percent LLCs are entirely owned by the 
parent corporation. Joint-stock companies may have a number of owners depending on 
state policy and the outcome of the equitisation process. In principle shares will be owned 
by managers and workers, and the proceeds transferred to the parent company. In many 
cases shares will have been resold on the OTC market or the formal Hanoi or HCMC 
stock markets.
Northern firms in the survey were established as state owned enterprises in the 1960s. 
The majority began life as factories reporting to Ministries or to People’s Committees. 
Southern firms, with a couple of exceptions, were former private firms or foreign owned 
firms expropriated after the end of the Vietnam war. In most cases firms continued to 
operate in the same broad activities, although a number moved into associated, but 
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different areas. These include: paper production, fertiliser production, metalworks, tyres 
and other rubber products, shipyards, glass production, apatite and coal mines, seafood, 
shipping and garments.
In the mid-1990s the majority of firms were placed under the direction of General 
Corporations. Most firms had little responsibility beyond production. Profits were 
transferred to the parent company. Goods were produced according to an industry plan 
initially agreed between the parent and the relevant ministry or people’s committee, and 
then subject to negotiations between the firm and the parent. 
Following equitisation, or in some cases transformation into Limited Liability 
Companies, firms had greater autonomy and were ultimately subject to the decisions of 
the board that represented the firm’s shareholders. If the parent company continued to 
hold the majority share then it held the right of veto. Nevertheless, the interviews 
indicated that in a number of cases tension existed between the parent company and 
management. In some cases the firm itself was able to exercise sufficient power. In 
others, a certain frustration is clearly evident. An interview with a large shipping 
company under the remit of Vinalines, revealed that the management felt that industry 
targets were negotiable. The interviewee hinted that the personal relationships between 
company management and the GCs rendered the plan to be largely meaningless. A tyre 
producing company, under Vinachem stated that by law permission from Vinachem was 
required for large investments and personnel issues, however, when discussing 
Vinachem’s ability to ‘coordinate’ member tyre companies felt Vinachem were 
ineffective:
‘[It is difficult] for Vinachem to coordinate between members 
when they produce the same products. Vinachem’s coordination 
isn’t effective, although they have invited directors to meet to 
discuss the division of markets between members. Members just 
operate independently for their own benefits.’
The degree to which subsidiaries are beholden to GCs largely depends on access to loans 
and the ability to generate retained earnings. Nine of twenty-three subsidiaries reported 
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that the main source of investment finance is retained earnings, followed by loans from 
SOCBs. Eleven placed SOCB loans above retained earnings. Some firms were dependent 
on GCs for finance and loan guarantees. Shipyards reported that loans from Vinashin 
were their main source of finance, followed by SOCB loans. One subsidiary of 
PetroVietnam also reported it its main source of finance was PVN Finance, 
PetroVietnam’s finance subsidiary. Large investments also required the input of parent 
companies. Contributions took different forms: direct grants, bank guarantees or loans. 
The majority of firms in which the GC held a majority share were only required to seek 
parent approval for the investment expenditures over a certain amount.
Subsidiaries varied substantially in terms of their perceived ability to access capital. Nine 
reported that access to capital was not a significant constraint on investment (four or five 
out of five). Three score ‘three’, and ten one or two. Of these all reported that accessing 
loans is more difficult or ‘the same’ (two responses), and collateral is ‘more frequently 
required’. In eight interviews with firms that reported access to capital to be a constraint 
interviewees reported that banks demanded more collateral and paid more attention to 
business plans and recent financial performance. One firm in which the GC had divested 
more than 50% reported that as the GC no longer guaranteed loans it had to rely on its 
own collateral.
The importance of retained earnings is also highlighted by the reported importance of the 
depreciation fund. A large shipping company, for example, argued that the depreciation 
fund was the most important source of investment funds:
‘After equitisation we have to lower the depreciation rate to make 
the company more attractive to investors… Profit has no 
meaning. Key to the development of the firm is depreciation. The 
Government’s minimum rate is 7.6 percent a year. We asked the 
Government for 29.8 percent a year for the whole fleet. Then we 
would have a big sum to buy or build other ships and reduce 
profits. From now on [after equitisation], this will have to change. 
There will have to be a more reasonable depreciation rate, so 
dividends exist so we are more attractive to shareholders’. 
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Another tyre production company pursued a similar policy. Prior to equitisation the 
company recorded low profits ‘because as an SOE we must pay 32 percent CIT 
[Corporate Income Tax] to the state, so it is better [to keep the money] and raise the 
living standards of the staff’. They also deployed a high depreciation rate (and so lower 
recorded profits) in order to pay off loans as quickly as possible. The interviewee felt the 
best future strategy would be to continue to declare low profits and issue new shares 
rather than dividends to existing shareholders as shares were considered to be overvalued.
All subsidiaries were asked to report the ratio of short term to long term liabilities. Ten 
responded. Of these six reported between 98% and 100% of liabilities were short term. 
Two reported 44% and 49% and two at 75%. Three firms that subsequently listed had an 
average of 65%, 83% and 76% short term liabilities between 2008 and 2012. 
Subsidiaries of PetroVietnam, Vinashin, Vinatex, Vinacomin and Geruco all reported in 
interview that the GC guaranteed loans. However, subsidaries of Vinapaco, Vinachem 
and VEAM claimed they had no support from their GCs, who were thought to be 
financially weak themselves. Three of the five firms that were listed on the stock market 
were owned (51%) by Vinachem. After the initial listing none of the three issued further 
stock. Balance sheet data suggests that the proceeds from the initial sale in all three cases 
went to paying off short term loans (all three saw a decline in the short term to long term 
liability ratio and a total fall in liabilities). However, both the short term to long term 
liability ratio and total liabilities then increased until 2012. The ‘acid ratio’ - the ratio of 
cash, short term financial investments and short term accounts receivable to short term 
liabilities -  was below one in all three cases. One tyre firm saw an increase in its acid 
ratio to above one in 2009 as a result of a fall in input costs and rise in output prices69. 
Cashflow statements and changes in balance sheet data suggest fixed capital investments 
were all financed from retained earnings and loans.    
In contrast two subsidiaries of PetroVietnam that were also listed displayed an acid ratio 
of over one, and cashflow statements suggested investments were partially financed from 
capital injections from shareholders. In interview both had claimed to have had to remit 
69. Provided as an ‘explanation’ for an increase in the firm’s profits on vndirect.com.vn.
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90 percent of their profits to PetroVietnam, suggesting they were almost entirely 
dependent on the GC for finance.
7.2.6. Parent Child Structure
A second form of subsidiary takes the ‘parent - child’ structure. These firms essentially 
operate as a holding company with the parent company having full or part ownership of a 
number of subsidiaries. The parent company in turn is partially owned by the state 
corporation. The majority of these companies are garments companies under Vinatex, or 
shipbuilding companies under Vinashin. Others include Viglacera, a glass production 
company under Vinachem, and Tan Mai, a paper production company, under Vinapaco. 
These firms are large employers - Viglacera employs approximately 16,000 people, 
Phong Phu (a garments company) over 17,000, Nha Be (a garments company) 7,000 and 
Viet Tien (a garments company) 7,500. All reported that there was no capital constraint 
on investment (scoring it ‘five’). The primary source of investment was retained earnings 
followed by SOCB loans. Viglacera, Phong Phu and Nha Be all listed subsidiaries in the 
stockmarket. Listed subsidiaries maintained a relatively low acid ratio (under one). 
Closer analysis of the balance sheets suggests that the low acid ratio is the result of 
holding low cash balances and no short term financial investments suggesting they can 
depend on their parent companies for emergency liquidity. Phong Phu, Viglacera and Viet 
Tien have all published balance sheets since 2010, however they are not disaggregated. 
For all three acid ratios are around one, and short term liabilities are a high proportion of 
total liabilities. 
There are a number of reasons why these firms took on the parent company model. The 
first, according to interviewees, lay in the firms’ relative success in the 1990s, and in 
some cases the early 2000s. The GC called on the firm to support ailing GC members so 
as not to have to fire workers. Most of those interviewed felt that supporting weak firms 
was in some respects a waste of resources, however, all tended to agree with the manager 
of Phong Phu, who said: ‘it is ethical. When you have a baby, you have to feed it. You 
cannot let it die’. In doing so these firms took on a parent - child structure, and were able 
to manage the cash flow of the firms they controlled. The fact that they were called upon 
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to do this points to better quality management. Indeed, interviewees suggested their early 
achievements learning new technologies or establishing relationships with foreign 
partners set them apart from other firms, and led to them taking on further responsibilities 
at the bequest of the state. 
The second reason is that firms were successful in areas consistent with Vietnam’s 
comparative advantage, in particular low wage, low technology activities. As such 
successful firms were likely to generate higher revenues, and so were able to expand by 
establishing new factories. Shipbuilding companies appear to be an exception. The 
majority of subsidiaries were established in 2007 following Vinashin’s securing an 
international bond. As explained above, money was distributed to subsidiaries, and many 
in turn established subsidiaries in unrelated areas. Whether this was a genuine attempt to 
‘hedge’ against potential price movements as one interviewee argued or straightforward 
‘hollowing out’ of state assets is a matter of conjecture (Cheshier and Pincus 2010).
Fourth, the process of equitisation itself, according to the majority of interviewees, 
provided the firm with greater autonomy. What is striking is that most firms established 
subsidiaries that specialised in financial investments or real estate investments. Others 
sought to use excess land to build industrial zones, hotels, or residential areas. 
Interviewees gave a number of explanations. The first, was that it made sense to use 
assets available to the firm, particularly land. The second, most clearly articulated by Nha 
Be, was that the ultimate responsibility of the firm was to generate revenues to satisfy the 
requirements of the Corporation:
‘Nha Be diversifies into other services to increase revenue. 
Vinatex simply pays attention to revenue. Nha Be must maintain 
and develop the capital for Vinatex. Nha Be must diversify to 
meet this demand’. 
The manager is referring to the fact that the loss of state capital is a punishable offence. 
However, the manager’s comments are supported by another long time manager of the 
garments company Viet Tien:
Chapter 7: Case Studies of Vietnamese Firms 212
‘The primary business is garments. But the company must stand 
on its own two feet. Production is the main business but business 
(trading and small production for trading) is the second leg that 
depends on opportunities. We started businesses in the 1990s… 
anything that is allowed by law. Usually [the objective] is to 
create employment. Trading is to develop and have more 
revenue...’.
Viet Tien’s early ventures included joint ventures with foreign companies seeking a 
partner to sell products in Vietnam and with domestic suppliers (buttons, linings and 
polyester) in order to ensure greater quality. They also ‘traded’ products such as 
cosmetics and telephones, as well as producing products for the Vietnamese military. 
Like the manager of Nha Be the manager of Viet Tien argues that the ultimate objective 
was to meet Vinatex’s targets. However, although the targets stem from the Government’s 
growth targets for manufacturing, there appears to be little restriction on which activities 
actually generate revenue.
 ‘Every year to reach GDP growth of seven to eight percent 
manufacturing growth must be twice the GDP growth rate. Each 
manufacturing company must reach a growth rate of at least 15 
percent year on year. Each industry must assign targets to each 
company to achieve the growth rate of the industry. So Viet Tien 
must try to achieve this growth rate. We must expand our 
business, open new factories etc. We must consider these orders 
as law.’
The difficulty for garments companies is that although investments in the garments and 
textiles sector creates employment and generates foreign exchange profits are small, 
suggesting a further motivation to diversify into new areas. Phong Phu, another of the 
larger garments companies, and also transformed into a parent child corporation began 
diversifying outside of textiles and garments in 2003. According to the manager: 
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‘The core business is textiles. The other businesses are property 
and commercial centres. The future strategy is that textiles 
remains the core business, but we will try to diversify into others. 
We hope other businesses will account for forty percent of total 
revenues and textiles sixty percent of total revenues. Other 
businesses will bring in more profits than textiles. We will take 
revenues from other businesses to invest in textiles’.
At the time of writing Phong Phu has eight garments and textiles subsidiaries, three joint 
ventures in related sectors (threads and textiles), majority shares in eleven related joint 
stock companies, four subsidiaries engaged in real estate and trading activities, shares in 
fifteen joint stock companies engaged in real estate and investment, shares in four joint 
stock companies engaged in unrelated activities as diverse as logistics and ‘providing 
services related to aircrafts’70. Its investments include holding shares in joint stock banks 
and investment companies established by other state owned enterprises.
Nam Trieu Shipbuilding Company, a 100 percent limited liability subsidiary of Vinashin, 
and one of the largest shipyards in Vietnam, has also established over thirty subsidiaries 
of its own. The majority are in shipbuilding related activities and appear to correspond to 
the government’s stated objective to increase domestic value added in the shipbuilding 
industry, however, a number of others operate in the tourism, construction and 
‘investment’ sectors.
Each of the ‘parent-child’ companies has also purchased shares in other domestic 
companies, joint ventures and joint stock banks. In most cases firms play no managerial 
role. Their objective is both dividends and an expansion of their portfolio account.
In conclusion, subsidiaries of state owned corporations fall into two broad groups: those 
that remain single activity firms dependent on the corporation for support with financing 
and strategy, and those that, as part of the ‘transformation process’ have assumed the 
parent-child structure, and who demonstrate a higher degree of financial autonomy.
70. http://www.phongphucorp.com/ accessed 26 June 2012.
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7.2.7. Quasi-private SOEs
Another category of firm is the ‘quasi private state owned firm’71. These firms are 
described separately from subsidiary corporations and GCs because, although originally 
state owned, they were not policy creations (such as the GCs), reported to a state 
government body, in most cases a People’s Committee (rather than an upper level 
corporate body) and, as the following paragraphs will suggest, were relatively 
autonomous. In a number of respects these firms are most similar to the handful of 
private conglomerates that also have a long history, but for various (mostly unknown) 
reasons have never been partially or wholly owned by the state. These firms will be 
described in the next section.
All four firms report that they face no capital constraint and that accessing loans is 
‘easier’, although Hanosimex claims that banks now pay more attention. Only FPT is 
listed on the stockmarket, with a acid ratio of over one, high interest and dividend 
payments from investments in other companies and banks. 
One of the most striking characteristics of these firms is their unusual histories. 
Hanosimex and Protrade began life as entrepreneurial endeavours. Food Processing 
Technology (to become Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology in 1990 
and FPT Corporation in 2008) was established in 1988 by the current CEO, and a number 
of his associates, all of whom had studied Maths and Sciences in Moscow. The company 
was originally a state owned enterprise under the Ministry of Science of Technology. The 
interviewee described the company’s movement into software and computers as the result 
of a chance meeting. The unauthorised version involves the smuggling of computers from 
Russia to Vietnam (Cheshier 2010). The company’s growth throughout the 1990s was 
built on its becoming the official distributor of foreign computers and software. From 
1997 FPT moved into Telecoms, establishing FPT Telecom and then winning the right to 
distribute Samsung phones in 2000 and Nokia phones in 2004. In 2003, apparently after a 
visit to Bangalore, FPT developed FPT software, which after initial teething problems has 
established itself as a low end regional software producer. In the mid 2000s FPT 
71.  The emergence of these types of firm is explored in detail in Cheshier (2010)
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cemented its ties with Microsoft and Cisco systems and attracted capital investment from 
Intel Capital and Texas Pacific Group. It also expanded its operations into, to date, eleven 
countries (FPT 2010). FPT has also invested in a University dedicated to teaching IT 
related skills and high tech parks. In 2006 FPT listed on the stock market72. The 
corporation is separated into two broad sections: ‘Information Technology and 
Communications’, and ‘Investment’. The majority of companies are JSCs, and FPT holds 
a majority share in all but FPT Telecom. On the investment side it holds a minority share 
in Tien Phong Bank, FPT Securities and FPT Capital, FPT’s ‘fund management arm’ 
managing nearly USD 200 million. According to the annual report the majority of FPT’s 
real estate operations are building plant for the company.
In 1982 the founder and current CEO of Protrade73 borrowed four million VND from the 
state owned Animal Husbandry company he had worked for since 1976 to establish a 
rubber processing company. By law he had to establish the company as an SOE, even 
though he repaid the loan within four years. He then branched into timber, paper and 
packaging, bottled water and garments, established joint ventures with a number of 
foreign companies (to establish, amongst other things, a golf course and potentially a 
horse racing course and a hospital) and merged with a number of domestic firms. Since 
1995 Protrade has held thirty percent of a a large foreign distributor of dairy products in 
Vietnam. Although an SOE, Protrade regards itself as essentially a private company. The 
CEO claims the state has no right to the company’s assets since he repaid the state loan in 
1986, and since then has received no extra state funds or support. Prior to assuming the 
parent - child model in 2006 Protrade equitised one of its subsidiaries and had to petition 
the People’s Committee in order to keep the proceeds of the sale that should, in law, have 
gone to the State. 
72. The state share is listed at seven percent, foreign ownership at forty five percent and ‘others’ at forty eight 
percent. Mr Binh’s share places him as the richest man in Vietnam.
73. Information for Protrade comes from an interview with the CEO and also with the Manager of the 
garments subsidiary in 2009.
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A third company, Cholimex, was in many ways a solution to the economic chaos of the 
early years of the unified Vietnamese state74. Cho Lon, four districts in the centre of 
HCMC, was prior to 1975 the city’s financial and production centre. Most businesses 
were run and owned by Vietnamese of Chinese ethnicity. According to the Vice Chairman 
of District 5 People’s Committee in the late 1970s and early 1980s:
 ‘The HCMC People’s Committee came up with the idea for 
Cholimex because they realised that… manufacturing equipment 
had no parts, there were no raw materials, new policies were not 
promoting a market economy, most entrepreneurs from before 
1975 had either left or were in re-education camps. So HCMC 
had no human capital, no equipment and no capital. The People’s 
Committee suggested the reorganisation of companies… and 
looked to people on the ground. Those left were chinese. District 
5 officials acted as a bridge with local entrepreneurs’.75
District 5 contributed the equivalent USD 500 thousand from its budget as well as land 
for factories and office buildings. The company also raised nearly the equivalent amount 
in gold from private chinese households in the area. Cholimex’s task was to leverage its 
relationships with Chinese suppliers in Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong to import 
goods required for production by local factories. At first Cholimex effectively bartered 
Vietnamese produce for foreign goods as foreign exchange was in short supply. Cholimex 
also operated as an intermediary between producers and farmers in South Vietnam, 
exchanging goods such as beer, sugar and milk for agricultural produce. In 1983 the 
government decided to clamp down on private activity demonstrated by Cholimex and 
nationalised the company, buying out the local share holders. Exports would, until 1989, 
be channelled through a a state trading company. However, the original management 
remained, and the company expanded its operations upgrading its existing operations and 
establishing a new garments factory. In 1993 Cholimex was reformed and its various 
74.  74. The initial interview was supplemented and confirmed by an interview with an original member of 
HCMC People’s Committee in August 2009.
75. The interview was conducted separately from the UNDP survey. 
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workshops and factories became independent accounting units subordinate to Cholimex. 
Over the next nearly two decades the company expanded into commercial services, 
aquaculture, timber, seafood trading, producing medical equipment (in which Cholimex 
held 24 percent), electronics assembly, construction and real estate. The company 
presently holds fourteen subsidiaries, and regards its primary role as ‘investment’.
Two further companies, Becamex and Dakruco, are provincial SOEs with particular 
responsibilities: industrial zone construction and rubber cultivation. Becamex was a small 
SOE established in 1976 in Binh Duong, a relatively unpopulated province with abundant 
land and close to HCMC. In the early 1990s Singapore was concerned that its small size 
and population was constraining its growth and so looked to make investments further 
afield as part of a strategy of ‘regionalization’, which first comprised of Malaysia and 
Indonesia before expanding to include China, Vietnam and India. The ultimate objective 
was to create ‘economic space’ for Singapore based companies in lower cost emerging 
economies, in the process freeing up Singapore for more value added activities. The 
strategy involved working with foreign governments to build industrial zones with the 
capacity to house Singaporian firms (Yeoh 2004). The first such park in Vietnam was the 
Vietnam Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP), a joint-venture between a Singaporean 
consortium and Becamex. Becamex went on to build either on its own or as a joint 
venture nine Industrial Parks. It also has interests in a number of real estate projects, 
including a new town, major infrastructure, as well as shares in a number of companies 
including a newly established pharmaceutical company. A series of interviews with 
members of the People’s Committee, employees and former employees of Becamex, 
revealed that the company has great sway in issues such as planning, infrastructure 
development and FDI attraction in the province. A large proportion of its revenues are 
derived from rent paid by foreign firms in the industrial zones76. 
The quasi-private firms appear to have fewer ties to the state’s industrial plans and the 
will of local and central government. Although some continue to operate in areas 
consistent with their original business license interviews revealed that the companies 
devised their own business strategies. The firms themselves appear to have grown rapidly 
76. An account of Dakruco in Binh Duong can be found in (Penrose et al. 2010)
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with revenues sourced from distribution licenses and access to foreign investors and land. 
Protrade was, from establishment, devoted only to those businesses that met the CEO’s 
three rules for investment: 
‘One, pick suitable products with no competition, and especially 
no competition from FDI. Two, it must be within the financial 
limits of Protrade. Three, investment must be sufficient to ensure 
acceptable quality and scale’.
The manager also prided himself on ‘never letting an opportunity pass’. Protrade is also 
an exception in that the company has, arguably, never been reliant on the state. Cholimex, 
although with a vastly different history to Protrade, is another company whose growth 
has explicitly been based on establishing factories and firms on the premise that they 
make money, to the extent that it now regards itself a holding company. Other companies 
in the survey - Dakruco, Hanosimex - had established similar levels of autonomy. Some, 
like FPT and Protarde, remained primarily attached to state imposed activities, however, 
at least according to the interviewee, were not tied to state plans. Others, had, for nearly 
two decades built portfolios of firms, sometimes at the request of the state, on other 
occasions based on commercial criteria. The degree to which firms were subservient to 
state desires varied, and depends in part on the size and the importance of the firm. 
Becamex and FPT, for example, suggest independence from state interests (the state now 
only holds seven percent of FPT) based on size and importance. The managers of 
Protrade and Dakruco implied that actual ownership was still a matter of debate, and 
would come to a head when, if ever, Protrade would be equitised. For both, the most 
contentious issue was who had the right to ‘state capital’ and its proceeds. The 
interviewees’ argument rested on not only ownership rights, but also the assertion that 
they should receive rewards for their efforts. Cholimex and Hanosimex, on the other 
hand, operate as if state interests in the company are incidental, although, Hanosimex, at 
least, suggested it is happy to abide by the wishes of the local people’s committees.
FPT’s equitisation saw the transfer of shares in the company to, initially, staff, workers 
and managers, and then to foreign buyers and others following its listing on the HCMC 
stock market. Although senior managers did not receive the initial proceeds - all of which 
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were transferred to the central budget - they have benefited from the sale of shares and 
increased net worth following the period of stock market inflation and FPT’s position as 
one of the more stable shares. The majority of quasi-private companies have grown on 
the back of relatively stable revenue streams generated by state allocated rents. It is 
probable that there exist, or at least have existed, illegal payments designed to acquire or 
keep access to such rents. There are also, close personal relationships between senior 
managers and powerful members of the Government or Party. Cheshier (2010), for 
example, points to the marriage between the CEO of FPT and the daughter of General Vo 
Nguyen Giap. Interviewees hinted at a close relationship between the CEO of Becamex 
and senior Party officials in both HCMC and Hanoi. Accounts of systems of patronage in 
Vietnam suggest that it is unlikely that such firms, and their managers, could not have 
achieved what they have achieved without ‘playing the game’77. 
A history of success has also helped firms access capital. In explaining why ‘collateral 
was less frequently required’ the manager of Cholimex explained: 
‘...banks can see our success on annual audited financial reports, 
and can see the increase in capital and the expansion of our 
business. [Because of our] reputation we do not require 
collateral.’ 
Protrade and Hanosimex have also developed relationships with SOCBs. However, the 
predominant source of investment capital for all firms is retained earnings, with bank 
loans more often used for working capital. FPT and Becamex have also turned to the 
stock market. FPT listed in 2008. Becamex has listed two of its subsidiary construction 
companies. A further source of finance is joint ventures with foreign investors, a trend 
throughout the 1990s, and continuing today. All companies have and continue to diversify 
and purchase shares of financial institutions and other Vietnamese firms. The majority of 
FPT’s investments are conducted by its investment subsidiary. It also owns a share of 
77. See, for example, Gainsborough (2010) and Fforde (2010).
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Tien Phong Bank. Becamex also holds shares in a number of firms. Dakruco has 
expanded into at least thirty separate areas78.
7.2.8. Private Companies
The fifth category is private companies. Six of the surveyed firms are in the original ‘Top 
200’. A seventh and eighth, Cat Thai and Fuvi, are included as representative of relatively 
successful medium to large size private firms (both employ approximately 400 people). 
The majority of companies were established in the early 1990s. In the Top 200 survey, 
one exception, Bitis, a footwear company, was established in 1982. Three companies are 
seafood producers, two are parts suppliers and two plastic moulding companies. 
Capital is not a constraint for all but one of the larger firms. Sources of finance are loans 
from Joint Stock Banks (ranked as number one for five companies and two for three) and 
retained earnings. Short term liabilities comprise 95% to 100% of total liabilities. All 
reported that it was easier to access bank loans as there were more banks willing to lend, 
however collateral was always required. Two seafood companies listed on the HCMC 
stock exchange. Initial proceeds were used to pay off short term loans, although both 
continue to have a low acid ratio. One issued new stock on two occasions. Balance sheet 
data suggests the proceeds were used to pay off loans.
Minh Phu
One such firm, Minh Phu, a seafood company, began operations in 1988 as an agent for 
an SOE ‘as the government didn’t encourage private enterprises’. Between 1988 and 
1992 the company ‘hired a factory’ and ‘assigned the SOE to sell its products’. It is likely 
that Minh Phu is an example of SOE managers using state assets for personal gain. The 
company was officially established in 1992 following the new Law on Enterprises. 
According to the manager, there then followed a period of difficulty and confusion as the 
company still had to rely on provincial SOEs to manage exports as well as interference 
from SOEs in the province. The company built a number of processing factories in the 
late 1990s and 2000s, became a LLC in 2002 and a JSC in 2006. In 2004 Minh Phu 
78. Information published on the company’s website, and is available on request.
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opened a subsidiary in the US to distribute its products. Minh Phu currently owns nine 
subsidiaries in seafood production79.
In interview the manager expressed a desire to diversify outside of seafood, ideally into 
‘real estate, ports, security, banking and an investment fund’. Apparently other 
shareholders argued that Minh Phu should continue to focus on their core capabilities 
(‘Minh Phu is good at seafood so we must focus on this’). One concern was increased 
and apparently unfair competition from SOEs. The manager argued that the state invested 
the proceeds from equitisation into SOEs, ‘who didn’t have to pay interest’. He went on: 
‘SOEs don’t have to make a profit, only break even. Private companies must make high 
profits to pay interest rates to the banks, satisfy shareholders and pay dividends. That’s 
why SOEs can buy [inputs] at high prices and sell low… [However], since 2007 all SOEs 
have become JSCs. Competitive pressures will reduce and [we] will be able to buy inputs 
at reasonable prices and sell final products at low prices’. Minh Phu felt it was easier to 
get loans, ‘as there were more banks competing for clients, especially high prestige 
companies’. Some banks, particularly those who were unfamiliar with the company, 
required collateral, however, the company’s reputation meant that loans were relatively 
easy to come by without collateral. The primary source of investment capital is retained 
earnings as interest rates are high for long term loans. Occasionally, however, Minh Phu 
turns over short term loans. Minh Phu did list in 2008 and its balance sheet demonstrates 
large investments in real estate and short term financial assets (around ten percent of total 
assets), particularly in 2008 and 2009 suggesting the company’s manager eventually got 
his way. 
Cat Thai
Cat Thai is a plastics injection moulding company that supplies foreign (predominantly 
Japanese) manufacturers in Vietnam. The company was established in 1999 by the 
current director who established the company as a 29 year old chemical engineer who had 
already amassed some experience working for Mitsubishi. In interview he claimed he had 
at first tried to connect foreign clients looking for Vietnamese suppliers with state owned 
79. http://minhphu.com/quan-he-co-dong.
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plastics companies. However, they ‘were not able to make decisions’ so he decided to 
establish his own company. At first Cat Thai lost money due to inexperience (a mistake 
producing products for a large multinational company cost USD 50,000). However, over 
time he managed to improve, purchase new machines and attract new customers. In 2003 
Cat Thai moved to a larger location. In 2006 they formed Duy Anh Engineering 
Technologies in a joint venture with Okumura Corporation, a Japanese construction 
company. 
The history of the company’s growth is a typical story of incremental growth. According 
to the manager and founder the key to the company’s growth was learning:
‘We need to learn from customers. Some people think it is easy to 
make [our products], but going from plastic parts for a 
refrigerator to making a refrigerator is very difficult. Our 
customers spend lots of money on training… new suppliers, but 
lots go bankrupt. Chasing stupid ideas means we lose… We can’t 
jump ahead. We can’t buy expensive and special machines and 
just use them… They are easy to get but hard to use. We have to 
know the machines, must feel the machines, know if they are 
sick, how they are working. Buying the machine and owning the 
machine are different [things].’
The company tried to accelerate the learning process by trying to make more 
sophisticated products, and ‘learning from our mistakes’. Banks did not help the process. 
According to the interviewee it was ‘very difficult to get money from the bank’. The bank 
required collateral and ‘sent inexperienced young people to evaluate [possible assets to be 
used as] collateral… We could only get up to seventy percent of the value’. The banks 
wanted the company to first invest in one machine and then once the company showed a 
profit to purchase a second. This was ‘too slow’. Ideally Cat Thai would have purchased 
‘ten machines at one time’. This was a particular problem with the joint venture, Duy 
Anh, which despite the presence of the Japanese partner could not access enough bank 
credit. The solution was for Cat Thai to buy the machines and transfer them to Duy Anh. 
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Cat Thai also appeared as a case study for a Japanese study into supporting industries in 
Vietnam:
‘Cat Thai’s managing director also notes that, while business 
inquiries from MNCs are increasing rapidly, the most serious 
problem was difficulty in raising enough capital from local banks 
to expand production capacity. He laments that banks lack the 
understanding of how essential it is for MNCs to purchase high-
quality plastic parts of which there is an acute shortage in 
Vietnam, and that his factory can supply them. Banks do not 
appreciate the value of a large number of long-term supply 
contracts between Cat Thai and MNCs and are unwilling to 
finance the purchase of expensive machines. But he believes that, 
as long as high standards are maintained, the business will be 
very secure and prosperous.’
(Mori and Ohno 2004, p.21)
Initial start-up capital was the manager’s own savings and the sale of family land. 
Currently the main source of investment capital is retained earnings. The state and SOEs 
enter the story primarily as a constraint on firm growth. At one point in the interview the 
manager makes explicit reference to his independence:
‘I have no ’umbrella’ in the government. We only work with our 
own knowledge and heart. We do our best, even the things we 
don’t want to do.’
Fuvi
Fuvi was established in 1994 by former employees of a state-owned plastics company. 
Like Cat Thai their growth has been based on taking on larger orders of increasing 
sophistication, primarily from Japanese manufacturers operating in Vietnam:
‘In the first year customers were testing our capacity. At the 
beginning we bought only small CNC (Computer Numerical 
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Control) machines so we could learn to use them. Once we were 
capable we would buy bigger machines.’
The company bought one new machine every year, and invested in management and 
technology ‘rather than investing horizontally’. However, Fuvi was concerned that they 
were relying only on customer orders, which could change quickly. For example, 
motorbike companies required new moulds only when they had new models, which 
might be ‘once or twice a year or not at all’. Their diversification strategy was based on a 
conversation the director had with a friend working in the construction industry:
‘[the friend] was complaining about having to dispose of truck 
loads of wooden form work. It was a waste of money. So we saw 
the opportunity to… develop plastic form work’.
It took the company over six years to develop the expertise and purchase the equipment 
necessary to manage large quantities of plastic and produce large enough moulds. The 
company worked closely with its Japanese suppliers in order to develop the required 
capabilities. At the time of interview the company’s strategy was described thus:
‘We don’t rely on mould production for profits. We have to go 
into product diversification. Producing moulds helps to train 
workers and build expertise. We prefer to produce difficult 
moulds rather than cheap moulds at large volume because it is 
higher value and we develop expertise. We will try to expand in 
plastic form work production80, which is becoming a strategic 
product [and so subject to tax   reductions]. Some profit from the 
plastic form work will be used to develop the mould area because 
we want to be competitive in terms of making difficult and large 
moulds. For example, for cars, aircraft, ships, construction etc.’
80. Fuvi’s formwork products are used to set concrete in the construction of large buildings. The plastic 
panels can be assembled rapidly, are extremely durable, cheap and easily stored and cleans. Fuvi even offers 
to recycle the panels once they are no longer needed.
Chapter 7: Case Studies of Vietnamese Firms 225
Fuvi also exports to a number of companies around the region, and has established a 
distribution office in Thailand. Between 2007 and 2011, however, its copyrighted form 
work products have become the company’s primary activity, and are ubiquitous in 
HCMC’s many construction sites.
Bitis
Bitis has a very different history. It was established in 1982 as workshop producing 
sandals. As rubber was the only input used by Bitis produced in Vietnam, the director was 
forced to smuggle the majority of inputs into the country. The company began by 
producing footwear for export to the Soviet Union as part of a programme to repay Soviet 
loans to Vietnam. A state owned organisation managed exports on behalf of Bitis. In 1986 
the company launched its own brand and turned its attention to the domestic market and 
to Eastern Europe. In 1989 the company became the first private company to win an 
import and export license. It then branched into France, Germany and Spain and slowly 
began to build its operations and brand in Vietnam. In 1990 it upgraded its factory with 
Taiwanese technology, formed a joint venture with a Taiwanese firm in 1991, transformed 
into a LLC in 1992, established an office in the United States in 1994, and branched into 
ladies shows and leather footwear in 1995. It has continued to invest in new technology, 
including technology from Korea in 1996 and Italy in 2006. It has also continued to 
expand across the world, including China and South East Asia. In 2002 Bitis began to 
expand into real estate, hotel, tourism and office space rental. Of particular interest and 
indicative of the firm’s reach it established ‘Trade Centres’ at the border with Cambodia 
in the Central Highlands, and Lao Cai on the Chinese border.
Unsurprisingly, each of the case studies mentions difficulties engaging in competition 
with SOEs and establishing the company. All the examples was established in the 1980s 
or the 1990s, and so were affected by legislation affecting issues such as international 
trade, and, to an extent, access to finance. Of the firms surveyed only Cat Thai and Utxi 
have no clear connections to the state sector. Minh Phu initially made use of an SOE’s 
ability to trade. Fuvi was established by ex employees of an SOE. It is improbable that 
Bitis had not forged and benefitted from close association with government officials. And 
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like Cholimex its early years were closely associated with the efforts of the state to 
rebuild the economy, and repay the Soviet Union.
All firms were established with entrepreneur’s own capital - either savings, loans from 
family and friends or the sale of family assets. In all cases the entrepreneurs based the 
firm on capabilities they had previously learned. Only Bitis benefitted from a state 
allocated rent, in this case trade licenses. In this regard it closely resembles FPT and other 
quasi-private SOEs. Even so, like the rest of the sample, the company’s growth was 
financed from retained earnings. In most of the interviews entrepreneurs described the 
balance they had to make between managing cash flow and investing beyond their 
capacity and capabilities. Both banks and potential foreign customers were clearly wary 
of firms’ capacity to meet orders. This explains entrepreneurs’ emphasis on the learning 
process, and also on the need to move into progressively more sophisticated production, 
in the process generating greater revenues, attracting more customers and potentially 
providing the basis for diversification into new products.
Firms were limited in their investments by the reluctance of banks to provide adequate 
loans. Banks required collateral, although a number of interviewees did suggest that over 
time once banks were satisfied with the firms’ ability to repay loans and had developed a 
knowledge of the business then it was easier to access credit.
Firms were concerned about basing a business on unreliable sources of revenue. The 
manager of Minh Phu, for example, expressed his own opinion that the company should 
diversify into real estate and other investments. The manager of Fuvi described the 
necessity to develop the company’s own products, which could, if necessary, then fund 
further investments in the main plastic moulding side of the business. The manager of 
Minh Phu pointed to the potential losses if quality fell short of customer’s requirements.
Ultimately, these five case studies are examples of ‘organic growth’, in which in the 
absence of outside financing and in a difficult, often hostile environment, entrepreneurs 
have had to build capabilities and reinvest retained earnings. Each of the companies 
makes standard, easily copied, products, and only one, Fuvi, has managed to establish a 
premium product of its own. Recalling the argument of Chapter 3 these firms developed 
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strategies to ensure to the best of their ability a constant flow of revenues. The larger 
firms were happy to diversify into new areas, including real estate and financial assets. 
They were also less dependent on the expansion of their core business for growth and 
increased revenues.
7.3. Listed firms
This section will present the findings first of the analysis of the available balance sheets 
and cash flow statements of original surveyed firms listed on the Hanoi and HCMC stock 
exchanges and then of sixty-four firms listed in 2007 and 2008 on the Hanoi Stock 
Exchange. 
Methodology
The quarterly balance sheets and annual cash statements of the sixty-four non-financial 
firms that listed in 2007 and 2008 on the Hanoi Stock exchange were accessed using the 
website www.vndirect.com.vn. Quarterly cash flow statements are not made available. 
Although it is easier to extract the data from annual balance sheets, annual balance sheets 
tend only to report firms’ financial status in Quarter 4 of each year81. Examination of 
quarterly data suggests that in many cases such annual data misrepresents the position of 
the company, particularly in regard to the objectives of this chapter. For instance, a 
company that issues stock in Quarter 4 may display an extraordinary cash balance for that 
year. By Quarter 1 of the following year the cash may have been used to pay off debt or 
financed some investment in fixed or other assets. It would be inaccurate, therefore, to 
conclude that the firm typically held large cash balances, or that a high ratio of current to 
total assets signified a new strategy for the firm.
The purpose of the study was to determine how firms used the proceeds from stock 
issues, in particular: were the proceeds used to finance or fund investments?; were the 
proceeds held as cash or short term assets, and if so was this temporary or did it appear to 
be an attempt to raise the acid ratio?;  were the proceeds used to reduce the debt burden?; 
81. Available and easily accessed on datastream, for example. 
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and finally is there evidence that firms used the proceeds to diversify into long term 
financial assets or real estate? 
The following methodology was followed for each firm. First, it was determined when 
firms issued stock and how much was collected. Cash flow statements reported how 
much was collected in any given year. For each company www.vndirect.com.vn reported 
in which quarter stock was issued. Available quarterly balance sheet data was then 
transferred to Excel. For each quarter the ‘acid ratio’ - cash and cash equivalents, short 
term financial investments and short term accounts receivable divided by current 
liabilities - was calculated, as was the proportion of short term to long term liabilities. 
The acid ratio is a commonly used measure of a firm’s ability to meet its current 
obligations. The proportion of short term liabilities of total liabilities provides an 
indication of whether firms are able to reduce their dependency on short term debt for 
working and investment capital. These ratios along with changes in fixed assets and the 
proportion of long term financial assets (including investments in joint stock companies) 
and real estate to total assets were then graphed to identify trends. The balance sheet was 
then examined to determine the uses of the proceeds of stock issues. Unfortunately, the 
absence of quarterly cash flow data means it is difficult to identify with complete 
accuracy the uses of the proceeds, particularly for small amounts. However, in many 
instances stock issues coincided with significant changes in one or more stocks. For 
example, there might be a significant fall in short term loans, a large increase in fixed 
assets or holdings in other companies, or in cash balances. Vndirect.com.vn also 
publishes information released by the company, and in a number of cases companies 
reported new investments or explained unusual changes in recorded profits or revenues. 
Surveyed Firms
Of the original ‘Top 200’ firms twelve firms subsequently listed on the Hanoi or HCMC 
stock exchanges. Six firms opted to list subsidiaries (Viglacera listed four firms, 
Vinaconex eight, Lilama, eight, Phonh Phu, two, Nha Be, one, Dakruco, two). Of these 
the subsidiaries held low cash balances and maintained ‘acid ratios’ well below one. 
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Moreover, subsidiaries tended not to hold long term financial assets or real estate, and 
short term liabilities dominated total liabilities (96% and higher).
Three other companies (Dak Lak, Lam Son and FPT) also listed, and analysis of their 
balance sheets suggests substantial differences compared to the subsidiaries. Acid ratios 
are consistently above one, and annual cash flow statements report substantial interest 
and dividend payments. Moreover, stock listings appear to have served to raise the acid 
ratio by either increasing the proportion of current assets or reducing the short term debt 
burden.
Firms that were already diversified into two or more distinct activities and so meet the 
definition of conglomerate have continued to diversify. FPT, Nha Be, Cholimex, Viet 
Tien, Phong Phu and Protrade have all moved into new and disparate areas. However, as 
balance sheets, income and cash flow statements are all aggregated it is impossible to 
determine the financial breakdown of each company.
As mentioned above two seafood companies, Minh Phu and Cataco, diversified into real 
estate and increased the ratio of long term to total assets to secure more diversified 
cashflow revenues. Dividends and interest payments from Minh Phu’s investments82, for 
example, secured a return of between 8% and 20% of total pre-tax profits between 2009 
and 2011.   
Non-Financial Firms listed in 2007 and 2008
To look more closely at the uses firms made of the proceeds from listing stock the 
quarterly balance sheets and annual cash flow statements of sixty-four firms that listed on 
the Hanoi Stock Exchange 2007 or 2008 were analysed.As might be expected the uses of 
the proceeds from stock issues are often ambiguous. In some instances it is far from clear 
how funds have been used, and in others funds have been used in a variety of ways. 
Studart and Davidson point to the importance of stock issues in ‘funding’ investments, 
which in practise might result in a reduced burden of short term debt and higher acid 
ratios as either firms are able to hold more in current assets or lower debt. Of the sixty-
82. Available at vndirect.com.vn
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four firms only fourteen had an acid ratio consistently above one. Of these nine were 
majority owned by a state organisation, and four minority owned by the state (Table 35). 
Seven firms were subsidiaries of larger (state owned) firms.
Table 35: Proportion of Firms with Acid Ratios above 1 by Ownership
Source: Vndirect.com.vn, own calculations
Table 36: Proportion of Firms with Acid ratio over 1 by Size (Charter Capital) 
Source: Vndirect.com.vn, own calculations
Table 37 and Table 38 present the uses of proceeds from stock issues. Cases where it is 
impossible to determine the uses of stock have been excluded. The tables recor the 
percentage of total issues, which is higher than the total number of firms as some firms 
issued stock more than once. The two tables clearly demonstrate that financing fixed 
capital investments is not the only use of funds, and that stock issues are used by many 
firms to improve the firm’s liquidity position by either holding cash or short term 
financial assets or long term financial assets.
Of the seven clear instances of the proceeds of a stock issuance channelled to long term 
investments two firms had charter capital of just over 50 billion VND, one of 3,000 
billion VND and one of 4,400 billion VND. The remaining four firms were over 150 
billion VND. Three firms had an average of between one third and one half of long term 
Charter Capital 
(Billion VND)
Under 20
21-50
51-100
101-200
200+
Acid ratio above 1
0%
19%
27%
13%
38%
Ownership
Subsidiary
Majority State
Minority State
Private
Acid ratio above 1
26%
25%
25%
8%
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and short term non-fixed assets as a proportion of total assets. All three also received a 
significant return from dividends and interest payments from their investments. Three 
firms invested in joint-stock companies, the remainder in undefined 'long term financial 
assets' or real estate. 
Nevertheless, only two firms with between 40% and 50% of non-fixed assets as a 
proportion of total assets could be regarded as coming close to being ‘overcapitalised’. 
However, even these companies did not have an acid ratio of significantly more than one, 
and two firms with a high proportion of long term assets had an acid ratio of slightly 
below one.
Table 37: Uses of stock issues by firm size (Charter capital billions)
Source: Vndirect.com.vn, own calculations
Table 38: Uses of stock issues by firm ownership (Charter capital billions)
Source: Vndirect.com.vn, own calculations
Finance
Funding
ST
LT
Pay Off loans
Total Non-
financing Uses
Under 20
0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
100%
21-50
33%
20%
20%
0%
27%
47%
51-100
35%
23%
19%
6%
16%
42%
101-200
33%
13%
27%
7%
20%
53%
200+
40%
20%
13%
27%
0%
40%
Total
35%
19%
19%
9%
17%
45%
Pay off Loans
Held in ST
Finance Investment
Fund Investment
LT financial Investment
Total Non-financing Uses
State Maj
20%
10%
35%
25%
10%
40%
State Min
4%
23%
31%
19%
23%
50%
Private
19%
31%
19%
0%
31%
81%
Subsidiaries
19%
15%
35%
23%
8%
42%
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In terms of ownership, subsidiaries and firms with a majority state holding (between 
which there is substantial overlap) tended to be less likely to hold the proceeds from 
stock issues as long term or short term assets, and more likely to use the proceeds to 
invest in or fund fixed capital investments.
Finally, there is little indication that firms are replacing short term loans with long term 
loans. The average ratio of short term to long term liabilities was 0.81. However, only 
thirteen firms had a ratio of below 0.65, and 23 had a ratio of above 0.9. 
Table 39: Short term to Long Term Liabilities
 Source: Vndirect.com.vn, own calculations
In conclusion it appears that, at least for the sampled firms, short term liabilities remain 
high as a proportion of total liabilities, and few firms are able to cover current liabilities 
with current assets. As a result many firms use the opportunity to issue stock to improve 
their liquidity position, either by funding investments, paying off loans or holding the 
proceeds as cash or financial assets. Larger firms that hold more long term financial 
assets report higher incomes from dividends and interest payments. Subsidiaries (of 
unlisted firms) are more likely to use stock issues to finance fixed asset investments. 
7.4. Conclusion
This Chapter sought to determine how different firms responded to financial development 
in Vietnam using case studies, survey data, secondary sources and analysis of balance 
sheets of firms listed on the Hanoi Stock Exchange. 
Firm Size (charter capital 
(Bil)
All
U20
21-50
51-100
101-200
200+
ST/ LT ratio
0.81
0.75
0.85
0.85
0.76
0.75
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Building on the discussion in Chapter 4 it distinguished between firms that adopted the 
conglomerate form (operated in different and distinct sectors) and those with one main 
activity. Given the importance of the state owned sector in Vietnam it also distinguished 
between state firms (and then between members of GCs and those attached to other state 
bodies) and private firms. 
On the whole the Chapter found that distinguishing between firms in this manner helped 
shed some light on financial behaviour, however, there was substantial difference 
between firms within categories. GCs differed in terms of size, importance to 
Government economic strategy and also in access to extraordinary sources of finance for 
their members (particularly bonds). GCs played an important role for many subsidiaries 
in guaranteeing loans, managing finance within the group via a designated financial 
company, which also, in some cases, sought to generate extra revenues through 
investments in asset markets.
A relatively new development is the emergence of parent-child structures among 
subsidiaries of GCs. Although such firms continue to operate in their traditional areas 
they are diversifying in order to generate profits and alternative sources of cash flow. The 
emphasis on real estate and financial investments suggests that strategies have, in part, 
been influenced by developments in the financial sector and also the growth of asset 
markets. In some cases, particularly, the ship building industry, finding alternative 
sources of cash was essential if firms were to meet the objectives set them by the GC and 
Government industrial strategies.
By helping to provide domestic and international sales outlets GCs were also able to help 
reduce risks inherent in their subsidiaries’ primary activities. Attempts to develop 
domestic industry through generating higher value added activities should in principle 
serve a similar purpose. Similarly, efforts such as those by Vinatex to improve 
coordination between firms by advising firms against duplicating investment projects 
served to reduce investment risks. 
The balance sheets of subsidiaries listed on Vietnamese stock exchanges also suggested 
that GCs played a significant role in the financial lives of firms. Low acid ratios were 
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primarily the result of relatively small holdings of current assets. Moreover, subsidiaries 
tended not to invest in non-productive assets, a strategy followed by a number of other 
firms. 
These examples of the ways in which GCs’ financial support for their subsidiaries has 
changed also point to the impact of developments in the financial sector and other asset 
markets. In the 1990s GCs either directly subsidised ailing firms, or called on successful 
firms to support weaker firms both financially and by providing managerial expertise. 
The predominance of non-performing loans in the banking system also suggested that 
SOCBs played an important if implicit role in firms’ attempts to manage liquidity. The 
findings in this chapter suggest that both GCs and some of their subsidiaries are adopting 
more market orientated strategies, and are actively responding to developments in 
financial markets. 
Financial development has had a number of impacts on Vietnamese firms. Balance sheet 
analysis suggests that short term loans remain a significant source of investment finance 
and working capital. Long term loans remain a small proportion of total liabilities. A 
number of firms pointed to the increase in the number of banks and so potential sources 
of finance. Interviewees also suggested that banks were effectively competing to provide 
loans to the larger more reliable firms. Firms also reported that as banks were more 
insistent on collateral it was harder to access loans than in the past, particularly if the firm 
lacked the required assets or long term relationship with a bank. The experiences of 
smaller private firms illustrate the difficulties firms face if they lack the means to access 
large loans. Firms both lack the financing they need, and are more vulnerable as they 
depend on a single source of revenues. Attempts to build portfolio accounts by the larger 
parent-child firms and single activity private firms suggest that capital market 
developments can provide firms with the means to manage risk. 
As expected many firms make use of the stock market to fund investments or to improve 
their liquidity. Nevertheless, it is striking how low acid ratios are for most firms. The vast 
majority of those analysed in Section 7.3 cannot cover current liabilities with current 
assets. 
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The observation that larger firms look to hold shares in other joint stock companies, ‘long 
term financial assets’ and even banks also informs the flow of funds analysis of the 
previous chapter, suggesting more complex flows between and within units in the ‘private 
sector’. There are increasing intra firm transfers as funds are moved between subsidiaries 
of emerging business groups and, to an extent, General Corporations. From the 
perspective of the state the management of liquidity has, on the whole, passed to the 
firms themselves. State owned firms and groups are expected to remain true to their ‘core 
activities’ as determined by state policy, but also to generate revenues by any means 
possible. In a sense this suggests little has changed, other than the formalisation of 
existing firm diversification strategies. However, there is some evidence that with the 
development of asset markets in Vietnam firms are able to manage liquidity in more 
conventional ways.
8.
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Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion
This thesis has presented an original analysis of the firm in economic development as a 
firm that manages a balance sheet from which cash flow may be generated in the usual 
income and expenditure way that is common to most theories of the firm, but also 
through balance sheet operations designed also to maintain the liquidity of the firm. This 
is based on the work of Kalecki, Minsky and Steindl and extends the post-Keynesian 
understanding of the firm both to take account of balance sheet management, and to 
apply it to firms emerging in a developing country in the transition from a centrally 
planned economy. This chapter summarises the applications of the approach to Vietnam 
and concludes with a discussion of the efficacy of the approach for our understanding of 
financial development. 
8.1. The Balance Sheet Approach in Vietnam
The thesis identified three periods since 1991 in Vietnam, characterised by different 
institutional structures and stances with capital flows and foreign direct investment. The 
first, from 1991, until, approximately 1998/ 1999 saw an economy dominated by the state 
sector, and in which establishing and growing private firms faced regulatory difficulties 
as well as difficulties accessing credit from the banking system. The second saw a 
downturn in foreign investment  and capital flows, reform of the state owned sector, some 
liberalisation of the financial and banking sector as well as liberalisation of the private 
sector. The third, following accession to the WTO saw further liberalisation of the state 
sector and the private sector, as well as the banking sector and financial markets. Foreign 
direct and indirect inflows increased significantly.  
8.1.1. Period I
8.1.1.1. Private Sector
Throughout the 1990s private sector investment was financed predominantly by retained 
earnings. Access to bank credit was limited for a number of reasons, and equity markets 
were effectively non-existent. Many firms were small household enterprises. The 
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majority relied on the entrepreneur’s own savings, and the savings of family and friends 
for investment. Although there is no enterprise survey data from the period it is likely that 
the private sector was close to that of the early 2000s. Profit margins were low, as were 
investments. As a result, firms struggled to make large investments. They lacked 
collateral and would have had few funding opportunities. Nevertheless, as they faced 
significant operational risks, it is likely they held relatively high cash balances as a source 
of liquidity. Low levels of retained earnings, an absence of funding opportunities and the 
need for high levels of liquidity meant overall investment was low. 
The case studies of Chapter 7 suggest that a number of private entrepreneurs managed to 
use savings and expertise accumulated whilst with working in the state sector. These 
firms, however, tended to opt for labour intensive sectors with low capital costs.
The private sector in the 1990s closely resembled that described in Chapter 4, although 
rather than risk long term and debilitating indebtedness (which it was largely denied due 
to difficulties accessing outside finance), investments tended to be small and risk averse. 
The availability of funds for reinvestment would have depended on entrepreneurial 
savings and the ability of the firm to generate retained earnings through its primary (and, 
likely, only) income account.
8.1.1.2. State Owned Sector
Like the private sector the state sector also relied primarily on retained earnings. 
However, a privileged role in the economy meant profit margins were relatively high. 
SOEs also had access to credit extended by state owned banks and other sources of policy 
lending and subsidy. The majority of foreign direct investment was also channelled to the 
state owned sector, providing a further source of funds and foreign exchange. 
Even so bank credit as a proportion of GDP was relatively low, and the equitisation 
process was slow. Investment finance was, therefore, predominantly sourced from a 
revolving fund of firm savings. 
There were few, if any, opportunities to formally fund investments - that is exchange long 
term for short term debt. However, as firms were required to undertake investments as 
prescribed in relevant industrial plans the level of investment was only loosely related to 
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the firm’s ability to repay it and associated risks. Moreover, SOEs had other 
responsibilities (policy burdens) providing further demands on cash flow.  
The high proportion of non-performing loans in the banking system suggests that the 
state played a funding role, ensuring investments were carried out - thus adding to 
general demand and also providing further investible funds in the form of profits that also 
accrued to the state sector - and that firms that could not meet their commitments were 
not forced into insolvency. 
Those firms that proved difficult or impossible to run as going concerns were, if the 
social need was deemed sufficiently important, placed under the responsibility of more 
successful firms. 
8.1.1.3. Quasi-Private SOEs
Although strictly speaking state owned firms, these firms were established with a 
combination of entrepreneurial capital and state finance. The strategies they adopted 
depended on the degree to which they were beholden to a plan. Of the firms discussed in 
Chapter 7, Protrade, for example, seemed to have relatively free reign. Becamex, on the 
other hand, grew as a result of its involvement in the construction of industrial zones. For 
most of the 1990s it was a small and insignificant firm. 
Most investments were relatively small and in sectors that, as one manager admitted, had 
little competition, required little capital and provided a low level of risk. The nature of 
some business activities and the close relationship with the state suggested that the 
primary source of income was a state provided rent - either in the form of a distribution 
license, responsibility for a particular state policy or export opportunity. Such firms 
tended to expand by diversifying into low risk areas. There was little need for funding, 
and capital intensive investments had the support and banking of the state. Diversified 
sources of cash flow ensured liquidity. 
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8.1.2. Period II
8.1.2.1. The Private Sector
Developments in the private sector stem chiefly from a more liberal and supportive 
environment, and improved relations with the banking sector. As a result there was rapid 
growth in the number of private firms - particularly in ‘private firms’ and ‘private limited 
liability companies’. This is also reflected in a greater share of turnover, and slight 
increases in the size of firm (in terms of total assets), as well as in average turnover. Even 
so, available data suggests there were few substantial differences in terms of financing, 
funding and liquidity management. Finance remained predominantly retained earnings 
supplemented by informal sources (essentially, household savings) with some access to 
bank credit. As bank loans remained short term and tied to collateral capital intensive 
investments were generally beyond the majority of firms. There remained few funding 
opportunities, were firms willing and able to make large scale loans.    
Although there was an increase in private limited liability companies and joint stock 
companies these too remained small and, debt to equity ratios were approximately 
constant. All categories of private sector firm tended to rely on retained earnings, and as a 
sector, had little opportunity or desire to go into deficit. Low profit margins suggest that, 
as in Period I investments, again predominantly in the state sector, return to the state 
sector. 
Figure 26 also suggested that current assets, as a proportion of liabilities, was higher than 
in the state sector, and higher for private and private limited liability companies than for 
joint stock companies. As well as demonstrating the relative lack of long term fixed 
capital investments the ratio may also support the observation that smaller firms tend to 
hold a greater proportion of liquid assets, which might otherwise be utilised in fixed asset 
investments.
Table 15 suggests that some portion of the profits accruing to the private sector stems 
from greater productive efficiency. Revenues as a proportion of both labour and capital 
are higher than for the state sector (although the state sector does make more capital 
intensive investments). 
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8.1.2.2. State Sector and Quasi-Private SOEs
Throughout Period II the state sector underwent restructuring, primarily through the 
liquidation or equitisation of firms. There were, however, few changes in key indicators 
before 2005/6, and the stock market remained small and capital inflows low suggesting 
that, although there were gains in efficiency as well as in the autonomy of a number of 
firms the financial strategies remained similar to those in the 1990s. One interesting 
development is the reduced net deficit with the state sector (bank credit and onlending) 
between 2004 and 2006. Although onlending declined slightly, so did tax receipts (as 
firms were equitised or liquidated) and bank credit increased. At the same time profit 
margins for the sector as a whole increased, as apparently did overall profits to the sector. 
Profit rates appear to have seen little change, although average profits did increase 
suggesting the state divested itself of weaker firms and the remaining state sector may 
have reaped in profits investments financed from increased bank credit and proceeds 
from an accelerating equitisation programme.
With regard to quasi-private SOEs the period up until WTO accession appears to be 
broadly similar to the 1990s. 
8.1.3. Period III
8.1.3.1. Private Sector
The non-state sector as a whole experienced a savings deficit that increased significantly. 
Breaking down the sector suggests that only the ‘private’ sector saw a significant change 
in its liability to equity ratio, as it benefitted from a more accommodating banking 
regime. By definition it was less likely to turn to outside sources of equity. Of the 
different non-state categories the ‘private’ sector experienced the smallest rise in the 
savings deficit. Table 15 suggests that new firms remained small. The findings in Section 
6.4.1 suggest further that bank loans were linked to collateral, and that smaller firms 
continued to hold larger cash balances. Even so, there are some indications that private 
firms held a lower proportion of current assets. Private limited liability companies saw an 
increase in equity over capital, which seems to have corresponded with a larger average 
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size and an increase in levels of investment, although there was no commensurate 
increase in profits (although profit rates did rise marginally). Equity was likely sourced 
from household savings. Firms with state capital saw a significant fall in the liabilities to 
equity ratio, attributable to equitisation. This was translated into a higher level of 
investment, largely responsible for the increase in the non-state sector deficit. Joint-stock 
firms without state capital, on the other hand whilst increasing in average size 
experienced only a slight increase in their savings deficit, and a small downward change 
in their liabilities to equity ratio.  
The increasing number of private firms listed on the stock exchange and the case studies 
in Chapter 7 suggest that private firms are finding the means to fund investment and 
develop portfolio accounts. However, smaller private firms remain virtually untouched by 
recent developments. The World Bank surveys discussed in Section 6.4.1 suggest that 
smaller firms rely on retained earnings, hold large cash balances, and, despite a more 
liberal and market orientated banking system are limited in their access to credit by the 
availability of collateral. 
8.1.3.2. SOE Sector
The impact of developments in Period III on the state sector is difficult to discern, given 
reform of the state sector itself is integral to institutional developments and financial 
flows. 
In terms of financing SOEs have benefitted from increased credit, both from SOCBs and 
JSBs. Credit growth, channelled through households, but probably more significantly 
both private and state owned enterprises combined with large inflows of foreign saving 
also effectively recapitalised equitised SOEs in OTC and stock market transactions. Joint-
stock companies with state capital grew significantly in terms of value of assets, although 
in relation to joint-stock companies without state capital the savings deficit appears to 
have been smaller. 
There may also have been developments in funding behaviour. Section 7.3 suggests that a 
number of firms used equity issues to replace debt used to finance fixed investments. 
However, the evidence is by no means conclusive.
Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusions 242
Others engaged in the development and manipulation of their portfolio accounts, taking 
advantage of what were effectively inflated capital markets. As one interviewee 
suggested as shipbuilding firms were unable to equitise they had to rely on their income 
account and debt to manage cash flow. The ratio of current assets to liabilities backs other 
accounts of the difficulties Vinshin members had in meeting their liabilities. Vinashin 
itself established a subsidiary responsible for both managing the proceeds of bond sales 
as well as managing an investment fund to provide extra sources of cash flow. 
Subsidiaries also diversified and themselves invested in real estate markets and equity. 
Other GCs also established finance companies intended to manage a portfolio of liquid 
investments that established a source of cashflow. 
The predicament of those SOEs unable to either access equity or build a portfolio of 
liquid assets is perhaps best illustrated by the case studies of the larger and more 
successful garments firms. These, able to recapitalise via equity markets looked to 
diversify out of garments to areas with greater returns, and also to invest in asset markets. 
Such firms also provide a useful comparator to the smaller private firms also described in 
Chapter 7. These firms were unable to access the bank credit they required for the size of 
investments desired as they did not possess the level of collateral by banks. It is an easy 
step to imagine the access a manager would have if part of a larger firm.      
Chapter 4 also suggested that firms might become overcapitalised, particularly in times of 
asset market inflation. The analysis in Section 7.4 suggests that a number of firms did 
indeed use proceeds from equity issues to create and manage a portfolio of current assets. 
In some instances it is possible that in holding short term assets for a prolonged period of 
time the firm was simply waiting until the time to put them to use.
In conclusion the analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 tended to support the propositions 
proposed in Chapter 4. The exception may, however, be Proposition E. Whilst many 
firms, particularly large SOEs hold a substantial portfolio of unproductive assets, in many 
cases with the intention of generating profits, it is not entirely clear that such firms are 
holding ‘excess capital’, or that they are not pursuing a valid strategy to manage their 
liquidity.  
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8.2. The Relevance of the Balance Sheet Firm Approach to 
Understanding Financial Development 
This thesis developed the balance sheet approach to the firm adapted with insights from 
Kalecki, Steindl and others to suggest that in a mature economy firms are not 
homogenous in the nature of their relationship with the finance sector. Financing, funding 
and liquidity management is, in part, determined by factors such as firm size and the 
capital intensity of investments. As the financial development of less developed countries 
implies the gradual implementation and development of financial institutions so it also 
implies that the ability of firms to access financing, funding and liquidity management 
services also changes over time, with implications for the size and nature of investments 
firms make, the degree to which firms hold liquid assets in their current account and the 
use they make of them. As developing countries tend to have few ‘large entrepreneurs’, 
then the attitude of the state toward the enterprise sector and particularly in compensating 
for the absence or immaturity of banks and financial markets takes on particular 
significance. As the financial sector develops then its relationship with different types of 
firm also evolves with implications for the sorts of investments firms make, the stability 
of financial markets and opportunities for firm growth and survival. 
This thesis has implications for existing approaches to financial development. With 
respect to the financial liberalisation hypothesis it suggests that financial liberalisation 
would not be likely to stimulate substantial growth among small enterprises with limited 
collateral. Indeed, it would be larger firms assumed to operate in an ‘enclave’ who might 
benefit more substantially. The application of post-Keynesian and Keynesian concepts of 
funding, liquidity management, the inversion of the relationship between savings and 
investment and endogenous money suggests that the FLH has limited explanatory power, 
particularly as the approach outlined in this thesis implies factors unique to individual 
countries have the most resonance. 
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With regard to the stages of banking approach, one of the few post-Keyensian 
contributions to development economics, it suggests that the approach can be further 
developed with reference to the composition of the firm sector in developing countries. 
Similarly, studies that are concerned with the impact of indirect investment and 
international capital flows on developing countries could also be supplemented with 
analysis of the history and composition of the firm sector. 
More generally, the approach developed in this thesis could provide some insight into the 
economic development of countries, particularly African countries, that have failed to 
develop a cohort of large firms. At present much analysis focuses on the constraints to the 
growth of small and medium sized enterprises - essentially, assuming, as did Marshall, 
that there should be growth from below, and that the imposition of business friendly 
institutions and liberal financial and banking sectors would facilitate economic growth 
via the mechanism of enterprise investments and growth. 
The study of Vietnam in this thesis demonstrated some of the implications of state 
attempts to compensate for the absence of large concentrations of entrepreneurial capital, 
as well as the strategies of firms seeking to compensate for the absence of funding 
opportunities. It demonstrated a clear divide between small firms and large firms, and 
suggested, although longitudinal data wasn’t available that an economic strategy reliant 
on the growth of initially small firms will not necessarily result in firms capable of 
making large scale investments without state support. However, it also suggested that 
granting large firms the autonomy to engage freely in financial markets may have an 
adverse impact. In the absence of funding opportunities and asset markets firms capable 
of generating retained earnings do seek to invest in non-capital intensive, low risk sectors 
in order to generate diversified cash flow. 
Whilst liberalisation of the banking sector did appear to facilitate banking behaviour 
commensurate with the latter stages of the stages of banking approach the demand driven 
credit expansion was only partially the result of relatively risk free lending to large firms 
backed with collateral. Instead, it appears that less risk averse joint stock banks, some 
connected to SOCBs, and others part owned by large firms made loans to borrowers 
known to be engaging in speculative activities. That the repayments of both principle and 
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interest would slow in the event of asset market deflation was not anticipated by some 
banks and large firms themselves, suggesting that unsecured lending is indeed a 
possibility in insufficiently risk averse banking systems, and liquidity management 
strategies as conducted by the likes of heavily indebted capital intensive firms such as 
Vinashin might not prove successful in the event of demand shocks to primary activities. 
If nothing else this suggests that those who do pursue industrial policies involving large, 
heavily leveraged capital investments must consider carefully the implications of a fall in 
demand what liquidity management strategies to pursue.
Another observation that might be made in response to those that see economic 
development as the outcome of ‘a broad movement from below upwards’, facilitated by 
liberal financial markets, is that much movement into new industries, or increased levels 
of investment in existing ones that is manifested in in the form of new enterprises is, at 
least in Vietnam, the direct result of large firm expansion. These firms both diversified to 
ensure continued liquidity, and also because they had access to retained earnings, outside 
finance and funding to ensure the investment projects were both possible and feasible. As 
some of the case studies of smaller, private, Vietnamese firms indicate although the 
productive and managerial capabilities might exist smaller firms will struggle to secure 
the funds required. 
Finally, the approach adopted in this thesis sought to suggest a clear link between the 
micro - the behaviour of firms - and the macro, particularly aggregate levels of 
investment and, the savings gap in the enterprise sector and its financing. It demonstrated 
that as investment was financed by firm savings, but at the same time levels of 
investment determined firm savings then profit rates went some way to determine both 
the availability of retained earnings, and so the distribution of the proceeds of investment. 
As investment in turn partially determined the size of the firm then the heterogeneity of 
the firm sector would explain, in part, the level of investment, the size of the savings gap 
and funds available to firms to exploit in short term investments. In Vietnam low profit 
margins in the private sector suggested that the state sector recouped the majority of the 
proceeds from investment. Moreover, it was larger, predominantly state owned or quasi-
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private SOEs who were able to source foreign savings in the stockmarket, and more 
generally use asset markets to fund investments and manage liquidity. 
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Appendix 1: The Top 200 Firms, All
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
English Name
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Corporation
Electricity of Vietnam
Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam
Vietsovpetro JV Enterprise
Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam
Pouyen Vietnam Co Ltd
Vietnam Insurance Corporation
HCMC Post and Telecommunications
Military Telecom Corporation
Vietnam Railway Corporation
Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Co
Canon Vietnam Co Ltd
The Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology
Vietnam Dairy Products Co.
Southern Steel Corporation
Vietnam Mobile Telecom Services Company
Tae Kwang Vina Industrial Co Ltd
Vietnam Paper Corporation
Fujitsu Vietnam Computer Products Co Ltd
CP Vietnam Livestock Co Ltd
Pouchen Vietnam
Saigon Tobacco Co.
Bao Viet Life Insurance
Honda Vietnam Co Ltd
Chang Shin Co Ltd
Hyundai Vinashin Shipyard Co Ltd
Appendices
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
Bao Viet Insurance
Nidec Tosok Vietnam Co Ltd
Petroleum Technical Services Company 
Furukawa Automotive Parts Co Ltd
Vietnam Construction Investment Import and Export Holding Corporation
Hwa Seung Vina Co Ltd
Vedan Vietnam
Yazaki EDS Vietnam Co Ltd
Saigon Tourist Holding Company
Dau Tieng Rubber Corp.
Viet Tien Garment Co.
Saigon Thuong Tin Bank
Dong Nai Rubber Co.
Vietnam Airlines
Hanoi Public Service and Transportation Co.
Tainan Spinning Co Ltd
Asia Commercial Bank
Yamaha Motor Vietnam Co Ltd
Saigon Beer Alcohol and Beverage Corporation
Hoang Thach Cement Co
Mabuchi Motor Vietnam Co Ltd
Civil Engineering Construction Corp. No.5
Nissei Electric Vietnam Co Ltd
Hualong Corporation Vietnam
Petrolimex B12
Vietnam Southern Food Corporation
HCMC Water Supply Co
Bim Son Cement Co
Khanh Viet Corporation
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57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
Prudential Vietnam
Metro Cash and Carry Vietnam
Nam Trieu Shipbuilding Company
Saigon Newport Co
Hanoi Textile and Garment Co
Dong Bac Coal Co.
Orion-Hanel Picture Tube Co Ltd
Cua Ong Coal Selecting Co.
Lam Thao Fertilizers and Chemicals Co
Petrolimex Region 2
Phong Phu Textile Co.
Chi Hung Joint Venture Co.
Thanh Le Commercial Import Export Co
Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam
Nha Be Garment Co.
Dona Pacific Vietnam Co Ltd
Vietnam Manufacturing and Export Processing Co Ltd
Nam Viet Co Ltd
Binh Long Rubber Co
Kim Anh Co Ltd
Development Investment Construction Corp.
Formosa Vietnam Co Ltd
Construction Company No. 1
Sumitomo Bakelite Vietnam Co Ltd
Vietnam Ocean Shipping Co
Petrovietnam Gas Company
Southern Airport Authority
Construction Company No. 319
Bai Bang Paper Co
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86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
Noi Dia Coal Co Ltd
Phuoc Hoa Rubber Co
Lever Vietnam JVC
Dona Victor Moulds MFG Co
Phu Rieng Rubber Co
Ha Long Shipyard
Bach Dang Shipyard
Thanh Cong Textile Co.
Samyang Vietnam Co Ltd
Petrolimex Region 1
Intimex Import Export Co
Quang Ngai Sugar Corp.
Vietnam Acecook Co Ltd
Vietnam Sea Transport and Chartering Co
Southern Rubber Industry Co
Saigon Passenger Railway Transportation Co. 
Kinh Do JSC
Saigon Co.opMart
Civil Engineering Construction Corp. No.1
Tan Mai Paper Co.
Ut Xi Aquatic Products Processing Co. Ltd.
Bao Minh Co
Cai Lan Oil and Fats Industries Co Ltd
Can Tho Agricultural and Animal Products Company
Uni President Vietnam Co Ltd
Ha Bac Nitrogen Fertilizers and Chemical Co
Northern Airports Authority
Dona Orion Vietnam Co Ltd
Binh Duong Trading Investment and Development Corporation
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115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
Cao Son Coal Co.
Uong Bi Coal Co.
Ha Tu Coal Co.
Saigon Port
Hanoi General Production and Import-Export Company
Vietnam Glass and Ceramics for Construction Corp.
Ha Tien Cement Co No.1
Thai Binh Co Ltd.
Machino Auto Parts Co Ltd
Phu Yen Material Company
Vietnam Air Petrol Co
Seaprodex Danang Co 
Scancom Vietnam Co Ltd
Vissan Import Export Corporation
Saigon Agriculture Corporation
Can Tho Sea Product Processing Export Enterprise
Hai Phong Port
Yazaki Haiphong Vietnam Co Ltd
Saigon Post and Telecommunication JSC
Vang Danh Coal Co.
Petrovietnam Fertilizer and Chemicals Co.
Nui Beo Coal Co.
Chutex International Co Ltd
Phy My Hung Joint Venture Co.
Sumi-Hanel Electronics Co.
Construction Company No. 4
Technological and Commercial Joint Stock Bank
Theodore Alexander Co Ltd
Dutch Lady Vietnam
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144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
Industrial Explosive Material Company
Freetrend Industrial Vietnam Co Ltd
Holcim Vietnam Ltd.
Vietnam Export Import Commercial Joint Stock Bank
Company No. 28
Green River Wood and Lumber Vietnam Co Ltd
Eastern Asia Commercial Bank
Coc 6 Coal Co.
Triumph International Vietnam Co Ltd
Always Co Ltd
Ha Tien Cement Co No.2
Ha Long Coal Co.
But Son Cement Co
Nam Dinh Textile Co
Binh Duong Production and Import Export Co.
Proconco Producing Animal Feeds JVC
Southern Fertilizers Co
Hanoi Trade Corporation
Ca Mau Frozen Seafood Processing Import Export Corp.
Pangrim Neotex Co Ltd
An Giang Agriculture and Foods Import Export Co.
Hoang Gia Cat Tuong Co. Ltd 
Northern Foodstuff Co
Mao Khe Coal Co.
Hoang Mai Cement Co
Kingmaker Footwear Vietnam Co Ltd
Saigon Transportation Mechanical Corporation 
Minh Quy Aquatic Products Processing Co Ltd. 
Tin Nghia Import Export Co
Appendices
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
Vietnam Apatite Company
Thang Loi Textile and Garment Co
Vietnam Northern Food Corporation
Toyota Vietnam
Vietnam International Bank
Dong Nai Agricultural Products and Food Processing Import Export Co
Thanh An Corporation
Vietnam Construction and Import Export Corporation
Phuong Nam Joint Stock Commercial Bank
Deo Nai Coal Co.
Ninh Thuan Agricultural Products Export Co.
Viet Thang Textile Co.
Phu Nhuan Jewelry Joint Stock Company
Water Electrical Mechanical Installation and Construction Joint Stock Co
Vietnam Industrial Construction Corporation
Electrical Mechanical Appliances and Technology Development Company Co
Aquatic food trading Company
Sanyo Vietnam Home Appliances ASEAN
Lam Son Sugar Joint Stock Corporation
Binh Tien Consumer Goods Production Co. Ltd. 
LG Electronics Vietnam Co Ltd
Ajinomoto Vietnam Co Ltd
Petec Trading and Investment Corporation
Cai Doi Vam Import Export Company
Danang Rubber Co
Grobest Industrial Vietnam Co Ltd
Minh Phu Seafood Import Export Co.
Loc Ninh Rubber Co.
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Appendix 2: The Top 200 Firms, Vietnamese
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
English Name
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Corporation
Electricity of Vietnam
Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam
Vietsovpetro JV Enterprise
Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam
Vietnam Insurance Corporation
HCMC Post and Telecommunications
Military Telecom Corporation
Vietnam Railway Corporation
Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Co
The Corporation for Financing and Promoting 
Technology
Vietnam Dairy Products Co.
Southern Steel Corporation
Vietnam Mobile Telecom Services Company
Vietnam Paper Corporation
Saigon Tobacco Co.
Bao Viet Life Insurance
Honda Vietnam Co Ltd
Hyundai Vinashin Shipyard Co Ltd
Bao Viet Insurance
Petroleum Technical Services Company 
Vietnam Construction Investment Import and Export 
Holding Corporation
Abbreviation
AGRIBANK
VNPT
EVN
BIDV
VIETSOVPETRO
VIETCOMBANK
BAOVIET
VIETTEL
VNR
TISCO
FPT
VINAMILK
SSC
VMS
VINAPIMEX
V I N A T A B A 
SAIGON
BAO VIET LIFE
HONDA VIETNAM
HVS
PTSC
C O N S T R E X I M 
HOLDINGS
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24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
Saigon Tourist Holding Company
Viet Tien Garment Co.
Saigon Thuong Tin Bank
Dau Tieng Rubber Corp.
Vietnam Airlines
Hanoi Public Service and Transportation Co.
Dong Nai Rubber Co.
Asia Commercial Bank
Saigon Beer Alcohol and Beverage Corporation
Yamaha Motor Vietnam Co Ltd
Hoang Thach Cement Co
Petrolimex B12
Vietnam Southern Food Corporation
Khanh Viet Corporation
Bim Son Cement Co
Civil Engineering Construction Corp. No.5
HCMC Water Supply Co
Nam Trieu Shipbuilding Company
Hanoi Textile and Garment Co
Orion-Hanel Picture Tube Co Ltd
Dong Bac Coal Co.
Saigon Newport Co
Cua Ong Coal Selecting Co.
Lam Thao Fertilizers and Chemicals Co
Petrolimex Region 2
Phong Phu Textile Co.
SAIGON TOURIST
VTEC
SACOMBANK
V I E T N A M 
AIRLINES
TRANSERCO
DONARUCO
ACB
SABECO
Y A M A H A 
VIETNAM
PETROLIMEX B12
VINAFOOD 2
BCC
CIENCO 5
HANOSIMEX
OHPT
NECO
SNP
LAFCHEMCO
P E T R O L I M E X 
SAIGON
P H O N G P H U 
TEXCO
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51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
Thanh Le Commercial Import Export Co
Chi Hung Joint Venture Co.
Nha Be Garment Co.
Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam
Development Investment Construction Corp.
Nam Viet Co Ltd
Kim Anh Co Ltd
Binh Long Rubber Co
Petrovietnam Gas Company
Vietnam Ocean Shipping Co
Construction Company No. 1
Southern Airport Authority
Bai Bang Paper Co
Construction Company No. 319
Lever Vietnam JVC
Noi Dia Coal Co Ltd
Phuoc Hoa Rubber Co
Phu Rieng Rubber Co
Ha Long Shipyard
Bach Dang Shipyard
Petrolimex Region 1
Intimex Import Export Co
Thanh Cong Textile Co.
Quang Ngai Sugar Corp.
Vietnam Sea Transport and Chartering Co
Saigon Co.opMart
Southern Rubber Industry Co
Saigon Passenger Railway Transportation Co. 
THALEXIM
NHABECO
INCOMBANK
DIC
NAVICO
PVGAS
VOSCO
SAA
BAPACO
U N I L E V E R 
VIETNAM
P E T R O L I M E X 
HANOI
INTIMEX
T.CTEX
VITRANSCHART
CASUMINA
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78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
Kinh Do JSC
Civil Engineering Construction Corp. No.1
Tan Mai Paper Co.
Cai Lan Oil and Fats Industries Co Ltd
Bao Minh Co
Ut Xi Aquatic Products Processing Co. Ltd.
Ha Bac Nitrogen Fertilizers and Chemical Co
Can Tho Agricultural and Animal Products Company
Northern Airports Authority
Cao Son Coal Co.
Binh Duong Trading Investment and Development 
Corporation
Saigon Port
Ha Tu Coal Co.
Vietnam Glass and Ceramics for Construction Corp.
Uong Bi Coal Co.
Hanoi General Production and Import-Export Company
Ha Tien Cement Co No.1
Machino Auto Parts Co Ltd
Vietnam Air Petrol Co
Phu Yen Material Company
Petrovietnam Fertilizer and Chemicals Co.
Seaprodex Danang Co 
Vissan Import Export Corporation
Phy My Hung Joint Venture Co.
Thai Binh Co Ltd.
Can Tho Sea Product Processing Export Enterprise
Saigon Post and Telecommunication JSC
Saigon Agriculture Corporation
KIDOCO
CIENCO 1
CALOFIC
BAO MINH
HANICHEMCO
CATACO
NAA
BECAMEX IDC
CSG
VIGLACERA
HAPROSIMEX
MAP
VINAPCO
PYGEMACO
PVFCCo
S E A P R O D E X 
DANANG
VISSAN
SPT
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107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
Hai Phong Port
Vang Danh Coal Co.
Nui Beo Coal Co.
Technological and Commercial Joint Stock Bank
Holcim Vietnam Ltd.
Sumi-Hanel Electronics Co.
Dutch Lady Vietnam
Vietnam Export Import Commercial Joint Stock Bank
Industrial Explosive Material Company
Construction Company No. 4
Eastern Asia Commercial Bank
Proconco Producing Animal Feeds JVC
Coc 6 Coal Co.
But Son Cement Co
Company No. 28
Ha Tien Cement Co No.2
Southern Fertilizers Co
Ha Long Coal Co.
Binh Duong Production and Import Export Co.
Nam Dinh Textile Co
Ca Mau Frozen Seafood Processing Import Export Corp.
Hanoi Trade Corporation
Hoang Mai Cement Co
Saigon Transportation Mechanical Corporation 
Northern Foodstuff Co
An Giang Agriculture and Foods Import Export Co.
Toyota Vietnam
Vietnam Northern Food Corporation
TECHCOMBANK
V I E T N A M 
EXIMBANK
VIMICCO
PROCONCO
AGTEX
SFC
PROTRADE
NATEXCO
CAMIMEX
HAPRO
SAMCO
FONEXIM
AFIEXCO
TOYOTA VIETNAM
VINAFOOD 1
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135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
Minh Quy Aquatic Products Processing Co Ltd. 
Mao Khe Coal Co.
Tin Nghia Import Export Co
Vietnam International Bank
Hoang Gia Cat Tuong Co. Ltd 
Vietnam Construction and Import Export Corporation
Vietnam Apatite Company
Phuong Nam Joint Stock Commercial Bank
Thang Loi Textile and Garment Co
Phu Nhuan Jewelry Joint Stock Company
Ninh Thuan Agricultural Products Export Co.
Dong Nai Agricultural Products and Food Processing 
Import Export Co
Deo Nai Coal Co.
Petec Trading and Investment Corporation
Vietnam Industrial Construction Corporation
Thanh An Corporation
Electrical Mechanical Appliances and Technology 
Development Company Co
Viet Thang Textile Co.
Aquatic Food Trading Company
Water Electrical Mechanical Installation and 
Construction Joint Stock Co
Lam Son Sugar JSC
Minh Phu Seafood Import Export Co.
Cai Doi Vam Import Export Company
Hanoi Beer Alcohol and Beverage Corporation
Binh Tien Consumer Goods Production Co. Ltd. 
Danang Rubber Co
Loc Ninh Rubber Co.
TIMEX CO
VIBank
VINACONEX
VINAAPCO
VITEXIM
DONAFOODS
PETEC
VINAINCON
GELIMEX
VICOTEX
APT CO
COWAELMIC
LASUCO
CADOVIMEX
HABECO
BITIS
DRC
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162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
Southern Airport Services Co
Hanoi Clean Water Company
Saigon Petro Co
Dong Phu Rubber Co.
Thang Long Metal Ltd.
HCMC Urban Environment Co
Chinfon Haiphong Cement Co.
1-5 Automobile Mechanics Co.
Pha Rung Shipyard
Dak Lak Rubber Co.
Ba Ria Rubber Co.
Saigon Culture Company
Vietnam Automobile Component Manufacturing 
Company
Power Construction Engineering Company No. 1
Sao Vang Rubber Co
Power Engineering Consulting Company No. 1
Ba Ria - Vung Tau Post and Telecommunications
Vietnam Food Production Company
Duong Huy Coal Co.
Dong Thap Import Export Trading Co
Vietnam National Tea Corporation
Hai Phong Cement Co
Vietnam Electric Wire and Cable Corporation
Production Service Import Export Co. 
Viet Foods Co Ltd
Seafood Import Export JSC
Nha Trang Textile Co.
Housing and Urban Development Corporation
SASCO
SAIGON PETRO
CHC
DAKRUCO
BRC
VAP
PCC1
SRC
VIFON
DOCIMEXCO
VINATEA
CADIVI
VIET FOODS
NHATEXCO
HUD
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190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
Song Da Co. No. 9
Vietnam National Shipping Lines
Song Da Co. No. 10
Garment Company No. 10
Construction and Investment Development Co
Vietnam National Textile and Garment Corporation
Ben Thanh Tobacco Co
Civil Engineering Construction Co. No.568
Hon Gai Coal Selecting Co.
Communication and Transportation Construction 
Company
Hoa Phat Steel JSC
Vietnam Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Private 
Enterprises
VINALINES
GARCO 10
INVESCO
VINATEX
VPBank
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Appendix 3: Interview Schedule
Company
I. Questionnaire and Interview
Honda Vietnam Co Ltd
Toyota Vietnam
Lam Thao Fertilizers and Chemicals Co
Hanoi General Production and Import Export Company
Machino Auto Parts Co Ltd
Vietnam Chemical Corporation
Lam Son Sugar Co
Vietnam Coal and Mineral Industries Group
Vietnam National Tea Corporation
Vietnam Apatite Company
Vietnam Automobile Component Manufacturing Co
Vietnam Paper Corporation
Rang Dong Light Source and Vacuum Flask Co
The Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology
Vietnam National Shipping Lines
Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Group
Vietnam Oil and Gas Group
Vietnam Glass and Ceramics for Construction Corporation
Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group
Van Dien Fused Magnesium Phosphate Co
Thang Long Metal Ltd
Vietnam Sea Transport and Chartering Co
Viet Tien Garment Corporation
Binh Dien Fertilizer Co
Vietnam Electric Wire and Cable Corporation
Coastal Fisheries Development Co
Questionnaire
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
D a t e 
Interviewe
d
5-Dec-06
5-Dec-06
6-Dec-06
7-Dec-06
7-Dec-06
15-Dec-06
3-Jan-07
4-Jan-07
4-Jan-07
5-Jan-07
7-Jan-07
8-Jan-07
8-Jan-07
9-Jan-07
9-Jan-07
10-Jan-07
11-Jan-07
11-Jan-07
12-Jan-07
12-Jan-07
15-Jan-07
16-Jan-07
18-Jan-07
22-Jan-07
22-Jan-07
24-Jan-07
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Southern Rubber Industry Co
Petrovietnam Fertilizer and Chemicals Co
Dong Nai Rubber Co
Tan Mai Paper Co
Chi Hung Joint Venture Co
Binh Duong Production and Import Export Co
Nha Trang Seafood Co
Ninh Thuan Agricultural Export Co
Dak Lak Rubber Co
Hyundai Vinashin Shipyard Co Ltd
Cho Lon Investment and Import Export Corporation
Fuvi Mechanical Technology Co
Southern Fertilizers Co
Nha Be Garment Co
Vietnam Rubber Group
Ba Ria Rubber Co
Petrovietnam Gas Company
Phong Phu Textile Corporation
Sao Ta Food Co
Ut Xi Aquatic Products Processing Co Ltd
Minh Phu Seafood Import Export Co
Can Tho Agricultural and Animal Products Company
Viet Foods Co Ltd
Quang Ngai Sugar Corporation
Danang Rubber Co
Seaprodex Danang Co 
Nam Trieu Shipbuilding Company
Vietnam Ocean Shipping Co
Bach Dang Shipyard
Ha Long Shipyard
Dong Bac Coal Corporation
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
24-Jan-07
25-Jan-07
26-Jan-07
26-Jan-07
29-Jan-07
30-Jan-07
1-Feb-07
 1-Feb-07
2-Feb-07
2-Feb-07
3-Feb-07
5-Feb-07
6-Feb-07
6-Feb-07
7-Feb-07
8-Feb-07
9-Feb-07
23-Feb-07
5-Mar-07
5-Mar-07
6-Mar-07
7-Mar-07
7-Mar-07
8-Mar-07
9-Mar-07
9-Mar-07
12-Mar-07
12-Mar-07
13-Mar-07
14-Mar-07
14-Mar-07
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Industrial Explosive Material Company
Vietnam National Petroleum Corporation
Sao Vang Rubber Co
Electricity of Vietnam
Petroleum Technical Services Company 
Electrical Equipment Manufacturing Co
1-5 Automobile Mechanics Co
Garment Company No.10
Company No.28
Mercedes Benz Vietnam Ltd
An Phu Corporation
Southern Basic Chemicals Co
Vietsovpetro
II. Interview Only
Vietnam Cement Association
Vietnam Steel Association
Vietnam Fertilizer Association
Vietnam Textile and Apparel Association
Vietnam Textile and Garment Group
Vietnam Rubber Association
Binh Long Rubber Co
Dau Tieng Rubber Corporation
Hoang Gia Cat Tuong Co Ltd 
Cat Thai Plastic Co
Cai Doi Vam Import Export Company
Cai Lan Oil and Fats Industries Co Ltd
Lilama Corporation
Military Telecom Corporation
Vietnam Northern Food Corporation
March 8 Textile Co
Hanoi Textile and Garment Co
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21-Mar-07
23-Mar-07
26-Mar-07
27-Mar-07
28-Mar-07
30-Mar-07
31-Mar-07
31-Mar-07
2-Apr-07
4-Apr-07
5-Apr-07
9-Apr-07
17-May-07
26-Oct-06
26-Oct-06
27-Oct-06
10-Dec-06
9-Jan-07
17-Jan-07
30-Jan-07
30-Jan-07
31-Jan-07
5-Feb-07
6-Mar-07
13-Mar-07
16-Mar-07
22-Mar-07
27-Mar-07
29-Mar-07
29-Mar-07
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Binh Tien Consumer Goods Production Co Ltd
Vietnam Dairy Products Co
Vietnam Engine and Agricultural Machinery Corporation
III. Questionnaire Only
An Giang Agriculture and Foods Import Export Co.
Anvifish Co Ltd
Bridge Construction Company No.12
Cao Son Coal Co
Chinfon Haiphong Cement Co
Civil Engineering Construction Corporation No.1
Coc 6 Coal Co
Construction and Investment Company No.18
Construction and Production Material Co
General Production Investment Service Import Export Co
Ha Long Coal Co
Ha Tu Coal Co
Hanoi Clean Water Company
Hanoi Post and Telecommunications
Hoang Thach Cement Co
Hon Gai Coal Co
Hon Gai Coal Selecting Co
Mao Khe Coal Co
Northern Airports Authority
Northern Foodstuff Co
Nui Beo Coal Co
Petrolimex B12
Petrolimex Region 1
Power Construction Engineering Company No.1
Proconco Producing Animal Feeds Co
Saigon Newport Co
Song Da Company No.10
 
 
 
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
2-Apr-07
10-Apr-07
16-May-07
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Thua Thien Hue Construction Corporation
Uong Bi Coal Co
Vang Danh Coal Co
Vietnam Construction and Import Export Corporation
Vietnam Construction Investment Import and Export 
Holding Corp.
Vietnam Food Production Company
Vietnam Railway Corporation
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Firm Questionnaire 
UNDP 
Questionnaire for Largest Firms in Vietnam 
Date: ____________________ 
Note: This questionnaire is intended for several types of firms and not all questions may 
be applicable. 
Please list values in Vietnam dong 
Company Name (English): _________________________________________________ 
Company Name (Vietnamese): ______________________________________________ 
Website address: _________________________________________________________ 
Section 1: General Information 
1. When was the firm founded (Year)? _______________________________________
2. Current Legal Operating Structure: ________________________________________
3. Division of Ownership:
Owner Percent 
1.) 
2.) 
3.) 
4.) 
5.) 
4. If an SOE please indicate whether: a public utility _____, or a business SOE ______
Also please indicate supervising agency ____________________________________
5. Is the firm classified as operating in a state sector (either 100% or 50% or more state
capital) according to Decision 155/QD-TTg of 2004?  Yes ___, No ___
6. Please list the firm’s major activities and record the total values for 2003, 2004 and 
2005: 
Activity 2003 2004 2005 
Primary activity: _____________________       
Secondary activity: ___________________       
Other: _____________________________       
* Rank the firm’s activities by total value added. If this is not possible rank according 
to the value of operations. If both are impossible rank according to net turnover.   
 
7. If the firm’s Primary Activity* is product-diversified please complete the following in 
percent for the products which contributed most by value to the Primary Activity in 
2005 (if not product-diversified, please complete for Primary Activity as Product 1): 
  
  
  Export Sales Sales to Domestic Customers 
Percent 
of 
Primary 
Activity 
Trading 
Agent 
Business 
to 
Business 
FIE SOE Private Other Related Firm* 
Product 1: 
__________                 
Product 2: 
__________                 
Product 3: 
__________                 
Product 4: 
__________                 
Product 5: 
__________                 
* Subsidiary, affiliate, joint venture, parent company, partner firm, etc. 
8. Indicate which of the following are major suppliers of raw materials for your primary 
product or service and provide percentage of total inputs (Please tick box): 
Supplier 
Major Supplier 
Percent total inputs Yes No 
SOEs       
Domestic private       
Joint-ventures       
FIEs       
Imported directly by firm       
9. Indicate which of the following are major suppliers of intermediate inputs for your 
primary product or service and provide percentage of total inputs (Please tick box): 
Supplier 
Major Supplier 
Percent total inputs Yes No 
SOEs       
Domestic private       
Joint-ventures       
FIEs       
Imported directly by firm       
 
10. Please complete the following table: 
 
Domestic Market 
Share (percent) 
Share of Vietnam 
Exports (percent) 
Primary Activity   
     of which:   
Product 1   
Product 2   
Product 3   
Product 4   
Product 5   
Secondary Activity   
 
11. Indicate which of the following are your major competitors for your primary activity 
and rank their importance (1 – Most Important, 5 – Least Important): 
Competitor 
Major Competitor 
Rank Yes No 
SOEs       
Domestic private       
Joint-ventures       
FIEs       
Imports       
 
12. Please indicate the numbers of staff in the following categories: 
Category Male Female Total 
Board of Management    
Board of Directors    
Line Managers    
Workers (non-management) with science based 
university degrees (e.g. Engineer) 
   
Workers (non-management) with non-science 
based university degrees.  
   
Skilled non-graduate workers (with relevant 
experience or qualifications) 
   
Unskilled workers    
Administrative Staff    
Other    
Total    
Section 2: History of Firm 
 
Year Event* Reason 
      
      
      
      
      
   
 
*Please include: Major investments by value (production facilities, capital assets); 
Change in Senior Management; Organizational expansion (acquisition, subsidiary, joint-
venture, domestic branch office, overseas office); Expansion into new markets; Changes 
in ownership; New or improved product or service; Financial changes: change in source 
of credit. 
Section 3: Strategy and Planning 
 
1. Is your strategy set out in a business plan which is available as a document? 
Yes ___, No ___ 
2. Is the business plan: 
a. Available to the public? ____ 
b. Available to investors only? ____ 
c. For internal use only? ____ 
3. How does the business plan reflect the industry development plan?  
Mostly___  Partially____ Not at all_____  No Industry Plan _____ 
4. If a member company, how does your business plan relate to the corporation business 
plan if one exists?  
Mostly ___  Partially ____ Not at all ____ No GC plan _____ 
5. What are the key performance indicators in your strategy/ business plan? __________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6. Please indicate if any of the following are planned or anticipated in the next five years 
and indicate the reason: 
 Planned Reason 
 Yes No Reorganize 
existing 
production 
processes 
Expand 
existing 
production 
processes 
Develop new 
production 
processes 
Other  
(Please Detail) 
Create 
subsidiaries 
      
Create 
affiliates 
      
JV with 
FIE 
      
JV with 
VN firm 
      
New 
Production 
Facility 
      
Other 
(Please 
detail) 
      
 
Section 4: Capital Equipment 
 
1. When was the majority of your capital equipment made (Please tick box)? 
 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Primary Activity       
Secondary Activity      
 
2. If capital equipment has been replaced in the last five years please indicate how 
quality, output and costs have been effected (Please tick box):  
Activity 
Effects 
Same 
Quality 
Increase 
Quality 
Same 
Output 
Increase 
Output 
Same 
Costs 
Reduce 
Costs 
Replaced existing 
equipment to produce 
same product or service              
Supplemented existing 
equipment to undertake 
same product or service             
Replaced existing 
equipment to produce 
new product or service             
Produce new product or 
service alongside existing 
product or services             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. If capital equipment will be replaced in the next five years please indicate how 
quality, output and costs will be effected (Please tick box):  
Activity 
Effects 
Same 
Quality 
Increase 
Quality 
Same 
Output 
Increase 
Output 
Same 
Costs 
Reduce 
Costs 
Replace existing 
equipment to produce 
same product or service              
Supplement existing 
equipment to undertake 
same product or service             
Replace existing 
equipment to produce 
new product or service             
Produce new product or 
service alongside existing 
product or services             
 
4. Are there incentives to buy capital equipment domestically? Yes ___, No ___ 
5. Please assess the quality of your main product or service in relation to (Please tick 
box): 
  Inferior Equal Superior Don't Know 
Vietnamese 
competitors 
State     
Domestic Private     
Foreign 
competitors 
Imports     
FIEs in Vietnam     
Competitors in export markets     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Please assess the price of your main product or service in relation to: (Please tick 
box) 
  Lower Equal Higher Don't Know 
Vietnamese 
competitors 
State     
Domestic Private     
Foreign 
competitors 
Imports     
FIEs in Vietnam     
Competitors in export markets     
 
7. Indicate which of the following was/ will be associated with purchase of equipment: 
a. Reduction/ Increase* of unskilled staff. 
b. Reduction/ Increase* of staff with science degree. 
c. Reduction/ Increase* in skilled staff.  
d. No Change _____ 
*Please delete as appropriate 
8. Rate the degree to which each of the following factors affect the acquisition of capital 
equipment (1 – Very Important, 5 – Not Important): 
Factors 
Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
Difficulties finding suitable equipment/ technology           
Difficulties licensing suitable technology from 
foreign firms           
Lack of capital           
Staff lack skills required to absorb technology into 
existing business and production processes            
Obstacles to laying off workers           
Acquiring necessary government approval           
 
Section 5: Innovation (improvements to existing processes, or actions undertaken to  
  incorporate new equipment or processes) 
 
1. Please indicate whether the firm has improved or will improve production processes 
and/ or business processes in the last five years/ next five years in response to the 
following factors (Please tick box): 
  Last 5 Years Next 5 Years 
 
N/A
* 
N
o 
Ye
s 
N/A
* 
N
o 
Ye
s 
Competitive pressure from Vietnamese private firms             
Competitive pressure from Vietnamese SOEs             
Competitive pressure from FIEs             
Competitive pressure from imports       
To match quality of competitors in export markets             
Quality regulations in new export markets              
To meet quality requirements of foreign partner             
New government regulation             
Government sectoral strategy and development 
policies             
* Not Applicable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Please indicate importance of the following when improving production processes, 
business processes and product (1-Very Important, 5-Not Important): 
Method 
Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
Internal R&D department      
Suggestions from workers and managers      
Cooperation with domestic R&D institutions      
Reverse engineering      
Buy technology from domestic sources      
Buy technology from foreign sources      
Joint venture with domestic enterprises      
Joint venture with foreign enterprises      
Hiring domestic consultants      
Hiring foreign consultants      
Domestic training      
Training/ study tour abroad      
Google      
 
3. Please indicate significance of the following obstacles to desired process 
improvements (1 - Very Significant, 5 – Not Significant):  
Method 
Significance 
1 2 3 4 5 
Lack of capital       
Lack of skilled technical staff      
Lack of access to technology      
Lack of technical knowledge.      
Other _______________________      
 
 
 
 
4. Please rank the following activities in order of priority (1 – Most Important, 8 – Least 
Important) in the last five years and the next five years: 
Activities 
Last Five Years Next Five Years 
Primar
y 
Activity 
Secondar
y Activity 
Primar
y 
Activity 
Secondar
y Activity 
Product improvement        
Improvement of production process       
New production facilities      
New product models       
Upgrade existing production facilities      
Increase market share in existing 
markets     
Enter new foreign market      
Others      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 6: Labour 
 
1. Please indicate the length of time staff have been with the firm, and if staff joined the 
firm within the last three years please indicate from where they were recruited:  
Category 
Length of time with firm 
(Percent of each category) 
If recruited within last 3 years recruited from 
(Percentage of each category): 
Over 10 
Years 
10-5 
Years 
3-5 
Years 
Domestic 
Private 
firm 
Domestic 
SOE FIE 
Gov 
Institution 
Direct 
from 
University 
Board of 
Management 
        
Board of 
Directors 
        
Line 
Managers 
        
Workers (non-
management) 
with science 
based 
university 
degrees (e.g. 
Engineer) 
        
Workers (non-
management) 
with non-
science based 
university 
degrees.  
        
Skilled non-
graduate 
workers (with 
relevant 
experience or 
qualifications) 
        
Unskilled 
workers 
        
Administrative 
Staff 
        
2. Please complete the following table for members of the Board of Management: 
 Number 
Are full time members?  
Has a university degree from a Western University?  
Has a university degree from a non-Western (Soviet Bloc, China) University?  
Has a science-based university degree?  
Has a Vietnamese university degree or equivalent?  
Has an MBA from a foreign business school?  
Has an MBA from a VN business school?  
Has experience working in an FIE?  
Has experience working abroad?  
Can communicate directly with foreign counterparts in English?  
 
3. Please complete the following table for Board of Directors: 
 Number 
Are full time members?  
Has a university degree from a Western University?  
Has a university degree from a non-Western (Soviet Bloc, China) University?  
Has a science-based university degree?  
Has a Vietnamese university degree or equivalent?  
Has an MBA from a foreign business school?  
Has an MBA from a VN business school?  
Has experience working in an FIE?  
Has experience working abroad?  
Can communicate directly with foreign counterparts in English?  
 
4. What percentage of skilled workers with a science degree (graduate or post-graduate): 
a. Has experience working in an FIE in the same field_____  
b. Was trained in a foreign University______ 
5. What proportion of skilled workers: 
Other         
a. Has experience working in an FIE in the same field_____  
b. Was trained in a foreign University______ 
6. Please complete the following table (Please tick box): 
Category 
Average wage (percentage of staff in 
each category) 
<2mil 
VND 
2-5mil 
VND 
5-10mil 
VND 
>10mil 
VND 
Board of Management     
Management (e.g. Directors)     
Workers (non-management) with science 
based university degrees (e.g. Engineer) 
    
Workers (non-management) with non-science 
based university degrees.  
    
Skilled non-graduate workers (with relevant 
experience or qualifications) 
    
Unskilled workers     
Administrative Staff     
Other     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Please record percentage of training budget spent on following categories: 
Category In firm Outside of firm in         Vietnam 
Training courses/ Study 
Tours in foreign country 
Board of 
Management 
   
Board of 
Directors 
   
Line Managers    
Workers (non-
management) 
with science 
based university 
degrees (e.g. 
Engineer) 
   
Workers (non-
management) 
with non-science 
based university 
degrees.  
   
Skilled non-
graduate 
workers (with 
relevant 
experience or 
qualifications) 
   
Unskilled 
workers 
   
Administrative 
Staff 
   
Other    
 
8. Please indicate the importance of training for the following (1 – Very important, 5 – 
Not important) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Bring new staff to required level      
Raising standard of existing skill sets      
Learning to use new equipment      
Learning new business processes      
Other __________________________      
 
 
9. Please indicate the availability of the following (Please tick box):  
Category Readily Available 
Available but 
expensive Not Available 
Board of Management    
Board of Directors    
Line Managers    
Workers (non-management) 
with science based 
university degrees (e.g. 
Engineer) 
   
Workers (non-management) 
with non-science based 
university degrees.  
   
Skilled non-graduate 
workers (with relevant 
experience or qualifications) 
   
Unskilled workers    
Administrative staff    
Other    
 
Section 7: Relationship with state institutions  
 
1. Rate state involvement in the following decisions (if member company of a 
corporation, please also fill out second column) (Please tick box): 
Decision 
State Involvement Parent Company Involvement 
Very 
High High Medium Low None 
Very 
High High Medium Low None 
Business plan 
and strategies                     
Investment                      
Hiring senior 
management           
Hiring new 
staff                     
Firing existing 
staff                     
Determining 
staff wages                     
Product 
diversification                     
Business 
Diversification           
Sourcing raw 
materials and 
inputs                     
Price paid for 
raw materials 
and inputs                     
Importing                     
Exporting                     
Determining 
prices of 
products                     
 
 
 
 
2. Please indicate state involvement in the following activities and if involved, which 
state institution(s) (Please tick box): 
 Very High High Medium Low None State institution(s) 
Provide brand 
name            
Find business 
partners            
Assist in 
exporting            
Assist in 
importing            
Provide 
financing            
Guarantee 
firm loans 
from banks            
Provide land            
Guarantee 
buyers of firm 
output            
Assist in 
acquisition of 
new 
technology            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. If a member company of a corporation, please fill out in relation to parent company 
involvement (Please tick box): 
  
Very 
High High Medium Low None 
Provide brand name          
Find business partners          
Assist in exporting          
Assist in importing          
Provide financing          
Guarantee firm loans from 
banks          
Provide land          
Guarantee buyers of firm 
output          
Assist in acquisition of new 
technology          
 
4. If an SOE, does the firm have plans to transform into an entity operating under the 
Enterprise Law?  Yes ___, No ____, Already transformed _____ 
If yes, what is the anticipated ownership type following transformation? 
__________________________________________________________ 
If yes, is this plan approved? Yes _____, No _____ 
Section 8: Finances 
 
1. Please complete the following table: 
 2003 2004 2005 
Total Revenues    
Total Assets    
Turnover from sales, service    
  of which:    
Domestic sales, service    
International sales, service    
 
2. How much did the firm remit to the state (taxes, returns to state capital, other) in:  
2003 _______________, 2004_______________  and 2005_______________? 
3. Did the firm benefit from any tax incentives in (Yes/No): 
2003 _______________, 2004_______________  and 2005_______________? 
4. If a member company, how much do you remit to the parent company (management 
fees, dividends, capital usage fees, other) in: 
2003 _______________, 2004_______________  and 2005_______________? 
5. If the firm did not pay Corporate Income Tax (CIT) in the following years, please 
indicate why not: 
Year 
Reason 
Made a loss Broke even Tax incentive Other 
2003     
2004     
2005     
 
6. Please complete the following table: 
Share of Total Debt (Short and Long should equal 100%) Percent 
Short term  
% short term debt secured by government  
Long term  
% long term debt secured by government  
7. Is securing a loan easier ____ or more difficult ____ now than five years ago? 
8. Please indicate how the importance of the following when securing credit has 
changed over the last five years (Please tick box): 
  
Never 
Required Unchanged 
Less 
frequently 
required 
More 
frequently 
required 
Collateral        
Financial 
statements   
 
    
Feasibility study        
Company audit        
 
9. Please rank the following in order of importance for sourcing funds for capital 
investments (1 – Most Important, 11 – Least Important): 
Source 5 Years Ago Now In 5 Years 
Retained earnings        
Central State budget       
Local State budget       
SOCB loan       
JSC bank loan       
Foreign bank loan       
DAF (VDB)       
Sale of assets       
Equity offerings       
Bonds       
Transfer from parent company       
 
10. Please provide the debt/asset ratio for: 1995 ______,  2000 ______,  2005 ______  
11. Please indicate the percentage of state capital in total capital ________ 
12. If a member company of a corporation, please indicate the percentage of parent 
company capital in total firm capital ________ 
13. Does the firm plan to list on the stock market? Yes ___, No ___  
If the firm is already listed, please provide the code: _______ 
14. Do you have investments in other companies? ___________ 
 
 
15. Please complete (percentage not value): 
Revenue Source 
Percentage of total revenues 
2003 2004 2005 
Sales       
Financial investments       
Renting, leasing land       
Other ______________________       
Total (should equal 100%)    
 
16. Please complete (percentage not value): 
Expenditures 
Percentage of total expenditure 
2003 2004 2005 
    
Wages    
Staff training    
Research and development    
Marketing    
Product distribution    
Market research    
Raw materials and inputs    
Maintenance of equipment    
Other _________________    
Total (should equal 100%)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5: General Corporation Head Office 
Questionnaire 
 
UNDP 
 
Corporation Questionnaire 
 
Date: _________________ 
 
Please list values in Vietnam dong 
Definitions: 
Corporation: all units of the corporation, including: head office, dependent accounting  
 units, independent accounting units 
Head office: the administrative office and departments of the corporation only 
Corporation Name (English): ________________________________________________ 
Corporation Name (Vietnamese): ____________________________________________ 
Website address: _________________________________________________________ 
 
Section 1: General Information 
 
13. Current Legal Operating Structure of the corporation:  
  Corporation Type Supervising Agency 
GC 90     
GC 91     
Parent-Subsidiary Model     
Economic Group    
Other ______________________     
 
14. When was the corporation founded (Year)?   
If having been transformed, please indicate the year of transformation?  
Does the corporation have plans to transform into an entity operating under the 
Enterprise Law?   
Yes ___, No ____,  
If yes, what is the anticipated transformation year? 
If yes, what is the anticipated transformation model? 
Parent-children company ________________economic group________________  
 
 
15. Did the head office exist prior to becoming the head office of the corporation?  
Yes ___ No ___, If yes, was it a: SOE ___, Government Agency ___, Other ___ 
If yes, please provide the name of the former organization: _____________________ 
16. Which enterprises were the founding members of the corporation? 
Enterprise Name 
1.) 
2.) 
3.) 
4.) 
5.) 
 
17. Is the corporation classified as operating in a state sector according to Decision 
155/QD-TTg of 2004?  Yes ___, No ___ 
18. Please list the corporation’s major activities and record total value: (million VND) 
Activity 2003 2004 2005 
Primary activity: _____________________    
Secondary activity: ___________________    
Other: _____________________________    
    
* Rank the firm’s activities by total value added. If this is not possible rank according to 
the value of operations. If both are impossible rank according to net turnover.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19. If the corporation’s Primary Activity is product-diversified please complete the 
following in percent for the products which contributed most by value to the Primary 
Activity in 2005 (if not product-diversified, please complete for Primary Activity as 
Product 1): 
  
  Export Sales Sales to Domestic Customers 
Percent 
of 
Primary 
Activity 
Trading 
Agent 
Business 
to 
Business 
FIE SOE Private Other 
Product 1: 
__________        
Product 2: 
__________        
Product 3: 
__________        
Product 4: 
__________        
Product 5: 
__________        
 
20. If the corporation’s Secondary Activity is product-diversified please complete the 
following in percent for the products which contributed most by value to the 
Secondary Activity in 2005 (if not product-diversified, complete for Secondary 
Activity as Product 1): 
  
  Export Sales Sales to Domestic Customers 
Percent of 
Secondary 
Activity 
Trading 
Agent 
Business 
to 
Business 
FIE SOE Private Other 
Product 1: 
__________               
Product 2: 
__________               
Product 3: 
__________               
Product 4: 
__________               
Product 5: 
__________               
 
 
 
 
 
21. Please complete the following table for the corporation: 
 
Domestic Market Share 
(percent) 
Share of Vietnam Exports 
(percent) 
Primary Activity   
     of which:   
Product 1   
Product 2   
Product 3   
Product 4   
Product 5   
 
 
Domestic Market Share 
(percent) 
Share of Vietnam Exports 
(percent) 
Secondary Activity   
     of which:   
Product 1   
Product 2   
Product 3   
Product 4   
Product 5   
 
22. Indicate which of the following are your major competitors for your corporation’s 
Primary Activity and rank their importance (1 – Most Important, 5 – Least 
Important): 
Competitor 
Major Competitor 
Rank Yes No 
Other state corporations    
Domestic private    
Joint-ventures    
FIEs    
Imports    
 
23. Please indicate the numbers of head office staff in the following categories: 
Category Male Female Total 
Board of Management    
Board of Directors    
Line Managers    
Workers (non-management) with science based 
university degrees (e.g. Engineer)    
Workers (non-management) with non-science 
based university degrees.     
Skilled non-graduate workers (with relevant 
experience or qualifications)    
Unskilled workers    
Administrative Staff    
Other    
Total    
 
24. Please indicate the numbers of corporation staff in the following categories: 
Category Male Female Total 
Board of Management     
Board of Directors    
Line Managers    
Workers (non-management) with science based 
university degrees (e.g. Engineer)    
Workers (non-management) with non-science 
based university degrees.     
Skilled non-graduate workers (with relevant 
experience or qualifications)    
Unskilled workers    
Administrative Staff    
Other    
Total    
Section 2: History of Corporation 
 
Year Event* Reason 
      
      
      
      
      
   
 
*Please include: Major investments by value (production facilities, capital assets); 
Change in Senior Management; Organizational expansion (acquisition, subsidiary, joint-
venture, domestic branch office, overseas office); Expansion into new markets; Changes 
in ownership; New or improved product or service; Financial changes: change in source 
of credit. 
Section 3: Strategy and Planning 
 
7. Is your strategy set out in a business plan which is available as a document?  
Yes ___, No ___ 
8. Is the business plan: 
a. Available to the public? ____ 
b. Available to investors only? ____ 
c. For internal use only? ____ 
9. How does the business plan reflect the industry development plan?  
Mostly___  Partially____ Not at all_____  No Industry Plan _____ 
10. Does the business plan include subsidiaries and joint venture member companies of 
the corporation?  Yes ___  No ____ 
11. What are the key performance indicators in your strategy/ business plan? __________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
12. Please indicate if any of the following are planned or anticipated by the corporation 
in the next five years and indicate the reason: 
 Planned Reason 
 Yes No Reorganize 
existing 
production 
processes 
Expand 
existing 
production 
processes 
Develop new 
production 
processes 
Other  
(Please Detail) 
Create 
subsidiaries 
      
Create 
affiliates 
      
JV with 
FIE 
      
JV with 
VN firm 
      
New 
Production 
Facility 
      
Other 
(Please 
detail) 
      
 
Section 4: Capital Equipment (please answer all questions in this section for the  
  corporation) 
 
9. Are there incentives for the corporation to buy capital equipment domestically?  
Yes ___, No ___ 
10. Please assess the quality of the corporation’s main product or service in relation to 
(Please tick box): 
  Inferior Equal Superior Don't Know 
Vietnamese 
competitors 
State     
Domestic Private     
Foreign 
competitors 
Imports     
FIEs in Vietnam     
Competitors in export markets     
 
11. Please assess the price of the corporation’s main product or service in relation to 
(Please tick box): 
  Lower Equal Higher Don't Know 
Vietnamese 
competitors 
State     
Domestic Private     
Foreign 
competitors 
Imports     
FIEs in Vietnam     
Competitors in export markets     
 
Section 5: Innovation (improvements to existing processes, or actions undertaken to  
  incorporate new equipment or processes) 
 
5. Please indicate whether the corporation has improved or will improve production 
processes and/ or business processes in the last five years/ next five years in response 
to the following factors (Please tick box): 
  Last 5 Years Next 5 Years 
 N/A* No Yes N/A* No Yes 
Competitive pressure from Vietnamese private firms       
Competitive pressure from Vietnamese state 
corporations       
Competitive pressure from FIEs       
Competitive pressure from imports       
To match quality of competitors in export markets       
Quality regulations in new export markets        
To meet quality requirements of foreign partner       
New government regulation       
Government sectoral strategy and development 
policies       
* Not Applicable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Please indicate importance of the following when improving production processes, 
business processes and products of the corporation (1-Very Important, 5-Not 
Important): 
Method 
Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
Internal R&D department      
Suggestions from workers and managers      
Cooperation with domestic R&D institutions      
Reverse engineering      
Buy technology from domestic sources      
Buy technology from foreign sources      
Joint venture with domestic enterprises      
Joint venture with foreign enterprises      
Hiring domestic consultants      
Hiring foreign consultants      
Domestic training      
Training/ study tour abroad      
Google      
 
7. Please rank the following activities in order of priority for the corporation (1 – Most 
Important, 8 – Least Important) in the last five years and the next five years: 
Activities 
Last Five Years Next Five Years 
Primary 
Activity 
Secondary 
Activity 
Primary 
Activity 
Secondary 
Activity 
Product improvement       
Improvement of production process      
New production facilities     
New product models      
Upgrade existing production facilities     
Increase market share in existing markets     
Enter new foreign market     
Others     
 
Section 6: Labour (please complete all questions in this section for the head office) 
 
10. Please indicate the percentage of staff who have the following length of time with the 
head office, and please indicate the percentage of staff who joined the firm within the 
last three years and their previous employment with the following institutions (%):  
Category 
Length of time with firm 
(Percent of each category) 
If recruited within last 3 years recruited from 
(Percent of each category): 
Over 
10 
Years 
10-5 
Years 
3-5 
Years 
Member 
company  SOE 
Domestic 
Private 
firm 
FIE Gov Institution 
Direct 
from 
University 
Board of 
Management 
         
Board of 
Directors 
         
Line Managers          
Workers (non-
management) 
with science 
based university 
degrees (e.g. 
Engineer) 
         
Workers (non-
management) 
with non-
science based 
university 
degrees.  
         
Skilled non-
graduate 
workers (with 
relevant 
experience or 
qualifications) 
         
Unskilled 
workers 
         
Administrative 
Staff 
         
Other          
 
11. Please complete the following table for members of the Board of Management of the 
head office: 
 Number 
Are full time members?  
Has a university degree from a Western University?  
Has a university degree from a non-Western (Soviet Bloc, China) University?  
Has a science-based university degree?  
Has a Vietnamese university degree or equivalent?  
Has an MBA from a foreign business school?  
Has an MBA from a VN business school?  
Has experience working in an FIE?  
Has experience working abroad?  
Can communicate directly with foreign counterparts in English?  
 
12. Please complete the following table for managers (e.g. Directors) of the head office: 
 Number 
Has a university degree from a Western University?  
Has a university degree from a non-Western (Soviet Bloc, China) University?  
Has a science-based university degree?  
Has a Vietnamese university degree or equivalent?  
Has an MBA from a foreign business school?  
Has an MBA from a VN business school?  
Has experience working in an FIE?  
Has experience working abroad?  
Can communicate directly with foreign counterparts in English?  
 
13. What percentage of skilled workers of the head office with a science degree (graduate 
or post-graduate): 
c. Has experience working in an FIE in the same field_____  
d. Was trained in a foreign University______ 
 
 
14. Please complete the following table for the head office (Please tick box): 
Category 
Average wage (percentage of staff in 
each category) 
<2mil 
VND 
2-5mil 
VND 
5-10mil 
VND 
>10mil 
VND 
Board of Management     
Board of Directors     
Line Managers     
Workers (non-management) with science 
based university degrees (e.g. Engineer) 
    
Workers (non-management) with non-science 
based university degrees.  
    
Skilled non-graduate workers (with relevant 
experience or qualifications) 
    
Unskilled workers     
Administrative staff     
Other     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. Please record percentage of training budget for the head office spent on following 
categories: 
Category In firm Outside of firm in         Vietnam 
Training courses/ Study 
Tours in foreign country 
Board of 
Management 
   
Board of 
Directors 
   
Line Managers    
Workers (non-
management) 
with science 
based university 
degrees (e.g. 
Engineer) 
   
Workers (non-
management) 
with non-science 
based university 
degrees.  
   
Skilled non-
graduate 
workers (with 
relevant 
experience or 
qualifications) 
   
Unskilled 
workers 
   
Administrative 
staff 
   
Other    
 
16. Please indicate the importance of training for the following (1 – Very important, 5 – 
Not important) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Bring new staff to required level      
Raising standard of existing skill sets      
Learning to use new equipment      
Learning new business processes      
Other __________________________      
 
 
17. Please indicate the availability of the following for the head office (Please tick box):  
Category Readily Available 
Available but 
expensive Not Available 
Board of Directors    
Line Managers    
Workers (non-management) 
with science based 
university degrees (e.g. 
Engineer) 
   
Workers (non-management) 
with non-science based 
university degrees.  
   
Skilled non-graduate 
workers (with relevant 
experience or qualifications) 
   
Unskilled workers    
Administrative Staff    
Other    
 
Section 7: Relationship between state institutions and the corporation, and the head 
office  
 and independent accounting member companies 
 
5. Rate state involvement in the following corporation decisions (Please tick box): 
Decision 
State Involvement 
Very 
High High Medium Low None 
Business plan and 
strategies      
Investment       
Hiring senior 
management      
Hiring new staff      
Firing existing staff      
Determining staff wages      
Product diversification      
Business Diversification      
Sourcing raw materials 
and inputs      
Price paid for raw 
materials and inputs      
Importing      
Exporting      
Determining prices of 
products      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Please indicate state involvement in the following corporation activities and if 
involved, which state institution(s) (Please tick box): 
  
Very 
High High Medium Low None State institution(s) 
Provide 
brand name       
Find 
business 
partners       
Assist in 
exporting       
Assist in 
importing       
Provide 
financing       
Guarantee 
firm loans 
from banks       
Provide land       
Guarantee 
buyers of 
firm output       
Assist in 
acquisition 
of new 
technology       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Rate head office involvement in the following independent accounting member 
company decisions (Please tick box): 
Decision 
Head Office Involvement 
Very 
High High Medium Low None 
Business plan and 
strategies      
Investment       
Hiring senior 
management      
Hiring new staff      
Firing existing staff      
Determining staff wages      
Product diversification      
Business Diversification      
Sourcing raw materials 
and inputs      
Price paid for raw 
materials and inputs      
Importing 
     
Exporting      
Determining prices of 
products      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Please indicate head office involvement in the following independent accounting 
member company activities (Please tick box): 
  
Very 
High High Medium Low None 
Provide brand name      
Find business partners      
Assist in exporting      
Assist in importing      
Provide financing      
Guarantee firm loans from 
banks      
Provide land      
Guarantee buyers of firm 
output      
Assist in acquisition of new 
technology      
 
Section 8: Finances 
 
1. Does the corporation maintain consolidated accounts for the entire corporation? 
Yes ___ No ___ 
2. Does the corporation have a financial member company(s)?  Yes __ No ___ 
3. Please complete the following table for the head office and dependent accounting 
units: (million VND) 
 2003 2004 2005 
Total Revenues    
Total Assets    
Turnover from sales, service    
  of which:    
Domestic sales, service    
International sales, service    
 
4. Please complete the following table for the corporation: (million VND) 
 2003 2004 2005 
Total Revenues    
Total Assets    
Turnover from sales, service    
  of which:    
Domestic sales, service    
International sales, service    
 
5. How much did the head office and dependent accounting units remit to the state 
(taxes, returns to state capital, other) in: (million VND) 
2003 _______________, 2004_______________  and 2005 ______________? 
6. How much did the corporation  remit to the state (taxes, returns to state capital, 
other) in:  
2003 _______________, 2004_______________  and 2005 ______________? 
7. Did the corporation benefit from any tax incentives in (Yes/No): 
2003 _______________, 2004_______________  and 2005_______________? 
 
 
8. If the head office and dependent accounting units did not pay Corporate Income Tax 
(CIT) in the following years, please indicate why not: 
Year 
Reason 
Made a loss Broke even Tax incentive Other 
2003     
2004     
2005     
 
9. Please complete the following table for the corporation: 
Share of Total Debt (Short and Long should equal 100%) Percent 
Short term  
% short term debt secured by government  
Long term  
% long term debt secured by government  
 
10. Is securing a loan easier ____ or more difficult ____ now than five years ago? 
11. Please indicate for the corporation how the importance of the following when 
securing credit has changed over the last five years (Please tick box): 
  
Never 
Required Unchanged 
Less 
frequently 
required 
More 
frequently 
required 
Collateral      
Financial 
statements   
 
  
Feasibility study      
Company audit      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Please rank the following in order of importance for sourcing funds for capital 
investments for the corporation (1 – Most Important, 11 – Least Important): 
Source 5 Years Ago Now In 5 Years 
Retained earnings     
Central State budget    
Local State budget    
SOCB loan    
JSC bank loan    
Foreign bank loan    
DAF (VDB)    
Sale of assets    
Equity offerings    
Bonds    
Transfers from member companies    
 
13. Please provide corporation debt/asset ratio for: 1995 ____,  2000 ____,  2005 ____  
14. Please indicate the percentage of state capital in the total capital of the corporation 
________ 
15. Does the corporation plan to list on the stock market? Yes ___, No ___ 
If the firm is already listed, please provide the code: _______ 
a. If not plan to list, why not? 
16. Does the head office have investments in other companies outside of the corporation?  
Yes ___ No ___ 
17. Please complete for the head office and dependent accounting units: 
Revenue Source 
Percentage of total revenues 
2003 2004 2005 
Sales      
Remittances from members    
Other financial investments    
Renting, leasing land      
Other ______________________      
Total (should equal 100%)    
 
18. Please complete for the corporation: 
Revenue Source 
Percentage of total revenues 
2003 2004 2005 
Sales    
Contribution from members    
Financial investments    
Renting, leasing land    
Other ______________________    
Total (should equal 100%)    
 
19. Please complete for the head office and dependent accounting units: 
Expenditures 
Percentage of total expenditure 
2003 2004 2005 
Wages    
Staff training    
Research and development    
Marketing    
Product distribution    
Market research    
Other _________________    
Total (should equal 100%)    
 
 
 
Appendices
Appendix 6: Flow of Funds Worksheets
1999
% of GDP Cen Gov (K1) RoW (K2) Mon Auth (K3) Dep Money 'banks flow' (K4) Private Sector (K6,K7) Disc Sources (K5) Total
U S U S U S U S U S U S
1
2 Gross Capital Formation 6.7% 21.0% 27.6%
3
4 Gross Saving 5.9% 0.0% 25.9% 31.7%
5
6 Surplus/ Deficit -0.8% -4.1% 4.9% 0.0%
7
8
9 Ch Foreign claims, net 7.3% 4.7% 2.8% 7.8% 7.5% 15.1%
10
11 Ch Foreign Assets 7.2% 4.7% 2.8% 12.2% 7.5% 19.4%
12 Ch Foreign Liabilities -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -4.5% -0.1% -4.4%
13
14 Ch Interbank Claims 0.4% -0.1% -0.3% -0.1% 0.0%
15
16 Ch Mon auth credit to DMB 0.9% 1.8% -0.3% 0.9% 1.5%
17 Ch Bank Reserves 1.3% 1.7% 0.0% 1.7% 1.3%
18
19 Ch Central gov debt -0.2% -1.5% 0.6% 0.1% -0.3% 2.2% -0.5%
20
21 Ch Claims on cen gov -0.2% -0.2% 0.5% 0.1% 3.4% 0.4% 3.2%
22 Ch Cen gov deposits -1.0% 1.4% -0.3% -3.7%
23
24 Ch Private credit, net 1.8% 6.4% 0.0% 10.0% 18.2% 18.2% 18.2%
25
26 Ch Claims on nonbank FI 0.0% 0.0%
27 Ch Other private credit 1.8% 6.4% 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 18.2% 18.2% 18.2%
28
29 Ch Money and quasi money 3.6% 10.9% 14.5% 14.5% 14.5%
30
31 Ch Curr and demand deposits 3.6% 2.2% 5.8% 5.8% 5.8%
32 Ch Time, savings dep 8.7% 8.7% 8.7% 8.7%
33
34 Misc and discrepancy 0.0% -3.2% -0.8% 2.9% 1.7% -7.1% -3.2% -3.2%
35
36
37 Total 8.5% 5.7% 6.2% 3.2% 3.1% 3.1% 11.4% 13.9% 35.6% 45.8% 0.0%
38
39
40
2000
% of GDP Cen Gov (K1) RoW (K2) Mon Auth (K3) Dep Money 'banks flow' (K4) Private Sector (K6,K7) Disc Sources (K5) Total
U S U S U S U S U S U S
1
2 Gross Capital Formation 6.7% 22.9% 29.6%
3
4 Gross Saving 4.0% 0.0% 29.2% 33.2%
5
6 Surplus/ Deficit -2.7% -3.5% 6.3% 0.0%
7
8
9 Ch Foreign claims, net 7.1% 0.7% 7.0% 14.3% 7.7% 21.3%
10
11 Ch Foreign Assets 7.0% 0.7% 7.1% 18.4% 7.8% 25.4%
12 Ch Foreign Liabilities -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% -4.1% -0.1% -4.0%
13
14 Ch Interbank Claims -0.1% 0.1% -0.1% 0.1% -0.2%
15
16 Ch Mon auth credit to DMB 0.9% 0.6% 0.0% 0.9% 0.6%
17 Ch Bank Reserves 0.8% 0.8% 0.0% 0.8% 0.8%
18
19 Ch Central gov debt 0.1% 0.9% -1.7% -1.7% -2.3% 1.2% -2.2%
20
21 Ch Claims on cen gov 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% -1.7% 2.4% -1.4% 2.5%
22 Ch Cen gov deposits -1.3% -0.8% 2.1% -4.6%
23
24 Ch Private credit, net 2.2% 5.7% 0.0% 9.7% 17.7% 17.7% 17.7%
25
26 Ch Claims on nonbank FI 0.0% 0.0%
27 Ch Other private credit 2.2% 5.7% 0.0% 9.7% 0.0% 0.0% 17.7% 17.7% 17.7%
28
29 Ch Money and quasi money 2.5% 9.2% 11.7% 11.7% 11.7%
30
31 Ch Curr and demand deposits 2.5% 2.6% 5.1% 5.1% 5.1%
32 Ch Time, savings dep 6.5% 6.5% 6.5% 6.5%
33
34 Misc and discrepancy 0.0% -2.2% -0.8% 2.7% 7.9% -11.9% -2.2% -2.2%
35
36
37 Total 8.9% 4.1% 7.2% 3.5% 1.6% 1.6% 10.3% 11.8% 32.9% 54.7% 0.0%
38
39
40
2001
% of GDP Cen Gov (K1) RoW (K2) Mon Auth (K3) Dep Money 'banks flow' (K4) Private Sector (K6,K7) Disc Sources (K5)Total
U S U S U S U S U S U S
1
2 Gross Capital Formation 8.4% 22.8% 31.2%
3
4 Gross Saving 5.6% 0.0% 27.7% 33.3%
5
6 Surplus/ Deficit -2.8% -2.1% 4.8% 0.0%
7
8
9 Ch Foreign claims, net 4.3% 1.0% 3.7% 20.0% 4.7% 24.3%
10
11 Ch Foreign Assets 4.5% 1.2% 3.8% 23.8% 5.0% 28.3%
12 Ch Foreign Liabilities 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% -3.8% 0.2% -3.5%
13
14 Ch Interbank Claims -1.1% -1.1% 0.0% -1.1% -1.2%
15
16 Ch Mon auth credit to DMB 0.7% 0.7% 0.0% 0.7% 0.7%
17 Ch Bank Reserves -0.4% -0.4% 0.0% -0.4% -0.4%
18
19 Ch Central gov debt 0.1% 0.8% -0.2% -3.4% -5.2% -0.8% -5.0%
20
21 Ch Claims on cen gov 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% -3.4% -0.9% -2.8% -0.8%
22 Ch Cen gov deposits 0.0% -0.6% 0.7% -4.3%
23
24 Ch Private credit, net 2.2% 4.8% 0.0% 6.9% 13.9% 13.9% 13.9%
25
26 Ch Claims on nonbank FI 0.0% 0.0%
27 Ch Other private credit 2.2% 4.8% 0.0% 6.9% 0.0% 0.0% 13.9% 13.9% 13.9%
28
29 Ch Money and quasi money 2.9% 8.3% 11.2% 11.2% 11.2%
30
31 Ch Curr and demand deposits 2.9% 1.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5%
32 Ch Time, savings dep 6.7% 6.7% 6.7% 6.7%
33
34 Misc and discrepancy 0.0% -2.6% 0.0% 2.4% 9.7% -14.7% -2.6% -2.6%
35
36
37 Total 10.6% 5.7% 4.2% 2.2% 1.8% 1.8% 9.5% 10.7% 30.6% 51.3% 0.0%
38
39
40
2002
% of GDP Cen Gov (K1) RoW (K2) Mon Auth (K3) Dep Money 'banks flow' (K4) Private Sector (K6,K7) Disc Sources (K5) Total
U S U S U S U S U S U S
1
2 Gross Capital Formation 8.4% 24.8% 33.2%
3
4 Gross Saving 6.3% 0.0% 25.2% 31.5%
5
6 Surplus/ Deficit -2.1% 1.7% 0.4% 0.0%
7
8
9 Ch Foreign claims, net -0.5% 1.5% -1.6% 22.2% -0.1% 21.7%
10
11 Ch Foreign Assets -0.5% 1.6% -1.6% 25.9% -0.1% 25.3%
12 Ch Foreign Liabilities 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% -0.1% -3.7% 0.0% -3.6%
13
14 Ch Interbank Claims 0.2% 0.0% -0.2% 0.0% 0.0%
15
16 Ch Mon auth credit to DMB 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3%
17 Ch Bank Reserves 0.5% 0.3% -0.2% 0.3% 0.3%
18
19 Ch Central gov debt 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% -4.0% -5.2% -0.8% -4.7%
20
21 Ch Claims on cen gov 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% -4.0% -0.7% -3.1% -0.2%
22 Ch Cen gov deposits -0.6% -0.1% 0.7% -4.5%
23
24 Ch Private credit, net 2.4% 4.2% 0.0% 7.8% 14.4% 14.4% 14.4%
25
26 Ch Claims on nonbank FI 0.0% 0.0%
27 Ch Other private credit 2.4% 4.2% 0.0% 7.8% 0.0% 0.0% 14.4% 14.4% 14.4%
28
29 Ch Money and quasi money 1.5% 4.7% 6.2% 6.2% 6.2%
30
31 Ch Curr and demand deposits 1.5% 0.9% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4%
32 Ch Time, savings dep 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8%
33
34 Misc and discrepancy 0.0% -3.0% 0.3% 2.2% 11.3% -16.8% -3.0% -3.0%
35
36
37 Total 10.8% 6.8% 3.1% 1.2% 2.0% 2.0% 8.5% 6.9% 27.0% 50.9% 0.0%
38
39
40
2003
% of GDP Cen Gov (K1) RoW (K2) Mon Auth (K3) Dep Money 'banks flow' (K4) Private Sector (K6,K7) Disc Sources (K5) Total
U S U S U S U S U S U S
1
2 Gross Capital Formation 9.7% 25.7% 35.4%
3
4 Gross Saving 5.4% 0.0% 25.1% 30.6%
5
6 Surplus/ Deficit -4.3% 4.9% -0.6% 0.0%
7
8
9 Ch Foreign claims, net 2.0% 5.6% -3.4% 19.2% 2.2% 21.1%
10
11 Ch Foreign Assets 1.8% 5.6% -3.3% 22.6% 2.3% 24.4%
12 Ch Foreign Liabilities -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% -3.4% -0.1% -3.3%
13
14 Ch Interbank Claims 2.5% 2.5% -0.2% 2.5% 2.3%
15
16 Ch Mon auth credit to DMB -0.9% -0.8% -0.2% -0.9% -0.9%
17 Ch Bank Reserves 1.6% 1.7% 0.0% 1.7% 1.6%
18
19 Ch Central gov debt -20.1% -0.1% 2.1% -7.9% 12.6% -3.6% -7.5%
20
21 Ch Claims on cen gov 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% -7.9% -2.9% -6.7% -2.9%
22 Ch Cen gov deposits -0.7% 0.1% 0.6% 15.5%
23
24 Ch Private credit, net 2.9% 4.8% 0.0% 10.7% 18.4% 18.4% 18.4%
25
26 Ch Claims on nonbank FI 0.0% 0.0%
27 Ch Other private credit 2.9% 4.8% 0.0% 10.7% 0.0% 0.0% 18.4% 18.4% 18.4%
28
29 Ch Money and quasi money 2.7% 12.6% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3%
30
31 Ch Curr and demand deposits 2.7% 2.5% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2%
32 Ch Time, savings dep 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1%
33
34 Misc and discrepancy 20.1% 2.0% 0.4% 1.9% 11.2% -31.6% 2.0% 2.0%
35
36
37 Total 12.6% -14.6% 9.1% 6.8% 5.5% 5.5% 7.4% 14.6% 33.2% 54.7% 0.0%
38
39
40
2004
% of GDP Cen Gov (K1) RoW (K2) Mon Auth (K3) Dep Money 'banks flow' (K4) Private Sector (K6,K7) Disc Sources (K5) Total
U S U S U S U S U S U S
1
2 Gross Capital Formation 9.2% 26.2% 35.5%
3
4 Gross Saving 8.9% 0.0% 24.5% 33.4%
5
6 Surplus/ Deficit -0.4% 2.1% -1.7% 0.0%
7
8
9 Ch Foreign claims, net 2.0% 2.0% -0.1% 18.1% 2.0% 20.1%
10
11 Ch Foreign Assets 1.7% 1.9% 1.1% 22.3% 3.0% 24.0%
12 Ch Foreign Liabilities -0.3% -0.1% 0.0% 1.1% -4.2% -0.3% -3.1%
13
14 Ch Interbank Claims 0.0% -0.2% -0.4% -0.2% -0.4%
15
16 Ch Mon auth credit to DMB 0.1% 0.3% -0.3% 0.1% 0.0%
17 Ch Bank Reserves 0.1% 0.1% -0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
18
19 Ch Central gov debt 3.5% 0.1% 0.2% -2.3% -7.7% -0.2% -4.1%
20
21 Ch Claims on cen gov 0.8% 0.8% 2.3% -2.3% 0.9% 0.8% 1.7%
22 Ch Cen gov deposits -1.9% 0.7% 1.2% -8.6%
23
24 Ch Private credit, net 2.4% 6.1% 0.0% 17.2% 25.8% 25.8% 25.8%
25
26 Ch Claims on nonbank FI 0.0% 0.0%
27 Ch Other private credit 2.4% 6.1% 0.0% 17.2% 0.0% 0.0% 25.8% 25.8% 25.8%
28
29 Ch Money and quasi money 2.6% 13.8% 16.4% 16.4% 16.4%
30
31 Ch Curr and demand deposits 2.6% 3.1% 5.7% 5.7% 5.7%
32 Ch Time, savings dep 10.7% 10.7% 10.7% 10.7%
33
34 Misc and discrepancy -20.0% -2.0% -0.5% 1.6% 26.9% -10.1% -2.0% -2.0%
35
36
37 Total 11.7% 12.4% 5.9% 4.1% 2.1% 2.1% 6.4% 15.5% 40.3% 77.1% 0.0%
38
39
40
2005
% of GDP Cen Gov (K1) RoW (K2) Mon Auth (K3) Dep Money 'banks flow' (K4) Private Sector (K6,K7) Disc Sources (K5)Total
U S U S U S U S U S U S
1
2 Gross Capital Formation 9.4% 26.1% 35.6%
3
4 Gross Saving 7.3% 0.0% 27.2% 34.5%
5
6 Surplus/ Deficit -2.1% 1.1% 1.1% 0.0%
7
8
9 Ch Foreign claims, net 5.2% 4.2% 1.0% 17.1% 5.2% 22.3%
10
11 Ch Foreign Assets 5.1% 4.0% 1.6% 20.8% 5.5% 26.0%
12 Ch Foreign Liabilities -0.1% -0.2% 0.0% 0.5% -3.7% -0.1% -3.4%
13
14 Ch Interbank Claims 1.7% 0.8% -1.2% 0.8% 0.5%
15
16 Ch Mon auth credit to DMB -0.4% 0.5% -1.2% -0.4% -0.7%
17 Ch Bank Reserves 1.3% 1.3% 0.0% 1.3% 1.3%
18
19 Ch Central gov debt -0.5% -0.4% 3.0% -6.1% -5.4% -0.9% -5.9%
20
21 Ch Claims on cen gov -0.5% -0.5% 1.2% -6.1% -0.3% -5.4% -0.8%
22 Ch Cen gov deposits -0.1% -0.1% 0.2% -5.1%
23
24 Ch Private credit, net 2.4% 7.0% 0.0% 15.8% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2%
25
26 Ch Claims on nonbank FI 0.0% 0.0%
27 Ch Other private credit 2.4% 7.0% 0.0% 15.8% 0.0% 0.0% 25.2% 25.2% 25.2%
28
29 Ch Money and quasi money 2.6% 15.6% 18.2% 18.2% 18.2%
30
31 Ch Curr and demand deposits 2.6% 2.6% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2%
32 Ch Time, savings dep 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0%
33
34 Misc and discrepancy 0.0% -0.7% -0.6% 1.4% 8.9% -10.5% -0.7% -0.7%
35
36
37 Total 11.8% 6.8% 8.8% 6.3% 3.7% 3.7% 5.4% 17.0% 38.3% 61.4% 0.0%
38
39
40
2006
% of GDP Cen Gov (K1) RoW (K2) Mon Auth (K3) Dep Money 'banks flow' (K4) Private Sector (K6,K7) Disc Sources (K5) Total
U S U S U S U S U S U S
1
2 Gross Capital Formation 9.1% 27.7% 36.8%
3
4 Gross Saving 9.2% 0.0% 27.4% 36.5%
5
6 Surplus/ Deficit 0.1% 0.3% -0.4% 0.0%
7
8
9 Ch Foreign claims, net 9.6% 7.3% 1.9% 18.8% 9.2% 28.5%
10
11 Ch Foreign Assets 9.6% 7.3% 2.9% 23.0% 10.2% 32.6%
12 Ch Foreign Liabilities -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% -4.2% -0.1% -3.2%
13
14 Ch Interbank Claims 3.2% 2.4% -1.9% 2.4% 1.4%
15
16 Ch Mon auth credit to DMB -0.3% 0.5% -1.8% -0.3% -1.3%
17 Ch Bank Reserves 2.9% 2.9% -0.1% 2.9% 2.9%
18
19 Ch Central gov debt -6.2% -1.5% 1.1% -2.8% 0.0% -1.8% -6.2%
20
21 Ch Claims on cen gov 0.5% 0.5% 2.8% -2.8% 0.0% 0.5% 0.4%
22 Ch Cen gov deposits -2.3% 2.0% 0.3% 0.0%
23
24 Ch Private credit, net 0.5% 7.6% 0.0% 14.5% 22.6% 22.6% 22.6%
25
26 Ch Claims on nonbank FI 0.0% 0.0%
27 Ch Other private credit 0.5% 7.6% 0.0% 14.5% 0.0% 0.0% 22.6% 22.6% 22.6%
28
29 Ch Money and quasi money 2.8% 16.9% 19.8% 19.8% 19.8%
30
31 Ch Curr and demand deposits 2.8% 2.3% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2%
32 Ch Time, savings dep 14.6% 14.6% 14.6% 14.6%
33
34 Misc and discrepancy 6.6% 2.3% -0.4% 1.2% 11.8% -17.0% 2.3% 2.3%
35
36
37 Total 9.6% 3.0% 11.3% 9.9% 5.8% 5.6% 4.7% 18.1% 44.7% 61.8% 0.0%
38
39
40
2007
% of GDP Cen Gov (K1) RoW (K2) Mon Auth (K3) Dep Money 'banks flow' (K4) Private Sector (K6,K7) Disc Sources (K5) Total
U S U S U S U S U S U S
1
2 Gross Capital Formation 9.8% 33.3% 43.1%
3
4 Gross Saving 7.6% 0.0% 25.7% 33.3%
5
6 Surplus/ Deficit -2.2% 9.8% -7.6% 0.0%
7
8
9 Ch Foreign claims, net 10.7% 14.4% -3.7% 24.3% 10.7% 35.0%
10
11 Ch Foreign Assets 10.6% 14.4% -1.7% 29.8% 12.7% 40.5%
12 Ch Foreign Liabilities 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% -5.6% 0.0% -3.6%
13
14 Ch Interbank Claims 1.4% 2.1% -0.9% 2.1% 0.5%
15
16 Ch Mon auth credit to DMB 0.7% -0.1% -0.8% 0.7% -0.9%
17 Ch Bank Reserves 2.0% 2.0% -0.1% 2.0% 1.9%
18
19 Ch Central gov debt -2.9% -2.0% 1.3% -3.8% -5.9% -3.2% -8.9%
20
21 Ch Claims on cen gov -0.8% -0.8% 1.1% -3.8% -0.3% -3.4% -1.0%
22 Ch Cen gov deposits -2.2% 1.2% 1.0% -5.7%
23
24 Ch Private credit, net -0.3% 21.3% 0.0% 32.7% 53.7% 53.7% 53.7%
25
26 Ch Claims on nonbank FI 0.0% 0.0%
27 Ch Other private credit -0.3% 21.3% 0.0% 32.7% 0.0% 0.0% 53.7% 53.7% 53.7%
28
29 Ch Money and quasi money 5.4% 30.7% 36.1% 36.1% 36.1%
30
31 Ch Curr and demand deposits 5.4% 7.1% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5%
32 Ch Time, savings dep 23.6% 23.6% 23.6% 23.6%
33
34 Misc and discrepancy -3.5% -0.8% -0.2% 1.0% 19.3% -17.4% -0.8% -0.8%
35
36
37 Total 9.5% 4.7% 21.8% 20.5% 12.4% 6.6% 4.0% 31.7% 65.6% 98.7% 0.0%
38
39
40
2008
% of GDP Cen Gov (K1) RoW (K2) Mon Auth (K3) Dep Money 'banks flow' (K4) Private Sector (K6,K7) Disc Sources (K5) Total
U S U S U S U S U S U S
1
2 Gross Capital Formation 9.7% 25.7% 35.4%
3
4 Gross Saving 5.4% 0.0% 25.1% 30.6%
5
6 Surplus/ Deficit -4.3% 4.9% -0.6% 0.0%
7
8
9 Ch Foreign claims, net 2.0% 5.6% -3.4% 19.2% 2.2% 21.1%
10
11 Ch Foreign Assets 1.8% 5.6% -3.3% 22.6% 2.3% 24.4%
12 Ch Foreign Liabilities -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% -3.4% -0.1% -3.3%
13
14 Ch Interbank Claims 2.5% 2.5% -0.2% 2.5% 2.3%
15
16 Ch Mon auth credit to DMB -0.9% -0.8% -0.2% -0.9% -0.9%
17 Ch Bank Reserves 1.6% 1.7% 0.0% 1.7% 1.6%
18
19 Ch Central gov debt -20.1% -0.1% 2.1% -7.9% 12.6% -3.6% -7.5%
20
21 Ch Claims on cen gov 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% -7.9% -2.9% -6.7% -2.9%
22 Ch Cen gov deposits -0.7% 0.1% 0.6% 15.5%
23
24 Ch Private credit, net 2.9% 4.8% 0.0% 10.7% 18.4% 18.4% 18.4%
25
26 Ch Claims on nonbank FI 0.0% 0.0%
27 Ch Other private credit 2.9% 4.8% 0.0% 10.7% 0.0% 0.0% 18.4% 18.4% 18.4%
28
29 Ch Money and quasi money 2.7% 12.6% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3%
30
31 Ch Curr and demand deposits 2.7% 2.5% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2%
32 Ch Time, savings dep 10.1% 10.1% 10.1% 10.1%
33
34 Misc and discrepancy 20.1% 2.0% 0.4% 1.9% 11.2% -31.6% 2.0% 2.0%
35
36
37 Total 12.6% -14.6% 9.1% 6.8% 5.5% 5.5% 7.4% 14.6% 33.2% 54.7% 0.0%
38
39
40
2009
% of GDP Cen Gov (K1) RoW (K2) Mon Auth (K3) Dep Money 'banks flow' (K4) Private Sector (K6,K7) Disc Sources (K5) Total
U S U S U S U S U S U S
1
2 Gross Capital Formation 13.6% 24.5% 38.1%
3
4 Gross Saving 6.9% 0.0% 24.4% 31.3%
5
6 Surplus/ Deficit 0.0% 6.8% -0.1% 6.7%
7
8
9 Ch Foreign claims, net -9.0% -7.5% 0.3% 26.3% -7.1% 17.3%
10
11 Ch Foreign Assets -8.6% -6.6% 2.5% 34.7% -4.1% 26.1%
12 Ch Foreign Liabilities 0.4% 0.9% 0.0% 2.2% -8.3% 0.4% -5.3%
13
14 Ch Interbank Claims -3.1% -5.6% -3.0% -5.6% -6.0%
15
16 Ch Mon auth credit to DMB 2.3% 4.9% -2.9% 2.3% 2.0%
17 Ch Bank Reserves -0.8% -0.7% -0.1% -0.7% -0.9%
18
19 Ch Central gov debt 3.1% 6.0% 0.4% -0.3% -3.1% 6.1% 0.0%
20
21 Ch Claims on cen gov 3.8% 3.8% 2.6% -0.3% 0.0% 6.1% 3.8%
22 Ch Cen gov deposits 0.7% -2.2% -0.1% -3.1%
23
24 Ch Private credit, net 0.0% 7.1% 0.0% 31.9% 39.0% 39.0% 39.0%
25
26 Ch Claims on nonbank FI 0.0% 0.0%
27 Ch Other private credit 0.0% 7.1% 0.0% 31.9% 0.0% 0.0% 39.0% 39.0% 39.0%
28
29 Ch Money and quasi money 3.4% 20.5% 23.9% 23.9% 23.9%
30
31 Ch Curr and demand deposits 3.4% 4.6% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0%
32 Ch Time, savings dep 16.0% 16.0% 16.0% 16.0%
33
34 Misc and discrepancy 0.1% -9.3% -0.3% 0.7% 10.5% -20.3% -9.3% -9.3%
35
36
37 Total 13.6% 10.0% -2.2% -2.2% -1.5% 0.0% 2.8% 21.2% 48.1% 74.0% 0.0%
38
39
40
2010
% of GDP Cen Gov (K1) RoW (K2) Mon Auth (K3) Dep Money 'banks flow' (K4) Private Sector (K6,K7) Disc Sources (K5) Total
U S U S U S U S U S U S
1
2 Gross Capital Formation 13.4% 33.1% 46.4%
3
4 Gross Saving 9.1% 0.0% 32.6% 41.6%
5
6 Surplus/ Deficit 0.0% 4.8% -0.5% 4.3%
7
8
9 Ch Foreign claims, net -1.4% -3.5% -0.3% 14.9% -3.8% 13.5%
10
11 Ch Foreign Assets -1.5% -3.4% 2.7% 26.7% -0.8% 25.3%
12 Ch Foreign Liabilities 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.0% -11.8% 0.0% -8.8%
13
14 Ch Interbank Claims -6.3% -7.2% -3.9% -7.2% -10.2%
15
16 Ch Mon auth credit to DMB 4.6% 5.5% -3.7% 4.6% 1.7%
17 Ch Bank Reserves -1.6% -1.7% -0.1% -1.7% -1.8%
18
19 Ch Central gov debt 3.0% 0.4% 2.3% -2.6% -6.8% 0.0% -3.8%
20
21 Ch Claims on cen gov 0.4% 0.4% 2.6% -2.6% 0.0% 0.3% 0.4%
22 Ch Cen gov deposits -2.6% 0.0% 0.4% -6.8%
23
24 Ch Private credit, net 0.0% 7.5% 0.0% 36.6% 44.1% 44.1% 44.1%
25
26 Ch Claims on nonbank FI 0.0% 0.0%
27 Ch Other private credit 0.0% 7.5% 0.0% 36.6% 0.0% 0.0% 44.1% 44.1% 44.1%
28
29 Ch Money and quasi money 2.7% 31.5% 34.2% 34.2% 34.2%
30
31 Ch Curr and demand deposits 2.7% 0.9% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6%
32 Ch Time, savings dep 30.6% 30.6% 30.6% 30.6%
33
34 Misc and discrepancy -3.3% -4.1% 0.5% 0.7% 2.2% -4.2% -4.1% -4.1%
35
36
37 Total 13.4% 12.1% 3.4% 3.4% -3.1% -3.1% 2.8% 32.2% 64.7% 78.9% 0.0%
38
39
40
2011
% of GDP Cen Gov (K1) RoW (K2) Mon Auth (K3) Dep Money 'banks flow' (K4) Private Sector (K6,K7) Disc Sources (K5) Total
U S U S U S U S U S U S
1
2 Gross Capital Formation 13.0% 36.9% 49.9%
3
4 Gross Saving 10.0% 0.0% 40.2% 50.2%
5
6 Surplus/ Deficit 0.0% -0.3% 3.3% 3.0%
7
8
9 Ch Foreign claims, net 0.8% 2.8% -0.3% 15.2% 2.5% 16.1%
10
11 Ch Foreign Assets 0.8% 2.9% 1.4% 28.8% 4.3% 29.6%
12 Ch Foreign Liabilities 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 1.7% -13.5% 0.0% -11.8%
13
14 Ch Interbank Claims 1.5% 1.6% -3.8% 1.6% -2.3%
15
16 Ch Mon auth credit to DMB 1.5% 1.6% -3.8% 1.5% -2.2%
17 Ch Bank Reserves 3.0% 3.2% 0.0% 3.2% 3.0%
18
19 Ch Central gov debt -1.9% -1.6% 2.8% -3.4% -4.6% -2.3% -6.5%
20
21 Ch Claims on cen gov -1.6% -1.6% 2.6% -3.4% 0.0% -2.5% -1.6%
22 Ch Cen gov deposits 0.3% 0.0% 0.6% -4.6%
23
24 Ch Private credit, net 0.0% 7.3% 0.0% 21.3% 28.7% 28.7% 28.7%
25
26 Ch Claims on nonbank FI 0.0% 0.0%
27 Ch Other private credit 0.0% 7.3% 0.0% 21.3% 0.0% 0.0% 28.7% 28.7% 28.7%
28
29 Ch Money and quasi money 2.0% 15.9% 17.8% 17.8% 17.8%
30
31 Ch Curr and demand deposits 2.0% 1.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7%
32 Ch Time, savings dep 14.2% 14.2% 14.2% 14.2%
33
34 Misc and discrepancy 2.9% -6.8% -2.3% 0.7% -1.2% -6.8% -6.8% -6.8%
35
36
37 Total 13.0% 8.1% 0.5% 0.5% 1.2% 1.2% 2.8% 16.6% 51.3% 67.6% 0.0%
38
39
40
